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
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VOLUME FOUR

1968



Editor : T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

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VOLUME FOUR

1968



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INTRODUCTION

The Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, is happy to present to the reading public the fourth volume of its journal, the Indian Philosophical Annual.

Part One of the present volume gives the proceedings of the All-India seminar on 'Determinism and Moral Freedom' held at the Centre in April, 1968. Part Two presents the proceedings of the first Joint seminar of the three Centres of Advanced Study in Philosophy in the three Universities of Banaras, Visva-Bharati, and Madras which was held at the Madras Centre in September, 1968. The subject of this seminar was 'The Problem of Method in Philosophy'. Part Three contains a special article by a former Visiting Professor to this Centre from Yugoslavia.


The volume has been published by utilizing the grants made by the University Grants Commission for publications by this Centre. We are thankful to the Commission for these grants. We are thankful to the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate of the University of Madras for the facilities they have given us for bringing out this Annual and for their continued support.

Madras
6—3—1970

T. M. P. Mahadevan
Director

PART ONE

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR
ON
DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM**



N. A. Nikam

DETERMINISM AND
MORAL FREEDOM:
A NOTE

We are not discussing the antinomy between causality and freedom but what 'moral freedom' means. The antinomy between causality and freedom conceives freedom as another *kind* of cause. If C is caused by B, and B is caused by A, then, A is caused by something else and so on without end; in this regressive series, there is no cause which is not an effect, and no effect which is not a cause. But freedom is another *kind* of cause; it is the spontaneity to begin a series absolutely; but the spontaneity to begin a series absolutely must itself 'begin'; the notion of 'beginning' involved in this implies the notion of a 'not yet acting cause', i. e. the power to begin a series absolutely cannot itself 'begin' which is a contradiction in terms. In philosophy, the word 'begin' seems to have no exact meaning, and we do not mean by 'beginning' only beginning in time. The antinomy between causality and freedom is unresolved.

The problem of determinism and moral freedom is not a problem of causality and no-causality, but a problem of the distinction between three types of necessity. (a) Firstly, there is the causal necessity; this has specific reference to time, a cause in an invariable and unconditioned antecedent in time such that in its absence the effect does not happen. Causality is a type of determinism in which what occurs "before" determines what occurs "later". This deterministic postulate implies that there is only one type of law in the universe, the causal law. While science is, on the one hand, in quest of novelty, yet, on the other, it admits no novelty as the ideal of causal determinism and seeks to explain all events in terms of what happened "before". (The term 'indeterminism' as used generally appears to mean failure to 'predict' events and not 'freedom'; indeterminism appears to be another nerve for 'contingency'). (b) Secondly there is the logical notion of necessity expressed in the form 'if p, then, q'. G. E. Moore used to say in his metaphysics

class that 'if p, then, q' is ambiguous as it may mean the purely logical notion of entailment or the physical notion of causality. But the notion 'if p, then, q' has no specific reference to time; it is a symbol of the philosophical notion of 'follows from'; and we have to distinguish between the two notions: 'What has caused this', and 'what follows from this'. The symbol 'if p, then, q' may define the logical notion of linear implication or one-sided dependence or the notion of 'intrinsic determination' (McTaggart's term) such that if one thing were different, other things would be different, that is to say, the purely logical notion of 'if p, then, q', makes room for the notion of possibility, i. e. the notion that things could be different provided other things were different. The idea of necessity implied is not 'inevitability' but the idea of 'dependent-organization'. But in both these types of necessities there is no novelty; both types of necessities imply a deterministic universe. (c) But the problem of determinism and moral freedom is the problem of the distinction between necessity and *consciousness of necessity*. Necessity and consciousness of necessity are two distinct things in existence; and, consciousness of necessity is a novelty of existence, at least, as we know it in ourselves. And consciousness of necessity is a fact; it is the nature of moral consciousness. For instance, I say to myself that I ought to have done what, in fact, I have not done, and I ought not to have done what, in fact, I have done. As Kant said, 'ought' implies 'can'. Moral freedom is not freedom to do 'as you like' but only the freedom to do under the consciousness of an 'ought', under the consciousness of an obligation, and there is no obligation unless it is self-inspired.

But even this notion does not bring out the true nature of 'moral freedom'; for the consciousness of necessity, even when self-imposed, is a limitation of the supreme good. There is a consciousness which acts to obtain the good as there is a consciousness which does not act if there is no good to obtain. But there is a consciousness which does not act to obtain a good nor ceases to act because it has no good to obtain, and yet it acts because this is the nature of the good, and this is the nature also of 'moral freedom', i. e. moral freedom is not even consciousness of necessity, *tasya kāryam na vidyate*.

K. Seshadri

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

Moral freedom is freedom to act as a moral agent. It is a correlative of moral responsibility, and has a special relevance to the human situation. It is not merely freedom to refrain from doing what may be recognised as "good" or "bad". It is also freedom to contribute positively to the progress and well-being of man and society. These aspects of freedom have direct significance within the limits of the temporal only. Moral freedom is freedom *in time*. It is spiritual freedom that transcends time. The former is freedom as exercised; the latter is freedom as experienced or enjoyed.

The *baddha* is bound by and acts in time, and therefore exercises moral freedom. Upon the proper exercise of it depends his release from the temporal and his emergence in the eternal. The *mukta* is one, who having been liberated has emerged from the limitations of temporality into the spontaneity and plenitude of the eternal. The freedom of the *mukta* is a fruit of the moral and spiritual endeavour put forth by him as a *baddha*. As one "bound", the *baddha* had freedom within limits, and exercised it as a "condition". As one "released", the *mukta* has and experiences unlimited freedom as a "consequence". Indeed, it is far too inadequate to describe this *state of fruition* as mere freedom, however unlimited or absolute. We may even say that neither freedom nor its negation or absence has any real relevance to that state. That is the state, which the *nitya* or the "eternally free" has *always* enjoyed. The *nityatva* of the soul is re-affirmed in liberation as the experience of its identity with the *nityatva* of God. It is a state, which might better be described as "spontaneous creativity", (rather than mere freedom) in the language of Berdyaev — a state — where the *nitya* and the *mukta* enjoy the utmost parity (*paramaṁ sāmyaṁ*) with the Supreme Being.

Where moral freedom is irrelevant, moral life itself ceases to have any meaning. Not that the *muktas* or the *nityas* are or would be "immoral" in any sense, but that their very life remains untouched by any necessity for the moral or the ethical. Being a state of consummation the essence of the *mukta-nitya* experience is nothing less than citizenship of the Kingdom of God.

Moral freedom arises out of a moral need or necessity, that is the necessity to recognise and adopt an ideal as worthy of realisation through effort and discipline. The need for any ideal would persist, so long as the actual is seen to be defective or deficient. The supreme state of spiritual freedom, into which the *mukta* emerges, is one of fulfilment, in which there would be nothing to be desired, nothing to be sought after. Moral freedom is freedom with a purpose and for a purpose. It is a means to an end. Spiritual freedom is of the very essence of the end.

Moral freedom is not really so much a condition of freedom as of discipline, for it signifies the freedom to subject oneself to discipline, which is preparatory to the emergence in the final freedom of the spirit.

The substance of freedom is in self-determination, whether at the lowest levels or at the highest. The awareness of freedom deepens with the sense of the absence of restraint from without, so that beyond a stage, where there is not even any sense of the "within" and the "without", no awareness of the "self" as different (though, perhaps, distinct) from the "other", the very consciousness of freedom gets dissolved into something fuller and deeper. But this is not yet to be in the "moral" level.

In the higher reaches freedom is experienced as determination by one's own "true" self or by one's "innermost self" or by the "Soul of all souls" or the "Self of all selves". In the illumined state the individual does not see himself as *different* from his true self or inmost self. In a profoundly "religious" state, which may be regarded as the penultimate rather than the final, man is aware of the Supreme as his in-most Self, the *Antaryāmin*, distinct from himself, but united by an indissoluble bond, and to the will of this Supreme Being he joyfully surrenders, in the full awareness that the surrender is to his own inmost Being, and therefore free from all taint of compulsion or control from an alien source. The attitude of the truly "religious" recognises surrender to the Supreme as self-determination. Far from any sense of the loss of freedom one would experience an enrichment of it, along with the deep satisfaction of having exercised freedom in a manner befitting the status of man as a person, a moral being

seeking fulfilment in a spiritual life. It is thus in the "religious" that the "moral" blends with the "spiritual".

Moral freedom as such is on a lower level, in that it manifests itself as the exercise of man's free-will in the conviction that such exercise would secure the good or lead to a desired goal. This, too, is self-determination, because the will that wills its own good is undoubtedly self-determining, and therefore "free."

It is in the realm of the natural and the temporal that determinism has any meaning at all. Nature is determined through and through by its own laws. Events in time are determined in terms of cause and effect, revealing necessity and uniformity and providing for predictability. All contingency is the result of the introduction of the human element and it is most evident in the realm of the temporal and the historical. Man sees the gift of his freedom as a factor that makes for his ascent and emergence in the eternal. In rarer moments he also sees in it the influx of Divine Grace.

Berdyayev in his work on "the meaning of history" offers a doctrine of two kinds of time — "false, disintegrated time and true, integral or divine time, which is eternity". Whether we admit or reject Berdyayev's distinction between the false and the true time, his doctrine is highly suggestive, for it brings out the idea that the Life Divine is not in "disintegrated" time, that it is not in time as we ordinarily know time, with its fragments of past, present and future, but something which would correspond, perhaps, to the "everlastingness" of Whitehead. The freedom of the eternal state is best expressed by the term "*sadā*" in "*sadā paśyanti*" of the Śruti, which besides suggesting that the experience is unbroken and without let or hindrance, fully reveals the eternal as the "eternal present", free from all involvement in time or in the memories of the "past" or the apprehensions of the "future".

The validity of moral determination as a negation of the principle of freedom is actually sustained by man's sense of the Supreme as an *alien* Power or Force, whose plans and purposes are not always in conformity with what he would consider to be his own interests. It is sustained by a compelling sense of the sway of an "incompetent" or unsympathetic Providence or in the alternative by "the niggardly disposition of a step-motherly nature." Thus, strangely enough, both naturalism and theism have tended to undermine the foundations of moral freedom. While the very premises of naturalism have largely been deterministic, most of our theistic and theological

presuppositions have tended to make freedom a mockery. Thus our common notions of human freedom and Divine Providence seem to push man to a parting of the ways, where one has to choose between moral freedom (with its concomitant, religious disbelief) and Divine Dispensation (with its concessional provision of grace). *yam-evaiṣa Vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*, says the *Kaṭhapaniṣad* (II, 23). But "if the soul picks and chooses its own men to whom it exposes its secrets", then "the privacy with the soul" becomes "the privilege of the chosen few", protests man against the "caprice" of grace. Man, thus, is apparently confronted with an opposition, hard to reconcile, between the fundamentals of freedom and determinism. And the opposition would persist so long as he labours under a *sense of compulsion*, whether in the moral or in the spiritual aspect of his life and activity. The sense of compulsion, however, is a consequence of a lack of spiritual perception, a privation, which is made good by the descent of grace and not by any effort of reason. "He alone is capable of making Himself known as He really is." (Brother Lawrence).

It is here that we witness the supreme significance of the concept of surrender, which being primarily religious may well serve to bridge the gulf between the moral and spiritual and reveal the inner meaning of grace in an intimate, personal experience. Surrender to a Being, recognised at once as the Supreme and as the Soul and Self of one's own being, would liberate the individual from all sense of compulsion. Surrender is not so much an *act* or an accomplishment as an enduring *state* of the individual's mind and heart rendered fit to respond to the impact of grace, which in itself is causeless and unconditioned. It is an illumined, divinised state, in which all that is done as deed or uttered as expression or entertained as thought or feeling, would reflect a genuine spirit of joyful dedication. All sense of conflict or compulsion would get totally dissolved, for one is no longer aware of an "alien" or an "other" under the same roof. There is, instead, an awakening to a sense of spontaneous participation in a divinely ordained cosmic plan.

Moral freedom is relevant at the level of volitional activity. Will implies awareness of an end and adoption of means to attain the end. These are impossible without freedom. The moral level is primarily the human level, and the essence of freedom is inherent in the very nature of the human will. Life at the lower levels is altogether determined by biological laws, uninterfered with by any factor of planned volition. But the animal has not awakened, either to the sense of constraint or to the need for freedom. It is at once the predicament of man and his privilege to be aware

of his bondage and to aspire for his freedom. Hence it is that the conflict between constraint and freedom is most manifest in man's life, i.e., in the life of an *individual as a person among persons*. The enduring sense of constraint and the fleeting glimpses of freedom combine to urge him towards an ideal state of eternal freedom. It is not mere constraint that binds man as a person but the sense of conflict between the fact of constraint and the vision of freedom. Such conflict seems to be a necessary factor of moral life. But its solution lies at the religio-spiritual level—in what has been described as the state of surrender, which really is the sublime state of illumination, for in surrender is one reborn and through surrender does one acquire, or emerge into one's own true being (*satta*) transcending and invalidating both determinism and freedom.

I have considered this question briefly at these levels, viz., the physical level or the level of nature, the volitional level or the level of morals and the mystic level or the level of religio-spiritual experience. Determinism dominates the first, though there is room for uncertainty or unpredictability even in nature. Freedom and spontaneity characterise the second, though these are conditioned by a higher law of governance (yet unmanifest), which would comprehend both constraint and spontaneity. Both determinism and freedom find their fulfilment in the final stage of consummation, which is one of peace and plenitude. Human nature is a composite of body and the senses, of will and of the spiritual essence which integrates these into an individual, and inspires and sustains the individual. Hence it seems to be inevitable that man as he is constituted must experience not only constraint and freedom, but the agony of a conflict between these two, so long as his nature remains unilluminated and unresponsive to the highest intimations.

A. S. Narayana Pillai

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

I

Freedom, in this context, is freedom to choose, to prefer one thing to another, one action, one goal, one means or one value to another. It is freedom of choice, freedom of willing. Of course, this can also include freedom to refuse to exercise this freedom, freedom from making the choice. But, this makes no essential difference to the point. We may be said to be agreed on this and we can ask, are we actually free in this sense?

If it is a fact of experience, *immediately* and *easily* known, that should settle it. We should be able to say that, as a matter of fact, we are free in this sense and that we know this. If it is not immediately and easily known we should be able to fix the lines of investigation by which this can be known (as we do in other investigations in our experience). If I say, this flower has five petals, we check this up and make it easily known to the others. If I say, that this flower blooms only in summer, this fact of experience can be shown with a little more elaborateness and with less directness. If I think that I have a bacillus in the forefinger of my right hand, this requires more indirect and more elaborate details of experience to settle the point. In all these cases, our experience can settle these points — only it involves various degrees of complexity. Can our experience of freedom be settled like this?

In many cases we seem to be able to do this. I can drop this pencil or not drop it. I can choose to break it or not break it. If not with the same ease, at least with a great amount of theoretical probability, I can choose to insult you or not insult you. With these facts in mind we convince ourselves that our experience tells us that we are free.

It is true that we are making free choices or what *appears to be free choices*. As Hamlet would say, Ah, there's the rub! How are we sure that they are *really* free choices? We may be deceived into thinking and feeling that they are free choices. They may not really be. Our feeling that they are free choices need not make them so. There may be determinate causes that operate to bring about the choice: only we may not know them. Our not knowing these causes cannot prove that there are no causes. Also the *impossibility* of knowing the causes by the very nature of the case, cannot prove that there are no causes, that choices are uncaused.

Our feeling is no guide. We are subject to various illusions, make many mistakes in our common life. That these mistakes are consistently made, over a period of years, that we have no inkling that we are making these mistakes do not take away the fact that they are mistakes.

II

Hence the attempts to show that whether freedom is known and felt as a fact or not, freedom *ought* to be a fact. Unless we have a suspicion that this *felt* fact may not prove anything, why do we rush to logic and take pains to prove that freedom of the will *should be taken as a fact*? The argument is, that without freedom of the will, ethics, law, criminology, jurisprudence, legislation, all social living, will lose their meaning. May be. But, there is no sound argument in this for philosophical purposes. To show that freedom is a fact, you show that if it is not a fact, various social, economic and political consequences (which are not desirable) will follow. We should show the logical contradictions in a philosophical position: social and political consequences, however undesirable, can hardly prove a point in logic or philosophy.

Are we trying to find out what is the truth or are we trying to pressurise people into accepting any thing as a fact by pointing out the bleakness of the prospect that faces them if this is not accepted? Are we playing the philosophical game or some other game?

III

Let us mention another point. If freedom is freedom of the will, freedom of choice, should this freedom of choice be only in moral situations? All Choice need not involve a moral situation, or moral value or the opposite. There can be choice of an *amoral* thing or goal. I can choose to have my dinner at 7-30 or 8-30

p. m. tonight. I can choose to take my coffee from a cup or a glass tumbler. Moral choice is a sub-class of choice. Freedom relates to this choice. So, moral freedom is a sub-class of freedom of the will.

Again, the antinomy is pictured as between determinism and freedom. Determinism is identified with *causal uniformity*. Freedom then gets identified with in-determinism, chance, freakishness, sudden emergence etc., that is, no rational connection. If to argue for freedom of will is to argue for this, it is not worth arguing. So, we get over it by saying that even freedom has the elements of determinism in it, like stability, sequence, understandable order etc., and yet it is different. This is the reconciliation that is made.

Even when the human will is free there is causation. It is not uncaused. It is not capricious. The cause is a motive : free action is not unmotivated action. The cause is in the self, itself. So there is sequence, order, uniformity, predictability of a kind etc. Freedom is self-determination. If freedom is also determination, then, where is the difference? The difference is, *what* determines. It is not absence of determination : that will be irrational anarchy. It is determination by the self—not by the natural forces, nor by the other agents (co-action). Freedom is immunity from necessity in the sense that it is immunity from *external* necessity. Self-determination means this—it is a kind of *internal* necessity.

This leads to the question of *external* and *internal*. We freely use the words, *within* and *without*. When some one points out that these are all *spatial* categories and involve identification of will, consciousness etc., with the inside of the body and that the whole thing is rather childish, we say that it is only a manner of speaking, a convenient phrase and so on. Quotations can be given regarding consciousness being located in and therefore identified with the separate, individual body. The consequent philosophical fallacies are many. Our centres of consciousness, individual wills, personal character, are all tied up with this philosophical mixing up of standpoints. We have to realise that whatever be the convenience, words like will, self, character, consciousness are totally inapplicable to categories like particular centre, within, without, internal, and external. It is an interesting study in itself to see how many philosophical problems get confused by these category confusions, and what is more, how many pseudo-philosophical problems arise as a result of this.

What is *within* and *without* with reference to the causes of willing? A person standing by my side, the table, the pen, the breeze

that touches my skin, the light and the sound are external. My willing, if affected by these, is not free willing. The pain in my stomach, the gladness of my heart are internal : the stomach and the heart are inside me. Or, shall we say, all physical causes (either outside or inside my body) are external and psychological causes (either inside or outside my body) are internal? This, it is clear, leads to endless complications.

I do not pursue this line here but would like to point out that the words, alien, another, bring out the position better. What is *in keeping with* the self will be self-determination. What is not in keeping with, not in consonance with, the self is not self-determined. Freedom, then, is the fact of absence of restraint from *alien* causes. But, this has only brought us back to the point (I do not say that there is no gain in reaching it) that the self is free when the self acts in accordance with the self. This is a platitude which does not take us far: in fact, does not take us anywhere when we raise the question, what is the self that we are speaking of—the person, the centre of consciousness, the bearer of the five *koṣas*, the bearer of the three *śāris*, the *jīva*?

IV

The status of the finite individual has to be settled before a meaningful answer can be given to the question, what is freedom? Is freedom a fact? After all, we must know who is free and if freedom is not a fact, who is not free? Of course, all philosophical questions are tied up with each other. Even so, the question of the status of the finite individual—the person—is important to the question of freedom—moral freedom or just freedom of will. Otherwise we will have a great deal of philosophical beating about the bush.

We do not escape this question by saying that the self for the purpose of a moral situation may be identified with character. Willing caused by one's own character will be self-determination and so free. But the question now becomes, are we responsible for our character? Do we make our character? And, who are the 'we'?

In conclusion, I shall touch on one other aspect of the problem. We bring about reconciliation between freedom and necessity by quoting the Hegelian dictum, that freedom is only the knowledge of necessity. Awareness of constraint is freedom. This may mean two things. Awareness of constraint makes the will take such steps as will bring about the desired end by making use of the constraints.

Knowledge is power. Knowledge of limitations enables the will to get over the limitations to some extent. Knowing the force and direction of the current the swimmer may not swim against the current but use these to reach the place he wants to reach—or very near it. Awareness of constraint gives the sense of direction to overcome the effects of the constraint, to win some form of freedom. Freedom, in essence is there: only in each case it has to be won by effort. This effort can be made, has to be made. But, without the knowledge necessary, it may not be won and then there is no freedom.

The second meaning is that constraint is there and cannot be got over. But, awareness of this, knowledge of this itself may be a kind of freedom. It may be a kind of reconciliation to it and in that reconciliation, a kind of going beyond it, getting over the limitations, may be sought.

If awareness of necessity is freedom, it is worth asking whether it is any boon at all?

C. T. K. Chari

CHOICE, PROBABILITY AND MORAL FREEDOM

The classical issues about moral freedom were centred round a *Gesinnungsethik* such as that of Kant with a postulate of freedom pitted against a cause-effect ethics or *Erfolgsethik*. For Kant, reverence for the moral law, *Achtung*, is possible only on the presupposition of freedom. I *can*, because I *ought*. Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral imperative; and the moral imperative is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. A careful study of Kant discloses that he regarded the postulate of freedom as the least dispensable. It is a kind of knowledge of fact, *scibile*. "Freedom is the only one of all the Ideas of Pure Reason whose object is a thing of fact (*Thatsache*). Nicolai Hartmann remarks that Kant's view of man as *Homo noumenon* is of much less significance than his insistence on a power in the moral ought "which strikes into the nexus of causal trends". Perhaps the classical moral problem, under the impact of modern positivistic and linguistic trends, has receded somewhat in textbooks of ethics. Bourke, Nelson and Paul Edwards have not much to say about it.

Older discussions distinguished the liberty of indifference, the *libertas arbitrii*, *liberum arbitrium*, from the higher *libertas non errandi*, the non-erring freedom of value, teleology, ideals. An undetermined act of choice was made disreputable by Hegel as well as by the Oxford Anglo-Hegelians. For Hegel, nature is un-freedom, *Aussersichsein* of the Idea and *Unfreiheit*. The three stages of Art have moral overtones: *unbestimmt*, *bestimmt* and *geistig*. Human history is the history of freedom. The perfect state is that form of totality or reality in which the individual enjoys his true freedom. Freedom for the individual is not the abstract and uneducated freedom of choice but the realization of his real will, the willing of what is

rational, what *Geist* would desire; for *Alles Wirkliche ist Vernunftig*. T. H. Green argued that an act of choice is not undetermined in the sense of being "unmotivated"; that would be sheer chance. On the one hand, Green insists that while character has a historical growth and creates external circumstances, these internal and external factors are not sufficient of themselves to determine a man's future action. On the other hand, Green holds that the relation of character to act is not caprice. Thinkers as widely different as F. H. Bradley and S. Alexander rejected the *liberum arbitrium*. We cannot be accountable morally, because we are unaccountable creatures. *Libertas arbitrii*, says Bradley, is little more than *contingentia arbitrii*. Alexander, in his *Space, Time and Deity*, says that, in a lower sense frustrating the Laplacian super-calculator, the bad and the good man are both free. But this is insufficient. Rejecting various criteria of freedom, for instance Spinoza's "ignorance of determining causes", Alexander suggests that freedom is "enjoyment in determination". The good man is more determined than the bad man in the higher sense.

The superficial predictability of the connection between character and choice or action is no disproof of a deeper creative venture, an urge to novelty in Bergson's sense, a Tychism in James's sense, as against an ontological necessitarianism upholding a considerable degree of causal and/or logical connectivity in the world. Erdmann posed the extremes by saying that "The doctrine of determinism is a will which *wills* nothing;... the doctrine of indeterminism is a will which *wills nothing*." Hopkins, in his *Ethics of India*, represents the doctrine of *karma* as a just balance between caprice and cast-iron determinism. Is *liberum arbitrium* a necessary, though not perhaps a sufficient, condition of moral freedom? I maintain that it is. The problem may be envisaged in the context of statistical inference and probability theory. Most empirical disciplines dealing with man have not risen above this level.

Is statistical determinism after all a version of James's "soft determinism"? G. H. Von Wright, in his *A Treatise on Induction and Probability*, distinguished induction of two orders, the first granting the repetition of certain specified conditions, the second introducing a conditional "if-then" about the repetition of conditions. The difference between invariable causal connection and statistical uniformity, Von Wright conceded, is not one of simple contrast. A translation of statistical inference into a recognition of implication-property or equivalence-property is possible. In the sequence of relative frequencies, p_n , of A 's among the n first H 's, there exist either points of convergence towards a given value p associated

with particular values of a quantity δ which is greater than 0; or, there are points of divergence from a particular value of a quantity q . While urging that a special study of inductive inference leading to statistical laws should be made, Von Wright held that statistical laws *could* be regarded as a sub-species of an inductive inference of the second order.

Von Wright's phrasing of the issues raises the whole thorny and still largely unsolved problem of probability in the scientific context. The field is still plagued by rival hypotheses. Sir Karl Popper, as is well known, modified the frequency theory of Von Mises by re-defining place selection. The probability of alpha being Beta may be viewed as a point of accumulation of Beta things on Alpha things represented by their relative frequencies. The fraction is insensitive to certain kinds of place selection, if there is only one such fraction. When there is only one point of accumulation, there is also a limit. Along these lines, a limited proof of the consistency of the two postulates of "absence of a gambling system" and of "limiting frequencies" can be sought. In his later writings, Popper defined probabilities as objective dispositions or "propensities". A shift of emphasis to the set-theoretical approach of Kolmogorov was announced. In correspondence with me, Sir Karl Popper told me that he was still working out the implications.

It seems necessary to point out that objective probabilities or "propensities", if they exist, would be pertinent to the issues about moral freedom versus determinism. Do they exist? Waiving the larger question, I remark that the set-theoretical approach has proved inadequate to the latest theoretical surveys of the foundations of quantum mechanics. An ordinary probability is a normally additive set-function. The subsets may be Boolean lattices. Mackey showed in the *American Mathematical Monthly* that the micro-systems of quantum mechanics do not readily provide Boolean lattices. Jauch and Piron, in *Helvetica Physica Acta* (1963) explored Von Neumann suggestion of a non-atomic lattice in a generalized geometry. Whereas classical systems are characterized by distributive laws, e.g. in the form, $a \cap (b \cup c) = (a \cap b) \cup (a \cap c)$, Jauch and Piron find that the distributive laws fail for generalized quantum mechanics. V. S. Varadarajan, has followed up his paper in *Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics* (1962) by his extensive *Geometry of Quantum Theory* published recently by the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta (1965). He shows that the lattice of closed linear manifolds of a separable Banach space admits an orthocomplementation if and only if the Banach space is isomorphic to a Hilbert space in such a fashion that the given orthocomplementation goes over to the usual one.

De Finetti and L. J. Savage put forward subjective theories of probability, the version of the latter incorporating the main results of Von Neumann's theory of games and Wald's theory of decisions. C. A. B. Smith presenting the newer ideas in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, 1965, said: "The idea of personal probability put forward by De Finetti and Savage has challenged all accepted statistical techniques." Smith has sketched a broader theory in which probabilities are defined only in certain ranges, in accordance with human imprecision. The experiments conducted by Cohen, Hansel and Cooper, for instance, in allowing individuals to choose either a single packet of sweets, or a one in five chance of winning five sweets or a one in twenty-five chance of winning 25 sweets, disclosed that subjective probabilities, departing sharply from well-defined objective probabilities in a given situation, influence human choice and behaviour.

Choice between alternatives can be topologized by introducing relations like "a is preferred to b", "a is not preferred to b", "There is indifference". By making suitable assumptions, we could talk about the separability and closure of the resulting topological spaces. The recent research on subjective probability indicates that neither a person's *verbal* description of choices not even his *actual* choices can be formulated in a sufficiently reliable and consistent fashion. I suggest that the result is not without a bearing on the larger problem of moral behaviour.

Existentialists have talked with a prophetic fire, if also with oracular obscurity, about freedom. Man, we hear, is not any determined set of dispositions, tendencies, habits, impulses. He is being-ahead-of-itself, *sich vorweg Sein*, the possibility of being, *Moglichesein*, or even a being with an ultimate commitment, *Forderung* or *Freiheit zum Tode*, freedom-towards-death. Engagement is perhaps no esoteric invention of Sartre. Racine's heroine, Phedre, caught in a moral crisis between contraries, finds her total consciousness and her total destiny "engaged": *elle est engagée*. This is Racine's double *Contrapposto*. Any attempt to define freedom, says Sartre, is a concession to determinism. Freedom is not a quality or mode of consciousness. It is *le pour-soi* itself interwoven with its *néant*. *Le néant est néantisé*; the nothing naughts itself; by no means the counterpart of Heidegger's *das Niche ist nichtet*, since for Heidegger the engagement is an engagement by being itself for the sake of being. We are entrusted with the "care" (*Sorge*) of being.

Without questioning the literary or metaphysical pretensions of the existentialists, I would say that it is well to seek some sub-

jective indices of moral freedom of the kind singled out by N. Hartmann in the third and last volume of his monumental series, *Ethics*. The Dutch personalistic existentialist, Kohnstamm, finds that, shorn of its sombre shades, existentialism demands uniqueness, *ein malige*. Freedom is "creative insecurity", says Peter Bertocci of Boston. The tragic implications of freedom were grasped by Hebbel who set out from Hegelian premises. Tragedy is life in conflict with itself, *Leben in seiner Gebrochenheit*. Hebbel's Maria Magdalene says: "*Ich verstehe die Welt nicht mehr.*" Sidgwick, in his *Methods of Ethics*, doubted whether remorse and self-blame could be accommodated by a convinced determinist. Hartmann refers to several indices. There is the phenomenon of moral responsibility and accountability, also the consciousness of guilt. The existentialistic *Schuld* ("debt") signifies both guilt and responsibility. There are feelings of moral worthiness and unworthiness, of living through great moral experiences, experiences of love, trust and friendship.

Moral freedom, like all metaphysical contentions, cannot be proved or disproved in some simple, unambiguous fashion, Hartmann says. The sceptic will argue that a little psycho-analysis will debunk most alleged moral sentiments. But, as a "Jury Trial of Psycho-analysis" in the *American Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (1940-1941) showed, Freudian determinism is only statistical with all the pitfalls of statistics and probability. We must set against much presumed psychological determinism the experiments of Ach, Michotte, Katzaroff and Aveling, suggesting subtle distinctions between "will acts" and "determining tendencies", between "cold choices" and "lively choices". "Cold choices", in which the element of effort was least apparent, were more voluntary. The breathing, circulation, and electrical records showed that "lively choices" were accompanied by considerable physiological disturbances. The consciousness of freedom may well be elusive.

D. M. Mackay points out, in *Readings in Psychology* (1964), that information about the future cannot be injected into an informational system without altering it and falsifying the prediction. Suppose that Mr. Brown asks for porridge whenever he finds Mrs. Brown cooking prunes, and for prunes whenever he finds her cooking porridge, then, as Mackay remarks, Mrs. Brown is precluded from making predictions by the fact that she is herself part of the system. One cannot hold that X *must* be the outcome of the decision and still hold that one has to decide whether it must be X or Y.

Much has been said and written about the cerebral concomitants of choice and consciousness. Stimulation of the motor and pre-motor cortex does not necessarily produce the awareness of voluntary effort. Penfield's "centrencephalon" is the reticular-hypothalamic-cortical system postulated as the condition for the integrity of consciousness. So sober a student as O. L. Zangwill remarks that the results have been elicited from abnormal subjects and under artificial conditions. No comparable evidence for "memory patterns" in the normal and healthy encephalon is available. Sir John Eccles, in his essay contributed to a volume honouring Karl popper, has underlined the still existing gap in our knowledge. Moral choice and freedom are not to be whittled away by the scalpels of a misguided logic.

T. G. Kalghatgi

DETERMINISM AND KARMA THEORY

I. The problem of determinism and freedom has been a perennial philosophical issue discussed for centuries. No satisfactory solution has so far been found. And the issue seems to be coming up in the fore-front of intellectual concern, because (1) the advancement of social sciences, including psychiatry, have tended towards the belief in determinism. The crimes of Hitler and others are considered as caused by complexes and obsessional drives (2) On the other hand in the field of physical sciences the postulate of universal determinism seems to have been surrendered for understanding the sub-atomic behaviour. The theory of *karma* explaining the inequality of human life and behaviour as fruits of *karma* has been interpreted as determinism and fatalism. It is, therefore, necessary to study the problems of determinism and human freedom and to justify the ways of God to man and of man to man.

II. Determinism is a general philosophical theory which asserts that all events are caused. Everything that happens is determined by preceding conditions. There have been many versions of deterministic theories. But we may restrict our discussion to physical, psychological and ethical determinism.

(a) The development of physical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inspired the philosophers to deterministic theories. All events are determined by preceding conditions. Neither moral consideration nor the will of God determines human actions, but like other events they are determined by eternal and immutable laws of Nature. The early Greek atomists reduced every event, including human behaviour, thoughts and desires to motions and combinations of atoms, as even the soul of man is composed of atoms. The Epicureans modified the theory by asserting that atoms

have the power of occasional, spontaneous swerve with a view to accommodating the freedom of human action to some extent. Hobbes denied the existence of God as a spiritual substance and said, that sensations, ideas and other psychic processes are motions and modifications of the brain. Yet, he insisted that his physical determinism is consistent with human liberty, as liberty is absence of all impediments to action. All human actions are caused by the alternate operation of the forces of desire and aversion and an act of will is the last appetite. Later philosophers rejected Hobbes's materialism, but accepted his conception of liberty. Schopenhauer thought it nonsense to ask whether the acts of will are free, as freedom is absence of impediments and constraints. In recent years A. J. Ayer, Meritz Sehliek and many others have said that freedom is not opposed to causation but to constraint.

(b) With the advancement of psychology in specialised directions like Psycho-analysis and Psychiatry, the determinists have gained added strength. All events including voluntary acts are caused. Psychiatrists speak of specific unconscious fears, defences and hostilities. The Psycho-analyst traces all human actions, including the willed ones, to the repressions and sex drive. They trace the origin in the dung heap of the unconscious. And consequently man is not free and is not morally responsible. A klepto-maniac, for instance, is not free to avoid his acts. And all significant behaviour is of the same order as that of a klepto-maniac. Therefore the issue of freedom is not philosophical but an empirical fact. This is hard determinism.

(c) The socratic dictum that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance has been the foundation of moral determinism. Seeking the good is determined by the knowledge of the good. If one knows the good one seeks it. If one seeks something else it can be because he is pursuing the apparent, and he does not really know what is good. Plato thought similar reasonings apply to any choice whatever. This ethical intellectualism so central to Platonism is deterministic by implication. Descartes believed that no man who knows his true end could reject it in favour of something else, and men's freedom consists precisely in knowing what is good and seeking it. Leibniz thought that God could not possibly be guided by anything except the true, which he must surely know. But Aristotle rejected the ethical determinism because one may desire something bad while knowing it is bad. John Locke took the same position. Some of the contemporary thinkers are inclined to the same view.

But the indeterminists, on the other hand, claim to refute determinism on the grounds of experience and achievement of physical sciences. They represent their arguments from three points of view :

(1) the stubbornness of the feeling of freedom is not to be tested on the grounds of reason. As Henry Sidgwick said, we choose one of the alternative actions on our own. It is the intuitive assurance of our belief.

(2) Some contend that modern science has gone the way of indeterminism. If we follow Heisenberg and Eddington, it has. But if we follow Russell, Planck and Einstein it has not. The Eddingtonians have emphasised the unpredictability of behaviour of electrons, 'the freewill among the electrons'.

(3) The indeterminists argue that the determinist makes a mess of morality. Praise and blame become meaningless, punishment impossible and duty a deceit. Man becomes only a machine, a big foolish clock which seems to itself to be acting freely. Man appears to be a gigantic machine toy, a sort of Frankenstein monster.

However, the determinists have constantly felt uncomfortable in the face of the problem of reconciling the determinism and moral freedom. The consistent determinists do not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation and the like. William James called them 'hard determinists'. Robert Owen, Schopenhauer and Freud were hard determinists. But some determinists do not find any contradiction between determinism and that human beings are free agents. Neo-Hegelians, Hobbes, Hume and Mill, hold this view. Freedom consists in the choice of actions which are free from constraint. Such actions are not uncaused, as every action is not uncaused. But the difference lies in the kind of causes that are present. On such occasions human beings act in a certain way because of their rational desires, because of their own unimpeded efforts, because they have chosen to act in these ways. Thus, Determinism is compatible with freedom in this sense, and hence, compatible with moral responsibility.

The problem of Determinism and Freewill has been shelved in the museum of philosophy in recent times by the linguistic approach to the problems of analysis of peripheral issues. Wittgenstein's criticism that philosophers do not know what it means to call something action has created problems in this field. Philosophers have been unable to analyse the distinction that some bodily actions are considered actions and others are not. As long as

ignorance prevails, it is contended, that there is little point in discussion whether men's actions are free. Gilbert Ryle, in his *The Concept of Mind* has maintained that volitions are fabrications of philosophy, corresponding to nothing that has existed. The concept of desire motive and choice have been similarly subjected to criticism. This is the philosophical sea-saw of Determinism and Freedom.

III. We shall now consider the nature of *karma* theory. Man's status and actions are unequal. Attempts have been made to find a solution to this problem of inequality in the doctrine of *karma*. The doctrine of *karma* is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It is the logical prius of all Indian thought. As man sows, so does he reap. These effects cannot be destroyed. They have to be experienced and exhausted. If we cannot exhaust the effects of our actions in this life, we have to complete the cycle of births and deaths to experience the fruits of all our actions. The concept of *karma* must have existed at least a thousand years before the beginning of the Christian era and has since become the basis of religious thought.¹ The Indian view of *karma* is doubtless of non-Aryan provenance, and it was a kind of a natural law.² In the *Sannyāsa Upaniṣad* we are told that *jivas* are bound by *karma*. A man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad deeds. Operation of *karma* can be considered as a principle of moral life, as a force limiting and particularising personality. The *karma* theory has been set forth in a variety of ways, from the most extreme realism which regards *karma* as a complexity of material particles infecting the soul, to the most extreme idealism where it is a species of newly produced invisible force. The *karma* binds the soul and the soul gets involved in the wheel of *saṃsāra*. This involvement is beginningless. But it has an end. The soul has the inherent capacity for self-realization. But it is obscured by the veil of *karma*. Once the veil is removed, the soul attains the state of self-realization, and ultimately *mokṣa*.

It has been contended that the *karma* theory is inconsistent with individual freedom of the will. "It does not guarantee true freedom to the individual which is essential to his moral progress." *Karma* works as the inexorable law of causation, in its essentially mechanical way. The theory in its entirety cannot escape the charge of determinism.

But determinism is here interpreted in a narrow sense as a mechanical operation of *karma* to produce its effects, as does law of gravitation. The present conditions and the nature of the individual are determined by the past *karma*. Yet the individual is

free to act in such a way as to mould his own future by reducing and destroying the existing *karma*. The present is determined, but the future is only conditional. In general, the principle of *karma* reckons with the material in the context in which the individual is born.⁴ "But spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his own nature." There is room for the lowliest of men to rise higher and purify their selves. *Karma* is compared to a fire which we can, by our efforts, fan into a flame or ally. Human effort can modify *karma*. According to the Jaina theory of *karma* human effort alone can save the soul. There is no place for the grace of God. A thief, for instance, undermines his own character and being every time he commits a theft. No amount of prayer and worship will erase the effect that has been accumulated, although it may create a mental atmosphere for eliminating such future possibilities.

(2) It has been objected that the *karma* theory connects action and its consequences in a rather mechanical way. The dominant impression that one gets of the *karma* doctrine is that the individual is in the grip of power, which heedless of his own wishes, is working out the burden of an immemorial past.⁵ Pringle-Pattison shows that the whole emphasis of the *karma* theory is on retribution. There is nothing redemptive in its operation, and 'the process becomes an endless one, leading to no goal of ultimate release'. The clockwork of requital, in running down always winds itself up again, and in perpetuity.⁶ And to conceive this universe as primarily a place for doling out punishment is to degrade it to the level of a glorious police court. In this there is no human freedom, nor is the choice possible for man. And men are to gods, like flies to wanton boys. The Universe is all a chequer-board of nights and days

Where destiny with men as pieces plays.

Hither and thither moves, and mates, and slays;

And one by one in the closet lays.

But the *karma* theory is not mere retribution, nor a mere negation of individual freedom. On the contrary, there is emphasis on individual effort. We are free to rise or to fall. The past actions have shaped our personality. The present is with us and the future is in our hands. It is not deterministic. It could be apter to say that the *karma* theory awakens a man to his responsibilities to himself and to others. Man's efforts are to be directed to the attainment of the highest end. The universe is, in the words of Keats, 'a vale of soul making'. And judged by the historic

standards, the *karma* theory did much raise man's status and to wean him from coaxing gods through sacrifice and prayer. It insisted on individual expiation, and emphasised the moral continuity of life here and here-after.

IV. The question, now, is whether *karma* theory implies determinism. We have seen that determinism emphasises that events are caused. An event is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter has occurred the former would not have occurred. The principle of causality operates in life. This has been accepted by the *karma* theory also. Our actions are determined by the *karma* that accumulates due to the previous actions. The after-effects of action in the form of *karma* have to be experienced and exhausted. In this sense, it is deterministic.

But the choice of action is with us. In this connection we may mention the distinction drawn by some regarding the levels of judgement of action. On unreflective level a person's action is distinguished on the basis of the fact whether it is due to impact of emotions or imbalance of mind or that it has been acted in accordance of unimpeded rational desire. Yet considered from the plane of reflection, each rational desire is rooted and determined by the total character and personality of man; and the total character is formed by the total life and the environmental factors. A thief, for instance, if reared in a spiritual environment would perhaps have been a different person. In this, all the past connecting him works up to make him what he is. *Karma* operates in shaping the personality of man. A man becomes good by good deeds and while we live thus, we fetter ourselves with the effects of our deeds. In the *Mahābhārata*, the emphasis is on the force of *karma*. Three forms of *karma*—*prārabdha*, *sañcita*, and *āgāmi* have been mentioned. The Jainas have distinguished eight forms of *karma*. Even the span of life and the family and social status of an individual are determined by the force of *karma*.

However, the individual can transfer the force of *karma* and channel its energies in the direction desired by him. The aim is deliverance and perfection. In the normal course of things it has no end. But the deliverance of the soul from the wheel of *saṁsāra* is possible by removing *karma* by voluntary means. When the *karma* is removed the soul attains its nature of pure perfect state. In this sense, the individual is free to be free and perfect. The individual's ability to be free is not impaired by the fact that his being is determined by *karma*. And moral choice, like thought and act, moves on different causal levels. It achieves freedom just as they

do; only when it is determined by its own appropriate necessity. We are determined by the past and we can determine the future. For the bondage we have so far suffered and for the kindly light of awareness of the power of self-realization, we can say to God, with Omer Khayyam, 'forgiveness give and take'.

1. Glassenapp Von (H): *The Doctrine of karma in Jaina philosophy*: Preface to the German Edition. (1942).

2. Ninian Smart: *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*. (Allen and Unwin) 1964. p. 163.

3. Paul (C. S.): *The Suffering God* (1932) p. 60.

4. Radhakrishnan (S): *Hindu View of Life*. 75.

5. Sigfrid Estborn: *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation* (1958) p. 68.

6. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of Immortality* (1922) p. 115.

Victor L. Nuovo

FREEDOM AND
DETERMINISM
(A METAPHYSICAL
REFLECTION)

I propose to alter the topic slightly and to consider the nature of human freedom generally over against determinism. In this way, I believe, the problem of this seminar can be given adequate treatment.

To speak of freedom and determinism, or, more accurately, of "being free" and "being determined" is to raise a question, for at first glance, the terms seem to be contradictory. This is certainly the case when we speak of moral freedom and determinism, for "determinism" is a doctrine which teaches that man's acts and powers, his desires and aspirations are determined by factors beyond his control, that in his inner striving he is at best impotent, but more than likely deluded. The defenders of moral freedom, on the other hand, would insist that man is at least free enough to be responsible for his actions and his aspirations. So the question arises whether man is free or determined.

Although the question is real, the contradiction need not be. It is conceivable that man is both free and determined, especially when one adopts the viewpoint that the ultimate arbiter of human existence and destiny is a power or being who so transcends the human situation that in governing man's affairs he provides for and guarantees his freedom. We are all aware of the dialectic of freedom and determinism in certain theistic systems according to which the will of an omnipotent being does not contradict the freedom of the individual soul. A similar viewpoint is found in pantheistic systems, like that of the Ancient Stoa, according to which there is no contradiction in the doctrine of free man in a determined universe, when the determining power is not irrational chance but rational nature. But visions of the universe as a stage on which God directs the course of history, or as a system of

harmonious and necessary laws whose purpose is the fulfillment of the highest good are problematic to say the least.

They are, at any rate, in the West. There, the problem is not whether these theories are true or whether they are false. In fact, they are regarded from the very start as improper topics for disciplined philosophical discourse. The question that remains is not whether they are true, but how they are to be interpreted. It is a question of hermeneutics. Now if I understand the hermeneutical literature of the past few decades, the procedure generally followed is to interpret these traditional viewpoints of myth, theology, and metaphysical vision in existentialist categories. From this point of view, divine transcendence becomes a function, or at the most a correlate of human existence. If we accept this judgment, and I propose to do so, then we cannot begin by postulating a transcendental guarantee for human freedom. The method I shall follow, therefore, will be to give an exposition of human experience *vis-a-vis* the problem of determinism and freedom. I shall attempt to show, however, that the course of such reflections does, or perhaps can, lead to a vision transcending historical existence, though arising within it.

When we confront the problem of freedom vs. determinism in terms of human experience it appears, first of all, that man, the historical self, is both free and determined. Or, to put it in another way, man is free to a limited extent. His acts and aspirations are determined, but not completely so as to deny him any self-initiating power or to release him from his sense of responsibility. Man has the power to choose and to act for the realization of a variety of limited objectives. He is a political animal, which is to say, he is always able, if he is willing, to practise the art of the possible, though what is possible may often disagree with what seems most desirable to him, and though the outcome of his efforts at the political game of life may belie his best laid plans. However, even when he fails, man has the power to see beyond failure, to redefine his objectives, or to discover new ones, which could only appear to him in his new, and formerly unwanted circumstances. This power is human freedom. By freedom I mean the power to transcend circumstance and thereby to act in a way that is not predictable from a systematic scrutiny of circumstance (social, political, behavioral, etc.) but in a way which is nevertheless meaningful. To say that it is unpredictable signifies that man has a depth of existence which escapes empirical scrutiny. His inwardness is always inaccessible, perhaps because it is a power yet to be defined. By this power he can

modify circumstance and reshape it. Such is his power, a subtle alteration of his self-conscious attitude can effect a transformation. But his acts and aspirations are realized in human history and are therefore meaningful. That is to say, they are human. Being human, they can be retold and understood, for although in human affairs we cannot look ahead and predict in a physical sense, we can look back and understand.

Thus man is never entirely a function of his situation. To be sure, he views all from a limited viewpoint, but he is never entirely unaware of this limitation. And he is at least able to imagine other standpoints and other views. Even in a moment of passion he is not fully bound, for consciousness is temporal, and the memory lies deep within. So the passionate moment may be the expression of a half-forgotten hope. What I am suggesting is that man is complex, and that this complexity may be the basis of his freedom. Even the limitations of character are not absolute, for character is not something static, but dynamic. And the struggles of the self with itself, even when the outcome is tragic, is evidence that man has the power to transcend the limitations of his situation.

The exercise of this power may be called aspiration. Aspiration is spiritual endeavor. When we aspire for something, we reach for it spiritually, which is to say, we envision it and invest it in value. Our objectives may remain limited, and thoroughly mundane, nevertheless, aspiration transfigures them, which may explain the depression that often follows success. Aspiration is a striving through limited objectives for the enjoyment of value.

Happiness is the enjoyment of value, the aim of man if not his end. All men aspire to it, whether by action or contemplation, art or industry, service or acquisitiveness. This human transcendent power, which I call freedom, the power to transcend the immediate situation, to take the initiative, to revise the play, as it were, to accommodate our failures, is motivated or is set in operation by man's desire for happiness. There are ultimate limits—but these can be met in freedom. Man cannot become a new creature, but he can change. He cannot restore the past, but he can make amends. A fate awaits him as inevitable as night and day—but he can fashion himself from within to face it.

It is in keeping with human freedom as I have described it, that man can recognize these ultimate human limitations, and can endeavor to interpret his life and fashion it in terms of them. When he does so, he envisions his destiny. Destiny is not something to which we aspire. It appears, from where I do not know, but

if I were to look for it I would search my memory. We perceive our destiny as we aspire to the enjoyment of value. I define destiny as the enjoyment of value in history. By history, I do not mean necessarily the history of the world or of a nation or tribe, but personal history. Although an individual may view his existence in terms of one of the former, it is not necessary that he do so. I have said before that consciousness is temporal. It comprises the past and the future: memory and aspiration, memory and despair, occur together, and in their single presence, destiny appears. In the case of despair, we would have to define destiny not as the enjoyment of value, but the negation of value. I include it here as a limiting case—an ultimate situation demonstrating freedom, but without hope.

Because it appears in human history, destiny always has a modal quality: comic or tragic or ironic, joyous or sorrowful, sober or ecstatic. The modal quality is appropriate to the situation in which value is realized, for example, the tragic mode is appropriate to failure. Reflecting on his fate, man invents myths and dramas, world views and ideologies which express his vision of destiny. Contemplating these, in trial he receives courage; in adversity, comfort; in success, direction.

Destiny is not an occasional or momentary awareness. For the individual who exists in history, it is a growing awareness of his own life, nourished by memory and imagination and open to an uncertain future. Its limits match the limits of man's fate. To be sure, it may shift or start or stop with fortune, but, in the consciousness of its possessor, it moves forward with a persistence that is almost inevitable. It is like an immanent God distributing blessings, or perhaps, awaiting the moment of its greatest gift. It is like Socrates's *daimon*, a God within.

I have spoken of the modal quality of destiny. The question arises whether among the modal qualities which I have enumerated there is one that is the most adequate revealer of destiny. In the light of the limitations of historical existence, perhaps the tragic mode is the most enlightening. For it is by the tragic vision that man is able to see beyond the hopelessness of his situation. It gives him courage to act, while it establishes value within the limits of his historical existence.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the tragic vision is not able to insure the enjoyment of value. The tragic hero is too deeply involved in his own misfortune. Sentiment clouds his vision. A deeper, more tranquil, mood is required for the abiding enjoy-

ment of value under the conditions of historical existence. What is the source of this deeper tranquility? It seems to derive from the power of the historical self to witness his own existence, to view it with the amusement that belongs only to the calm, as if it were all play. Such is the ironic vision: the vision beyond the vision of destiny and the source of all our visions.

The lessons of history, if such there be, can be summarized in one statement: "All things change." Not only do they change, as things that grow and decay, following the course of their essential nature. They change from within, and sometimes reverse themselves, such is the fickleness of history. Even values reverse themselves: today's wisdom is tomorrow's folly. Everything has its time. The ironist knows this, for his vision can be characterized as one of compassionate acceptance and resourceful imagination. Things change, and can be changed. The realities of history are not inexorable. There can be no ultimate judgments in history—a truly resourceful responsibility arises out of the detached commitment of the ironist, for irony reconciles seriousness and playfulness. Perhaps we can call irony the ultimate mood, the ontological mood revealing history's deepest self and profoundest witness and the source of our freedom.

It may be that through this vision there will emerge in our human situation higher values than the moral virtues, but on which they should rely if we are to form our lives and not deform them. I have already mentioned peace: to this I would add compassion, which emerges not as a duty to be performed, but as an openness to all beings. One could not ask for greater values than these.

G. Srinivasan

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

There can be no moral freedom, if the individual has no option to choose between the given alternatives. His choice may be either between two modes of action or between a mode of action and desistence from it. But in either case the individual is responsible for his choice. Choice and responsibility however always go together and both are implied in moral freedom. The individual is responsible not only for what he does but also for what he refuses to do, since both are basically matters of his choice. The individual's choice thus makes him responsible both for his acts of commission and omission.

Determinism is usually associated with a belief in God who is said to control or determine human choice. In determinism the individual believes that God 'makes' him choose what he chooses and hence the choice is not *really* his. Both freedom of choice and responsibility thus come to be denied in determinism.

The most radical form of determinism seems to be presented by Spinoza in the history of western philosophy. His is a system of metaphysics committed to the belief in one substance and the logic of one substance invariably reduces the 'individual being' to a 'mode' of one substance whereby its acts are interpreted as really following directly from God or Substance. Accordingly Spinoza insists that it is only by a 'trick of imagination' that we conceive of ourselves as independent, while, in fact, everything really follows from God alone.

The general tendency among philosophers is, however, to deny determinism in the interests of moral freedom. A thinker who has championed the cause of moral freedom to the utmost in contemporary times is Jean-Paul Sartre. He believes that if moral

freedom is to be retained, the existence of God is to be denied, since it is the source of determinism. Man is free, because God does not exist and what he makes of his freedom is entirely a matter of his own responsibility. There are no pre-determined values which man is pre-destined to follow, but he has to create values himself in his freedom. Freedom is the birthright of each individual and each individual has to create or invent values. But, if each individual is thus the creator of moral values, it may be feared that morality becomes purely relative to each individual and the result would be moral anarchy. This is a difficulty which seems to arise from the denial of God as the source of universal moral values. But Sartre believes that this difficulty can be easily overcome even within the limits of his own atheistic ethics. Accordingly, he insists that when a man chooses or creates a value, he must hold himself responsible not only for himself but for the whole of mankind. He must choose such a value and act in such a manner that others will be guided through his choice and activity. The question he has inevitably to ask himself is, what would happen if all others were to choose the same value and act in the same manner. And it is only when he is convinced that the value of his choice may as well be chosen and pursued by others without being detrimental to the interests of any one that he may choose and pursue it. This is the criterion of 'universal applicability' to which all values chosen by man in his authentic existence must conform. Thus, in the philosophy of Sartre, ethical values which are chosen in a subjective act of choice should yet possess 'universal applicability' since otherwise they will have to be discarded. Sartre thus seeks to rescue the subjectivity of values from relativism by his insistence on their 'universal applicability'. He maintains, in other words, that values are subjective not to this individual or that but to the whole of mankind within the framework of which values are chosen by the individual. Values are thus subjective to mankind in general and are created *by man for man*.

Sartre's thesis on subjectivity of values thus combines the individual's freedom with immense social responsibility. While the individual is free to create values in his subjective act of choice, his responsibility extends over the whole of mankind since the whole of mankind is involved in his individual act of choice. This sense of immense responsibility for one's fellow beings creates anguish in the individual. Anguish is the state of mind in which the individual is called upon to take a momentous decision which involves the lives of many others besides that of himself. What accompanies the feeling of anguish is the feeling of forlornness. This is the

state of mind in which the individual is intensely aware of the fact that he *alone* has to choose and that there is no God or any power other than himself to 'guide' or dictate to him. In forlornness, the individual experiences his own solitariness in taking a decision unaided and unrestricted by anything else; it is the intense awareness that the decision is to be entirely his and the responsibility for it wholly rests on him alone. There is also a feeling of despair accompanying a free ethical decision, since the individual cannot be but aware of the 'limited' possibilities or alternatives open to him.

Sartre points out that anguish, forlornness and despair are not obstructions to moral freedom but are the conditions in which freedom comes to be exercised by the individual. There can be no moral freedom in the absence of these conditions and any one who wants to escape from these conditions seeks refuge in determinism. Determinism of values is the denial of man's freedom to create values and is often the result of dread of freedom. Dread of freedom arises out of the sense of moral responsibility which freedom implies and hence the man who is not prepared to take responsibility on himself, gives up freedom to create values and accepts them as determined or created by God, or as being eternal in themselves. But the view of values as essences, independent of the human act of creation, gives them a priority over human existence and deprives human existence of its freedom and responsibility in the matter of creating values. We, thus, find in Sartre's atheistic existentialism, one of the most emphatic refutations of the determinism of values. In fact, he describes his existentialism as an attempt to draw out all the possible deductions from atheism and the most important deduction that follows is human freedom and responsibility.

Sartre's refutation of determinism, however, deserves some careful consideration. For it may not always be correct to say, as Sartre believes, that faith in determinism is born out of dread of freedom and moral responsibility. Faith in God as the creator and guarantor of values is an expression of certain emotive and conative longings of human personality and has a positive content which cannot be explained as mere absence of dread or escapism from it. In fact, what is sought in faith is not necessarily escapism from human freedom and responsibility but a foundation and an orientation to it. To posit the existence of God as the ground and guarantor of values does not deny human freedom and responsibility, since man is still *free* either to accept or to reject these values, and responsibility for accepting and realising them by an act of subjective appropriation entirely rests on him. Moreover,

the faith that there is a divine being who preserves man's moral achievements opens up a spiritual prospect beyond death for his ethical life. A feeling on the contrary that all values are likewise going to be annihilated in death makes man's moral life purposeless beyond death and takes away the incentive from it. In fact, it is highly difficult to plead for the pursuit of universal moral values in an unselfish manner in the context of a philosophy of human finiteness which assumes death as the finality of human life beyond which there can be nothing.

This is a difficulty which Sartre in his atheistic existentialism faces, and in his attempt to meet it, he almost appeals to conscience. He points out that a man who chooses values which are conducive to his own self-interest without a sense of responsibility for others is a man of 'uneasy conscience'. Conscience is thus made the touchstone of ethical life in the atheistic philosophy of Sartre, and it is to satisfy one's own conscience and without the hope of any spiritual reward or preservation beyond death that a man should choose and pursue the universally applicable values.

Sartre's resort to conscience at a crucial point in his ethics is, of course, inevitable in his philosophy because of his original non-metaphysical atheistic commitment. The subjective phenomenon of conscience falls within the structural analysis of human finiteness unlike God who cannot, in the same sense, be included in it. While this may justify Sartre's introduction of conscience into his philosophy, still it cannot objectively meet the moralist's question, why a man should live a moral and responsible life, if nothing is going to be preserved after death of him and for him. It is in response to this persistent question that God as the preserver of values is postulated. Faith in God thus fills an emotive gap in the ethical life of man and gives it a spiritual orientation or purpose beyond death without which it lacks a sense of 'completeness'.

This is the reason why the theistic personalist postulates the existence of God. But he is as much eager as any one else to maintain the moral freedom of the individual and hence it is that he is prepared to so modify the postulate of divine perfection as not to contradict the moral freedom of the individual. Divine perfection ordinarily implies supreme benevolence, omniscience and omnipotence. Of these three attributes of God, benevolence is not said to be contradictory to man's moral freedom, but the very source of it. It is believed in theism that it is an act of supreme benevolence on the part of God that He in His own image should create man as a 'free' being. But, if it is asked

why a supremely benevolent God did not create a perfect man, the theist would point out that 'perfection' is what is to be realised by man by means of his own freedom and can never be given to him as a boon.

The two other attributes of God, viz. omniscience and omnipotence are however rejected by some theistic personalists, since they seem to contradict human freedom directly. The argument against God's omniscience is that it implies God's prior knowledge of man's future acts and experiences, and this reduces the individual freedom to be barely nominal or illusory. Some philosophers have however pointed out that what really contradicts human freedom is not divine omniscience but divine omnipotence. For God's mere knowledge as an outsider about what a man is going to do, does not affect or determine man's activity, but if He, as an omnipotent being, determines all the conditions of man's activity or negates all the alternatives but one, it amounts to predestination or denial of moral freedom. Moreover, if God is omnipotent, nothing would prevent Him from so influencing the individual as to see that all things are done according to His own plans through the individual, while the individual may still be made to feel that he is a free agent for all practical purposes. God in this case would be a Great Hypnotist under whose spell of hypnotism, the individual merely carries out His instructions or suggestions, all the while, however, believing himself to be a 'free' agent. This would obviously reduce the feeling of moral freedom to an illusion and hence it is maintained that Divine Omnipotence seriously affects the moral freedom of the individual.

A philosopher who takes a serious objection to divine omnipotence is E. S. Brightman. He recognises a finite God, a God who is constantly engaged in fighting evil, and calls upon man to cooperate with God in His ethical endeavour. A. N. Whitehead similarly affirms that there are many unrealised possibilities in God and man is created as a 'free' being so that he may co-operate with God in realising the unfulfilled possibilities, and whatever man achieves through his freedom will be preserved by God in His 'tender care'.

These and several other philosophers have no belief in the eternal perfection of the individual soul — a belief which is most basic to Vedāntic Philosophy. Moreover, they have sought to modify the conception of God's perfection in one way or other, so as to accord to man's moral freedom a real and positive significance. A criticism usually raised against this view is that a God who is not omniscient, a God who is finite and struggling

against evil, or a God who has unrealised possibilities and is in need of human cooperation, is an imperfect God, and an imperfect God is not worthy of human worship and adoration.

Hence an attempt is sometimes made to retain the individual's moral freedom and attach a real significance to it without giving up the postulate of divine perfection or modifying it. The root cause of determinism is, in fact, shown to be not the admission of divine perfection but the structural 'separation' between God and man. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta of Rāmānuja may be looked upon as an attempt to overcome this difficulty in its conception of God as both the *upādāna kāraṇa* and the *nimitta kāraṇa* of the individual self; the individual self is, hence, regarded as integral to the Divine and is described as the attribute of God. The self being an attribute of God, there can be no ontological separation between them, and the two together constitute a single substantive continuum, an integral whole or a biune reality. The conception of the individual self as a biune of Infinite—finite provides the requisite ontological base for a fair combination of individual freedom with his sense of dependence on God. For, even if the individual were to act with a sense of complete dependence on God, the acts he performs are still *his*, since his own being is basically integrated with God on whom he depends.

Thus, in the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, the individual is capable of assuming and acting at the two poises of his being. He may assume the poise of the exclusive finite and act from that standpoint in which case his freedom to act will be highly limited by the egoistic, self-separative conditions. He may, on the other hand, assume the poise of the infinite—finite and act from that standpoint in which case the ego-centric limitations of his freedom come to be removed and his freedom becomes intense and fuller.

Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta thus tries to reconcile the freedom of the individual with his dependence on God or Brahman within the framework of its own metaphysics. But there are two postulates which it shares in common with many other systems and which are of specific relevance to an understanding of the significance of moral freedom of the individual. The first of these postulates is that Brahman or God is perfect. If Brahman is perfect, then all the possibilities are already realised in Him and there are no unrealised possibilities in Him. This will make the individual's moral pursuit and realisation of values irrelevant to God.

The second postulate is about the perfection of the individual soul. It is believed in Vedānta that the individual soul is eternally

and essentially perfect, but during bondage, the eternal and essential perfection of the soul comes to be lost sight of due to a false sense of 'independence' from God; it is also believed that the self is free to realise its own basic and eternal perfection by overcoming the false sense of 'independence' from God, and that its moral acts serve as means towards this final end. But the Vedāntins insist that perfection cannot be said to have been produced or created out of moral acts, since perfection is eternal; the significance of moral acts is, hence, purely negative inasmuch as they remove the 'obstructions' which conceal or limit the perfection of the soul, and once the 'obstructions' are removed, the eternal perfection of the soul comes to light. Thus the postulate of the eternal perfection of the soul limits the significance of moral freedom to that of removing the hindrances in the path of perfection but does not regard it in any sense as *positively* contributive to the perfection of the soul.

It may be pointed in conclusion that the problem of determinism and moral freedom admits of differences of opinion. Moral freedom, however limited it may be, is a fact of experience for most men, while determinism is mostly a matter of faith. Whether the fact is to be interpreted through faith or faith is to be adapted to the fact is an open question and an answer to it determines the kind of philosophy we believe in.

Ignatius Hirudayam

DETERMINISM
AND MORAL FREEDOM :
MODERN SCHOLASTIC
VIEW

Scholastic philosophy moves in a circle, but not in a vicious circle. Its metaphysical enquiry starts from the experience of the external world and of man's own inner consciousness. And by the methods of induction and deduction, it discovers God. And then in the light of the knowledge of God, it returns to gain a deeper, wider understanding of the universe and hence a truer knowledge of the totality of reality which is wisdom, *sophia*.

Changes and transformations are what meet our senses and mind first. From the metaphysical analysis of changeable beings, their inner composition and the co-principles which compose them into existence viz. potency and act are established. And from the analysis of substantial changes in material beings the concepts of potency and act is concretised into the concept of the co-principles of matter and form. Now in every change a new form is educed from the potency of matter. This is not possible except through the causality of an efficient cause. Moreover *agere sequitur esse* : 'to act results from to be'. Therefore the form that determines a being in a certain essence gives it also a certain nature, i. e. a certain dynamic inclination, orientation of activity. An orientation is inexplicable except by the causality of final cause or end which specifies such a nature. Thus scholastic philosophy arranges an order of causes as material cause (which ought to be understood as a co-principle and not as pre-existing matter), formal cause, efficient cause, final cause and exemplary cause. This metaphysical enquiry proceeds up to the discovery of the First Cause, the cause of all secondary causes. The same process that discovers the First Cause not only proves that it is also the Final Cause, but sets it apart from all other causes in an order of existence all its own, and which can be known only by the method of affirmation by means of negation. Now we realise that only the knowledge of

the creature—Creator relation will throw light on many a complicated problem of human existence. Our problem of determinism and moral freedom is one of them.

In this, as in other complicated issues Scholastic Philosophy holds both ends of the rope up, though the connecting line may elude its grasp and lie embedded in a mystery. No truth is denied because its connection with other undeniable truths is not yet clear. So here, it is undeniable that man is a person, not a chattel. It is by the freedom of his choice that he claims to be the captain of his soul. And the dignity of his personality is respected by his Maker Himself and ought to be respected by his fellow men and by the State as well. Yet painful experience points out that man and his choice often seem to be determined by forces physical, physiological, psychological and supernatural not to speak of coercion by other men which are all beyond his control. And *a-priori*, the principle of sufficient Reason and the demands of God's absolute dominion over His creatures seem to be determining laws ruling every thing in the world including man's moral choice. Thus we see that the problem existed for the Schoolmen long before John Stuart Mill, Claude Bernard or Proudhomme and others excogitated their theories of determinism.

Determinism

By determinism we mean the doctrine which affirms that everything in the world has its determined reason and everything is produced infallibly when certain conditions are present and does not appear when the contrary case obtains. Before Claude Bernard, people were ready to admit that vital functions took place irregularly under the influence of arbitrary and mysterious forces. Claude Bernard brought against this indeterminism the doctrine of vital determinism of physiological phenomena. Scholastic philosophy respects the determinism of the natural phenomena, not a mechanistic determinism but a teleological determinism, with this proviso that among the determining causes must be reckoned also the free concursus of the First Cause which upholds the laws of the secondary causes retaining its own freedom to interfere occasionally for the sake of a higher order.

But it is in the fields of psychology and ethics that determinism has been greatly bandied and systems that uphold the freedom of the human will have been branded as indeterminism, causeless volition, motiveless choice and so forth.

Medieval Schoolmen defined freedom as the immunity from necessity or negation of determinism. Necessity may be of three kinds, they said :

1. Necessity of the end : i. e. if you wish to attain this end or goal, you are obliged to act in this manner. This teleological necessity was not repugnant to the freedom of the will.
2. Necessity of coercion is the compulsion from an external agent. This is repugnant to the freedom of the will.
3. Necessity of nature which arises by virtue of an intrinsic principle which determines one course of action. This necessity of nature may be either *physical* and this would be repugnant to the freedom of the will; or it may be *moral* in which case there was a doubt whether it was repugnant to the freedom of the will or not.

Now immunity from necessity may be considered *negatively*. 1. as immunity from external necessity or coercion; 2. as immunity from the necessity of one's own nature introduced into one from outside, whether from creatures or from the Creator.

This negative aspect was called *Libertas Arbitrii*. *Libertas Arbitrii* is defined as the active intrinsic indifference, by virtue of which the will enjoys dominative power over its act in such a way that given all the requisites and motives for acting, it can act or not act.

Or this immunity may be considered in its *positive* aspect, i. e. as a capacity to determine oneself.

Complete liberty will include :

Freedom of exercise : capacity to choose from among contradictories, i. e. to act or not to act.

Freedom of contrariety : of choosing from among contraries : to act well or ill, to love or to hate, etc.

Freedom of specification : of choosing from among actions which are diverse : to study, to play or to pray, etc.

The Scholastics' proofs for the existence of free will were both a-posteriori and a-priori.

A-posteriori arguments :

- I. From consciousness during our deliberation before an action that it depends on us to do this or that, to do or not to do.
 - II. From the consensus of men from the praise and blame they mete out to people and their actions.
 - III. From the imputability of the act and man's responsibility.
- (Ref. S. Th. I. q. 83. a. 1 ; De Malo q. 6 ; De Ver. q. 24. a. 2.)

A-priori arguments :

To act results from 'to be' (= *agere sequitur esse*)

To act is to tend toward a definite end or goal.

Hence a proper inclination results from every form by which a being is constituted.

Beings that lack knowledge are determined in one definite nature by their substantial form to be fulfilled by the attainment of one particular and natural end.

Beings that possess sensitive knowledge and act through instinctive inclinations are fulfilled by the attainment of the particular natural end as known and determined by the senses.

But the intellectual being is constituted by its form in its grade in such a way that it can become so to say all things by the intentional or mental possession of all forms. To this mode of existence which is spiritual, there must correspond a spiritual inclination which will be fulfilled only by the attainment of the universal good. This spiritual inclination or rational appetite is that faculty of the soul which is called will. And its adequate object is the Universal good or ultimate final cause which is called God. This adequate End when adequately apprehended will determine the will, the medieval Scholastics affirmed. When He is not apprehended adequately or only particular ends are proposed, the will is left with its freedom of choice both of exercise and of specification.

(Ref: S. Th. I. q. 82. a. 2; I-II. q. 10. a. 3; q. 13. a. 6.)

The cooperation or concursus of the First Cause in the operation of all secondary causes is indispensable and has been upheld by the Scholastics. And the freedom of the will and man's moral responsibility has also been tenaciously held. But the expla-

nation of their confluence has given rise to controversies and created more schools of explanation than the Vaḍagalai-Teṅgalai controversy in India.

(Ref: S. Th. I-II. q. 10. a. 4.)

Again, we notice that there are two causes that are at work in the production of an act of free choice, viz. the will which is the efficient cause and the end or final cause. The act of choice is an immanent action, i. e. produced and received within the will itself or in the soul. In what does the causality of the final cause consist? Various scholastic schools have proposed various explanations. Francis Suarez's explanation briefly is as follows. Since there is no physical contact of the final cause, it is represented and apprehended in a sensible way by agents having only sensible cognition, and by agents endowed with the spiritual faculty of intellection it is to be apprehended through intellectual knowledge and judgment. But its final causality does not consist in this apprehension for this is but the approximation of the final cause that it may exercise its causality and therefore it is only a condition. Actually, in *actu secundo*, one and the same act is caused both by the end and by the will. In so far as it is caused by the will it is efficient causality and in so far as it is caused by the end it is final causality. (Suarez: In Disp. Metaph. XXIII. Sect. IV. p. 861). Since the will is but the dynamic orientation of the rational essence "*voluntas est amor simplex*" (Suarez: Omma opera Vol IV. p. 17 para 5 & 6), the causality consists in a simple complacency of the will by reason of which it is inclined naturally and universally towards the end that it may love and intend it. This simple complacency is in the will in *actu primo* just as it is in every other creature which tends towards God and embraces all the ends which are in fact made to impel it on in this current. This simple complacency affirms itself also in *actu secundo* under a new aspect. In *actu secundo* (or the real actuality) it constitutes the whole reality of the act put forth by the will in so far as it results from the action of the end, leaving nevertheless the same and whole reality the effect of the will in so far as it is the efficient cause. All this may sound just quibbling in words but there is a fundamental metaphysical axiom at stake. Cause as cause does not change. If it changes, it is due to its defective way of being a cause, i. e. *movens motum*. Also the action of the cause is in fact *in patiente*. Being educed from the potency of the subject, it is nothing else than the dependence on the cause in origin or in being.

It is here that Modern or Neo-Scholasticism has elaborated certain insights of its great seer St. Thomas Aquinas on Cause—effect relation or Creator—creature relation.

Creation may be considered actively or passively. Actively considered, i.e. on the part of God it is an absolutely free divine act. Now, Scholasticism asserts, like any good philosophy, that in God every attribute including freedom and action are absolutely identified with His Essence which is Himself in His ineffable simplicity and fecund omnipotent unity. His relation to the creature therefore on his part is not real and not distinct from Himself. So, the whole totality of the creature-Creator relation has to be sought for on the part of the Creator. On the part of the creature too creation is not a transformation or change but for the opposite reason: there is no preexisting subject that can undergo the transformation. Hence Aquinas had said that creation passively considered is nothing else than a relation to the Creator as to the principle of its *esse*. And in another place he had defined creation as a certain relation to the Creator with a newness of being. This relation is not only in the creature but constitutes the totality of the reality of the creature. Thus the scholastic monism is stated in the axiom: "Being and one are identical"; "by creation Being is not multiplied". An ontological orientation of the created things towards the Creative Act which is God Himself is not merely the result of the creature's finitude as such but it is in the creature the Creative Hold (*L'emprise creatrice*) of the Creative Act Itself. And it is this Creative Hold that is the secret of the preservation of the contingent being. Thus we see that creation and preservation are identical. Now this creative hold on the part of the creature is the dynamic movement set up and moved by divine law. We may say that it is the communication of the love of God for Himself by which the creature moves disinterestedly towards God as to its centre of existence. The creature is first and foremost heterocentric, its centre is in God. The creature tends towards God 'legaliter' if it is non-living matter, plastically if it is living matter, instinctively if it is a sensitive being and rationally if it is an intelligent spiritual being. At the same time the creature which by means of this movement participates in the divine essence is essentially limited. Being limited, it tends to assimilate to itself by this very movement the fulness of *esse* which is God. The creature therefore cannot help being autocentric at the same time. The creature is a synthesis of a disinterested love and an interested love of God. While, therefore, the Creative Act of God which, formally considered, is God Himself, affirms Itself inchoatively in the created essences by making them participate in God, we have seen that the participation which is

actively tending toward this Absolute Being with a centrifugal as well as a centripetal dynamism makes up the very actuality of the created essences. However the element of infinity in the creature is prior to and is in fact the explanation of the element of finitude in it.

At the zenith of the hierarchy of material creatures, is man in whom the essential form is not conditioned intrinsically in its essence by matter. In man that infinite dynamism infused into it towards the infinite expresses itself in the illimitable and brilliant form of being and it is in the light of this form whose capacity will be satisfied only by the divine Reality that the intellectual love tends towards the Absolute. This activity is reduced in its affirmation to refer implicitly the sensible objects which are the term of its operations, to refer them as particular ends to the divine unity which it seeks as the ultimate end. This constitutes the norm of man's morality. And at the same time it is the source of his moral freedom.

Modern scholasticism meditates a little deeper on this dynamism of the soul which we call will. It considers first the will as nature, i. e. as a movement of the soul arising connaturally in us, and secondly the will as reason, i. e. *Liberum Arbitrium* which forms theoretical and practical judgments.

Our freedom in this world has something of perfection and something of imperfection. Our capacity of determining ourselves of spontaneously uniting ourselves with the end which is apprehended intellectually is certainly a perfection. But the capacity to deflect from our end is not a perfection but an imperfection. This is what the medieval Scholastics called the "Indifferentia". Our freedom is made known to us through this property of indifference. But its true nature consists in the perfection rather than the imperfection, in the fact that the whole determination flows from the root of our personality which is called *suppositum*. True liberty therefore consists in this spontaneity of our personality though it might be impossible for this spontaneity to terminate in any other course of action. This spontaneity is worthy of praise and the seat of moral goodness and is sufficient for merit, if other conditions of moral goodness and of merit are also present. Therefore the essence of liberty consists not in indifference much less in the deflectability but in this that an intellectual being tends towards an object knowingly, deliberately, and spontaneously determining itself, albeit indefectibly.

Hence it follows that the more perfect is the intellection, the more perfect will be the freedom, (because the will will more intensely adhere to it) and the less the power of deflecting from the end and from the means connected to that end.

Hence we may say that God loves His own Perfection with absolute determinism and absolute freedom because He is Absolute Spontaneity. The blessed souls united to God love God with confirmed necessity and ineffable spontaneity. Christ was determined to obey His Father's Will and was perfectly free in obeying it. God's concursus with secondary causes determines non-intellectual causes without any possibility of freedom, but in intellectual causes it evokes and preserves this spontaneity. His Providence and even His Predestination must be conceived in this way as supports of the spontaneity of the human will. The mystery still remains as it was when St. Paul wrote: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for God is at work in you both to will and to work for His good pleasure": Phil. II, 12, 13. But these meditations have helped us not to get a notional clarification, but a real knowledge that these two apparently contradictory attributes have a common root in the human soul. And deeper knowledge of the soul and its transcendental relation to the Absolute will generate a satisfying grasp of this truth.

P. K. Sundaram

DETERMINISM AND
MORAL FREEDOM :
AN ADVAITIN'S POINT
OF VIEW

The two broad contexts within which the problem of moral freedom has been posed are the theological and the scientific. Theologically, the belief in an omniscient and omnipotent God will entail His fore-knowledge of all that is to happen by way of human action in its minutest detail. This will effectively forestall the freedom on the part of man to choose among possible courses of action which he deems the best under the circumstances by a rational deliberation. For, if man had the least chance of initiating an action, not fully governed by or comprehended in the all-knowing wisdom of God, to that extent God's omniscience is compromised, and by theological presuppositions, a God who is not omniscient forfeits his right to His exalted title. From this theological point of view, then, the free will of man is a figment of imagination.

On the other hand, science has increasingly succeeded in showing that for all that we know, man as part of nature, should himself be subject to the same set of physical laws like the other non-human phenomena. The presence of the supposedly unpredictable mental element in him need not deter us for long. The horizons which science can conquer are not yet revealed; it is theoretically possible to imagine a time when mind will not be something that bloweth where it listeth, but will be mapped as a perfectly natural system in which the constituents would predictably behave. Acts of free-will will in reality be necessitated action only if we could know what the antecedent conditions of such acts are at any given time; and it is possible to know them and express them in the manner of natural laws. In short, science militates against free will.

Thus it seems that the so-called free-will of man, considered as his distinctive privilege, is cancelled out between science and theology, matter and God.

The dilemma is sought to be solved by opposing *free-will* only to *compulsion* and not to *determinism*. There is no incompatibility between causal laws and freedom. Far from being incompatible with *determination* freedom involves it and is even inconceivable without it. When compulsion, constraint, necessitation, determination and causation are taken to be synonymous, confusion inevitably results. The last two are compatible with each other but incompatible with the first three.

Sometimes one's conduct is free and sometimes not. When it is not, it is mere compulsion, by which we mean that the conduct has issued forth in obedience to forces outside the individual, who, had he been left to himself, would have acted differently. On the contrary when the individual acts in accordance with his own wishes and desires, he feels no sense of compulsion but thinks he acts freely. It is true that his wishes and desires are the immediate preceding causes of his conduct and thus *determine* the conduct; nonetheless the conduct itself is free. Otherwise our action will cease to be responsible. The point is that for not being compelled, the acts of a free agent in the sense of the term meant here are not indetermined. Indetermination is not freedom.

The term 'Determination' is used sometimes to convey necessity or complete predictability. For instance, a material body falls vertically downwards and when its initial position is known, its future positions can accurately be predicted and the formulas that enable us to do so are called 'laws'. These laws merely express the regularities of connection between physical quantities and properties. Here determination means predictability by means of a law. The positions of the falling body are predictable because they are determined by irrefragable laws. The falling body can never transgress the law and thus falsify our expectations. There can be no freaks in nature.

But the behaviour of material body on this account is not supposed to be *compelled* by the laws. The question of compulsion will arise only when there is the possibility of the falling body behaving otherwise than as predicted. The material body has no personal choice. It is only a sequence or chain of events that we call the fall of the material body. There is neither compulsion nor indetermination, no question of compliance or non-compliance.

The physical laws thus describe and do not prescribe. There is no element of 'ought'. This 'ought' is present in moral laws but moral laws are not necessary order of things. If they were,

morality will be meaningless. The prerogative of moral laws is that they can be transgressed knowingly and willingly. That is why they are neither true nor false. 'Ought' does not imply 'must' but only 'can'. Moral responsibility and necessitated action are a contradiction in terms.

In other words prescriptive moral laws presuppose that man makes himself subject to moral judgment, not by coercive compulsion, but by voluntary choice of action. Even when one completely abandons himself to wherever his inclinations take him, he *lets himself go*; it is precisely because one acts *consciously* according to one's own desires and wishes, however thin and narrowed his own freedom may be, that man is differentiated from the material bodies. Our theories of punishment presuppose this determination and freedom in voluntary actions, for, otherwise, if there were thorough indetermination, the action for which one is condemned might well be repeated. The punishment is intended to supply a deterrent circumstance which will influence the personal choice of the agent in the future, when an identical situation prompts him to act in the earlier fashion. It will be a determining factor in the decision *vis-a-vis* his own wishes and desires. That this will be so is to the presumption in all punishments and social disapproval. A man behaving totally unpredictably or completely predictably in all circumstances is as amoral as the animal or material body behaving quite predictably. In brief, though man's actions are not predictable, they are not undetermined or uncaused. The element that makes this distinction possible is the free-will of man. The feeling of moral responsibility, whether it is real or illusory, requires the presence of freedom in man.

To this approach, there may possibly be a demur. The distinction that when a person acts freely when he acts according to his own wishes and predilections and that he is bound only when he is constrained by others to do as he does cannot be so easily drawn. It may only be a "wretched subterfuge"; for, when the internal forces like, for instance, the "subconscious" and the "unconscious", operate, the individual is almost compelled by them in spite of his best efforts to resist. The compulsion can come from within. Even while a man thinks he is freely choosing a course of action, he may well be under delusion. Forces beyond his ken swelling from the depths of his mind may influence his decisions.

To this aspect of the matter, our attention is drawn by the *Gītā*. Stating that, as a rule, man cannot stay without action

for any two moments together, the *Gītā* explains that this is so because man acts in complete obedience to the primordial qualities of his physical and mental natures.¹

Prakṛti is either primordial nature or Māyā with three qualities; or the mental equipment with which one is born as the result of past acts, says Śaṅkara on *Gītā*: *prakṛtir-nāma pūrvakṛta dharmādharmādi-saṁskāraḥ vartamāna-janmādaḥ abhivṛyaktāḥ*.²

Then, to the specific question how a man acts wrongly against his will as though actuated irresistibly by an outside force, the answer is given that it is the desire and anger that constitute the internal constrainers.

Kāma eṣaḥ krodha eṣa, rajoguṇa samudbhavaḥ. (B. G., III, 37)

If the Self is neither a doer nor an inducer to action, who is the actor or who causes to act, asks Śaṅkara and says: it is *prakṛti* or *māyā*. *svabhāvo avidyālakṣaṇo prakṛtir māyā pravartate (B. G., V. 14).*

It seems that in this case man is nothing more than a phenomenal creature very closely bound up in servility with the material forces among which mind is included. But even here the sense of being overpowered is obvious. Man feels that had his own freewill prevailed, the course of the events would have been different while tacitly he gives his consent by a desire at the subterranean deeps of his mind. Prakṛti acts only through the wishes and inclinations of man. *yāhi puruṣasya prakṛtiḥ sā rāgadveṣa-purassaraiva svakārye puruṣaṁ pravartayati*. Consequently, the consent of man is essential even for the nature to operate. The awareness of the possibility of his acting otherwise when one in fact acts in a contrary way, bespeaks the inviolability of a consciousness that is witness unto both the possible and the actual, the good and the bad and the variance between the two. This awareness belongs to an order different from that of the will and the desires. The fact of being forced to act against one's will and the consciousness thereof may indicate the distinctive existence of a subject, *upadraṣṭā* as opposed to the objective forces, both internal and external.

The statements: *guṇā guṇeṣu vartante iti matvā na sajjate*, and again: *ahaṁkāra vimūḍhātmā kartāham iti manyate* and others of that kind show that the subject, *kṣetrajña*, is contrasted from the objective forces.³ The famous statement: *karmaṇyeva adhikāraṣṭe mā phaleṣu kadācana* is so construed as to mean that the person who

is not yet possessed of the full knowledge that he is the *homo noumenon*, the pure subject in contrast to objective forces, has alone eligibility for action. It is the 'empirical me' as against the autonomous pure subject that is strictly bound by causal laws. As it is the pure subject that expresses itself in the activities of the empirical self, though it is not possible to say how, the latter has the semblance of freedom and the power of initiative. Ordinarily this is expressed as the power to initiate, possessed by mind as differentiated from blind matter. Finer the expression of the pure subject the greater is the degree of freedom in action, though action itself belongs to the realm of causality and time. Among the five sheaths, *anna* and *prāṇa* and *mana* and *ānanda-maya* are common to all creatures. *Vijñāna* is peculiar to man alone. This only makes man a *kartā*. The *Vijñāna* is perhaps the quantum level in man. In fact, freedom or indeterminacy is spoken of only in respect of this *Vijñāna-maya-puruṣa*.

Moral or immoral actions are relevant only to this empirical self in the realm of time and causality. The same pure subjectivity may express itself variously in the different individuals. It supplies only the element of freedom to do good or bad. Hitherto it was seen that *Prakṛti* is said to be the cause of action, instrument and agency while the soul is the cause of its experiences. But we have reckoned without the fifth factor, *daiva*. (B. G., XVIII, 14). And when we turn to the theological point of view, we seem to lose in the swing what we gained in the roundabouts. To be brief, the *Gītā* statement can again be taken for illustration. It is unequivocally declared there that man is only an instrument in the hands of God. Things will move on relentlessly to their destined ends in spite of man:—*ṛtēpi tvā na bhaviṣyanti sarve*. Man is patronisingly patted on the back and told that he had better understood the situation and be reasonable. He will be given the glory though he does not deserve it: *tasmāt tvāṁ uttiṣṭha, yaśo labhasva*. Man himself is only a character in a complete drama; a link in a grand story. But yet, God *does* require an instrument, *kaṛaṇa* or *nimitta*. The drama is not a puppet show performed in a mindless universe; but a human drama where the characters can make or mar the play. In the words of the *Gītā*, man is the *parāprakṛti* of God.⁴ That is how he becomes capable of becoming morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. God punishes some, some he rewards according to *their* deeds. A piece of matter which is *aparā-prakṛti* is not treated in this way. Since actions are born of the forces of nature, *prakṛti*, man in so far as he is entangled or associated with this *prakṛti*,

forgetting his higher nature, makes himself subject to judgment, for he can choose, by his inherent nature of freedom, not to associate himself with the lower physical forces.

Man occupies an intermediate position in the scale of reality. He has got the choice to do the better rather than the good; to do the bad rather than the worse. He can stay in his freedom, *jñāna*; or lapse into shackles, *karma*. (Thus he gets *jñāna-karmādhikāraḥ*). In him, the 'ought' implies the 'can'. Writing on the *Brahma-sūtra*, I-3-25, Śaṅkara writes: *śāstraṁ manuṣyāneva adhikaroṭi*. The scripture entitles man alone to act. The reasons according to Śaṅkara for this are: Man alone is capable of complying (or non-complying for that matter) with its commandments, (*Śaktatvāt*) and capable of desiring a goal (*Arthitvāt*). Not merely he is commanded to execute the obligations that devolve on him, but by virtue of his special and moral status he is not anywhere prohibited from the performance of any duty (*aparyudastatvāt*). Lastly, the necessary eligibility is in fact conferred on him when he is supposed to be reborn as it were into a spiritual being. Mere bodily birth is considered as inadequate. The purification must be gone through (*upanayanādiśāstrāt*).

The word '*śaktatvāt*' excludes from moral action the animals, Gods and the Rishis. (*tiryag devaṛṣiṇām aśaktānām adhikaraṁ nivartayāti*). The second reason *arthitvāt* excludes those who do not desire anything but emancipation, and the inanimate beings, for they cannot desire anything from action: *antaḥsamjñānām mokṣamāññānām ca kāmyeṣu karmasu adhikaraṁ niśedhati*.

The third and the fourth reasons speak of the qualification of man for ethical purification and subsequent spiritual endeavour. Man is thus conspicuous for his capacity to choose rationally, precisely for the very reason that only he is bewildered by alternatives.

A distinction may well be seen here; all men as men without distinction are entitled to action with all kinds of desire and motive (which then becomes *kāmya-karma*). *Śāstrīyakarma*, too, may be *kāmya*. But the persons having as their goal the redeeming knowledge have no *arthitva* about them. *mokṣamāññānām kāmyeṣu karmasu anadhikāraḥ* says Vācaspati. In the ordinary action motivated by desires, religious or secular the freedom of the will is just nominal; for, freedom is essentially a spiritual power. The very notion of free will at this plane is false as the *kāmya-karmas* spring from the physical sources in man. They show the physical counterpart of

his being. As it is put by Śaṅkara, it is the basic *añāna* which is the matrix of all the material forces. Śaṅkara was seized with this problem when he commented on *Brahma-sūtra*, II-1-34.

The Lord's distribution of rewards and punishments is not arbitrary but depends on the work of the individual soul. Śaṅkara writes: the role of God in this respect is like that of Parjanya, the Dispenser of Rain who is the common cause for the growth of plants and production of grains like rice and barley, while the specific differences among the various species of plants and grains are determined by their individual potentialities embedded in the germinal seeds. Similarly, God is just the general or common cause for the creation of Gods, men and animals while their individual destinies are traceable to their deserts earned by their own actions. In other words, God, on this supposition, fixes the responsibility on the individual souls for what they deserve. "*A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work*" (*Bṛ. Up.* III, 8)

To the question how the first distinctions in creation like man, God and animals with their lives under various conditions of pleasure and pain could have been brought about, unless it be arbitrarily, for want of free action and its results on the part of anyone prior to creation, the only answer that is possible is that free actions and their deserts are there beginninglessly. To conceive the first man with his advantages and limitations will land us in a logical sea-saw. That is to say, unless we presuppose man as a free agent at all the historic times, the diversities of experiences could never be explained. God dispenses justice with due regard to this freedom. Vācaspati gives an example to show how God for his impartial justice and fair play, looks to the free deeds of man and makes him thereby responsible. The President of an assembly pulls up a speaker when he makes observations that are improper and expresses his approbation when another speaker makes a correct suggestion. This does not mean that he is partial. Even so the Lord.

God's omniscience according to Vācaspati is not compromised when man is allowed the freedom of the will. The sovereign master when he distributes the prizes according to the excellence of service by his servants, cannot be said to have lost his sovereignty. *phalabhedapradatḥ prabhuḥ na aprabhuḥ bhavati*. Like Parjanya who is the common cause and the sovereign master rewarding his servants, the Lord is the general controller and the merits of the specific action reside in the power of the individual.

The semblance of freedom of action in unregenerate man, though the result of the reflection of the central freedom of his

true being, is almost indistinguishable from the mechanical response of an automaton reacting with predictable regularity. Or, better, he is almost like the lower orders of creation which act by drives and instincts like fear and hunger. Fate just plays havoc with their lives.⁶

paśvādibhis'ca avis'eṣāt is Śaṅkara's characterisation of such an order of men. The freedom is increasingly regained when, from being propelled by drives, he raises himself by his effort, (and this again is possible because of the central freedom) to the mastery of his own self.

uddharet ātmanā ātmānam says the *Gītā*. (VI, 5). The self is its own aid; or its own handicap. Those who act under ignorance like blind lump of matter are slayers of their own self: *ātmahano janāḥ*. The Statement: *yaṁ eva eṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ* means that to a desireless man who seeks for the self alone, the self reveals itself.

The theological problem of God's will constraining human action may be solved by the explanation of God being the very self of man. If we leave out God from the picture, man is no better than matter and hence, no question of freedom; to them who hold Him different from their very real Being, His rule by Destiny can never be overcome. But to lose one's freedom of action willingly obeying God's decrees saying "Thy will be done" itself implies a basic freedom which exalts one beyond destiny, the wheel of action.⁶ Knowledge is freedom. To the extent it expresses itself in actions, there is moral freedom. To those theorising on God's Decree being omnipotent and all-constraining and at the same time thinking and doing things as if they are masters of the situation, the problem of free will will be as insoluble a conundrum as it has ever been.

1. III, 5.

2. III, 33.

3. In the *Gītā*, the *kṣetrajña* is *Īśvara*. *S B G*, XIII, 22.

cp. *ātmā kṣetrajña iti uktaḥ samyuktaḥ prakṛtair guṇaiḥ*.
M. B., *Sānti Parva*: 187, 24.

4. *B. G.* VII, 4-5.

5. See *Bṛ. up.*, I, 4, 10.

6. S. on *B. G.*, IV, 14.

Abbreviations

B. G. Bhagavad-gītā

Bṛ. up. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

S. Śaṅkara

S. B. G. Śaṅkara on *Bhagavad-gītā*

S. Gopalan

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

The term "moral freedom" is extremely significant in the universe of human discourse, for, the evolution of the species *homo sapiens* corresponds to the stage of consciousness becoming reflective consciousness. Problems of morality and ethical norms arise only at the human level, and, since these two are insignificant unless they are related to the "others" in society, an interpretation of the concept of moral freedom from the point of view of man-in-society may bring to the fore certain aspects of the twin problems of determinism and moral freedom.

The precise significance of these terms for society can best be understood by examining the role of tradition in human society. Such an analysis of tradition helps us to refute the view that man is completely determined and hence that he is not morally free. Our emphasis here being on the significance of determinism and moral freedom for man-in-society, it is obvious, a reference to tradition makes it necessary to examine the question whether the individual is crushed by the dead weight of tradition as some may point out.

An analysis of the view that an acceptance of tradition in itself signifies that man's life in society is completely determined, that he is not "free to choose" his course of action, affords a useful starting point for our inquiry. According to this extreme view, asserting the free-will of man is synonymous with freeing oneself from all traditional ideas and points of view. In effect, it is maintained that determinism (here, in regard to society and social living) and free-will (exemplified by a will to look to the future and never to the dead past) are contradictory to each other. No wonder, therefore, the question itself has been very often discussed under the caption: "Determinism Vs Free will". The aim of this paper is to show that by the very nature of the institutional situation of man, he can neither

be determined completely by tradition nor determine his future fully, i.e., unconditioned by his past experience. Our standpoint then is that in the world of human relations, both determinism and moral freedom play their respective roles—enabling society to preserve a continuity of fruitful ideas and making it possible for the individual to effect changes in the existent social conditions, should they become necessary.

It is only in the case of man that the social institutions have assumed phenomenal importance, and, by examining the part played by reason and free-will in human life and the significant relationship between the social institutions and traditions our view can be substantiated.

The two distinct aspects of human life, viz., possession of the capacity for reasoning and the freedom of his will make him comparatively free from his way of life being determined completely by tradition. Unlike the animals, man is not a helpless creature who cannot go beyond the instincts with which he is born; nor is he a passive creature to be subdued by his environment. It is due to the capacity of reasoning that man is able to overcome the sway of his instincts as well as the pressure from his environment. It is because of this and the free-will that he is able to institutionalize ideas and ideals and shape his conduct accordingly. A passing reference to man's capacity to overcome the effects of the instincts has been made only to drive home the point that if man has the capacity to go beyond the instincts, his capacity to go beyond tradition is more easily understandable.

Institutionalizing ideas and ideals is nothing but creating the conditions conducive to the realization of the values man cherishes, aims he has and objectives he holds for himself. For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to go into the question of the types of values man has, deep down his heart. Even if we are to refer to certain elementary aims like having the conditions of uncertainty in society removed, the point that his capacity for reasoning is at the back of the institutions and that his free-will is at work to effect the institutionalization desired becomes clear.

Traditions (with reference to society) are nothing but the institutionalizations handed over by one generation to the next. But unfortunately when the institutionalizations are handed down from generation to generation, the institutions themselves begin to be looked upon as irrevocable. They become static aspects of a society in which even the dynamism of the individuals gets thwarted. The insensitivity of some individuals to the changing patterns of

society and to the needs of society tends to make them tradition-minded and their influence again is transmitted on to people who further the rigidification of the social environment.

The rigidification in turn makes the individual feel that he is to accept tradition, that he is not free to determine the conditions for society. If this were really the case we cannot account for social change at all. When tradition has the effect of conditioning people's attitudes and ways of behaviour, slow transformation of society is inevitable and the reasons are not far to seek. When a thought which is to ultimately transform human society arises in one or a few, it is dubbed as the opinion of the minority and fails to get the assent of the majority.¹ Courage of conviction and consistency of purpose are required on the part of the negligible minority when they differ from the majority opinion. The positions they take up may seem to be novel when proclaimed but the same ideas get slowly accepted and have the ultimate effect of bringing about the necessary transformation of society. Bertrand Russell, referring to the inevitability of the few fearless thinkers being left in the minority and the effectiveness of their thought in changing tradition writes: "Those who want to gain the world by thought must be content to lose it as a support in the present. Most men go through life without questioning, accepting the beliefs and practices which they find current, feeling that the world will be their ally if they do not put themselves in opposition to it. New thought about the world is incompatible with this comfortable acquiescence; it requires a certain intellectual detachment, a certain solitary energy, a power of inwardly dominating the world and the outlook that the world engenders. Without some willingness to be lonely, new thought cannot be achieved. And it will not be achieved to any purpose if the loneliness is accompanied by aloofness, so that wish for union with others dies, or if intellectual detachment leads to contempt. It is because the state of mind required is subtle and difficult, because it is hard to be intellectually detached yet not common, that most theorists are either conventional or sterile. The right kind of thought is rare and difficult, but it is not impotent. It is not the fear of impotence that need turn us aside from thought if we have to wish to bring new hope into the world."²

It is evident, therefore, that man's free-will holds out potentialities for his changing the accepted modes of thought and conventional forms of behaviour whenever he feels that the social institutions do not reflect his innermost aspirations. But the smothering effect of tradition is such that a complete breaking away from all

tradition is advocated by the free-will enthusiasts. They point to many of the social evils experienced by mankind in the past and in the present and maintain that man's "passive participation" in social life (in the form of accepting traditional forms of thought and modes of living) has been mainly responsible. Though it may be conceded that an unthinking acceptance of tradition is a causal factor for many social problems, we have to see that nothing is done to worsen the situation by breaking away from traditions altogether. In the process of remedying society of its illness we should not ruin it; in the name of reconstruction we should not uncritically accept everything novel and new as better than the beliefs cherished by man for so many generations.

The difficulty here is to put a restraint on our over-enthusiastic, fanciful, unidealistic attempts at beginning anew. However bad the present society might be, a better future cannot be accomplished for it by doing away with the past. In the history of human thought which makes it what it is and determines what it will be, nothing is accomplished overnight; this is responsible for the relevance of the consideration of the past even to analyse the maladies of the present. In thinking about the effective ways in which the defects of our social systems can be rectified and how a better life for posterity can be guaranteed, the guide-lines of the wisdom of the past are bound to be valuable.

Our acceptance of the deterministic theory of society implied above should not be misunderstood as our contribution to social fatalism. What is asserted here is that the heritage of the past is a factor which cannot be ignored as some of the votaries of radical change imagine. What is suggested here is that there should be a cautious approach to the problem by a careful assessment of the merits and demerits of certain ways of thinking and acting characteristic of the past. The suggestion of beginning anew is as unrealistic as it is impractical and is therefore as worthless as the attempts to turn the clock back—to go back to the bullock-cart age to find solutions to the problems posed to humanity in the atomic age.

The rationalistic approach to the past, to tradition, is that of humbly submitting the mind's receptivity to all worthwhile ideas and picking up suggestions that they might offer for tackling the present-day problems. The advantage of this approach is that the ideas of the past, with certain modifications can be applied to the present. This enables an useful and fruitful continuity of ideas and traditions in human society. The mechanical continuity

of ideas leading to dogmatism is replaced by a more analytical and rational inquiry enabling the living present not to carry the deadweight of the past but to inherit the vital sap of tradition.

That tradition, far from hampering the individual's progress and social welfare contributes to both, and hence that it solidly helps the individual in the exercise of his free-will may be gathered further from the fact that it saves the individual from the tyrannical proportions that the social institutions have a tendency to attain. Since the institutions are the results of the individuals' aspiring for realizing values in co-operation with one another, they are themselves directly responsible for the corruption that sets in in the institutions. That is why it is often said that by devising institutional checks the corruption that sets in in the institutions could be effectively checked, and ultimately the real purposes behind the institutions can be realized. The checking itself becomes possible because of the fact that tradition is an intermediary between the individual and the social institutions and prevents the individual from doing damage to the institutions and vice versa. Thus, tradition, on the one hand prevents the institutions from curbing the growth of the individuals and positively helps the preservation of the individuality of the persons, and, on the other helps in the preservation of the distinct characteristic of the institutions—as being man-made and reflecting the wishes and vision of the individuals who man them, while at the same time preventing the individuals from being determined completely by the institutions.

We have thus refuted the view that accepting tradition necessarily implies the denial of free-will of man mainly on two grounds: (1) On the one hand traditions, on a deeper analysis, have been found to be the creations of man since they are the media^a through which the social institutions are handed over to posterity; (2) on the other, changes effected in the traditions have been shown to be due to the exercise of free-will by the individuals who have been moved by the necessity to effect them.

1. See J. S. Mill: "On Liberty".

2. "Principles of Social Re-Construction", (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 14th Impression, 1960), pp. 156-157.

3. Traditions being ideas handed down through succeeding generations in the various spheres of the individual's life in society provide him with the background knowledge of each one of the institutions facilitating an easy incorporation in himself of the ideas and values prevailing in his society. The organic and reciprocal relationship that exists between the individual and society helps tradition to influence the individual by giving him a background against which he acts. The individual, being organic to society draws his inspiration from his society and, tradition, by preserving the continuity of ideas of the past with the present supplies the individual with the ideas which have been purified and distilled by the social ethos.

S. E. Demetrian

DETERMINISM IN BIOLOGY

Biology, as science of living nature, finds its place, in the hierarchy of sciences, between those pertaining to matter (physics and chemistry) and those of the mind (psychological sciences). It is concerned with the realities which although made of the same matter as studied by physics and chemistry have a new quality, that of life. Biology starts by observing the phenomena of life and the living beings as such. The summarised observed facts are then generalized in some larger concepts as species, races, habitat, gene, and classified. After observation and generalization, and classification, the next step is that of explaining the phenomena of life and morphological aspects of the living beings in terms of definite causes and effects; biology tries to establish sequential relations between what it considers to be the causes and what the effects.

Now if the principle of causation is generally recognised, as regards the "cause" of the causation or as regards on what is the basis of the causation, two were the ways, or at least the extreme ways, to approach the phenomena of life: the *deterministic* point of view that considers things as pushed from back and bound to happen by some laws in a world which seems rather a network, the *finalistic* point of view that considers things rather as drawn to happen in the aim of fulfilling some scope; this point of view leaves place to choice.

The following lines are intended to sketch the present situation of the determinist theory of causation in biology and to try also to guess something of the future of the determinist approach, as it appears in the present situation of biology.

The word 'determinism' applied at first at the beginning of 18th century by William Hamilton to the doctrine of Hobbes, comes from the Latin "De terminus" and literally would mean "about the end"; despite of its literal meaning, determinism is a materialist theory holding that all the facts of the universe are strictly dependent upon laws and completely conditioned by their causes.

Without entering the metaphysical discussion of causation, asking ourselves here if the principle itself is or is not only an inborn principle of the mind, an invented category, or something coming from experience, we may observe that determinist causation takes into account mostly the material type of cause from the classification of Aristotle, leaving out the formal causes, the efficient ones, the final, and the first cause.

The history of determinism is old. The Greek pre-Socratic philosopher Leucippus of Abdera (about 450 B. C.), holding that "Nothing happens without ground but everything through a cause or by necessity", stated that all qualitative differences in Nature appear only through the intermediacy of the quantitative differences. The dialectical materialists holding the same theory are speaking about "qualitative leap" the moment when an accumulation of quantitative differences passes into a new quality.

Democritus of Abdera (about 460-360 B. C.) gave the first organized philosophical materialistic account of Nature stating that all substance consists of atoms: the variety of the material qualities of things corresponds, for him, to the variety of atomic forces.

But it is only Newton in his *Principia* (1687) who gave us with his "Law of the universal gravitation" the first successful causal theory applied to science. Newton says in the preface of his *Principia* (1687):

"in this sense rational mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces whatsoever and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately produced and demonstrated ...Then from these forces...I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon and the sea. I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes either unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one another. These forces being unknown,

philosophers have hitherto attempted to search of nature in vain". (Cit by Grant, Verne in *The Origin of Adaptations*, Columbia University Press, N. York and London 1963 p. 15)

Some hundred years later (1812) the French astronomer and physicist Laplace was even clearer in his conviction of the possibility of every effect being asserted by knowing somehow all the forces of the Universe:

"Let us imagine an Intelligence who would know at a given instant of time all the forces acting in Nature and the positions of all things of which the world consists, let us assume, further, that this Intelligence would be capable of subjecting all these data to mathematical analysis. Then it could derive a result that would embrace in one and the same formula the motion of the largest bodies in the universe and of the lightest atoms. Nothing would be uncertain for this Intelligence. The past and the future would be present to its eyes. (Cit by Grant, Verne in *The Origin of Adaptations*, Columbia University Press, N. York and London 1963 p. 19).

And finally Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* (1862) applied mechanistic principles to all evolutionary phenomena and in fact tried to interpret life, mind and society in terms of matter, motion and force. For him evolution was "an integration of matter and dissipation of motion". So the modern concept of external causation is a mechanical one; the cause is considered here as what is moving a system of active units. Applied to biology this type of causation led the biologist to the idea of machine-animal prevailing in the XVII century and after to the idea of an electrical-animal.

Leaving aside the questionable value of the simply mechanical theory of motion in the now-a-day era of the "liberty" of the physical particles and the "consciousness" of atoms, we may say that mechanical causality applies only to some of the biological realities as to the movements of the living beings, or the so-called functional-structures of the living bodies. For example a bone is a functional-structure: mineral salts and proteins are arranged in a system of vaults (made) in such a way that with the smallest quantity of substance the bone has the highest possible elasticity. This elasticity is exactly fitted to all the movements the bone is supposed to perform in the conditions of a normal life. The functional structure is to be found in all the cells and tissues of a living being

Other processes are explainable in biochemical terms: but the biochemical type of determinist causality is able to explain only the causes of some phenomena of life. The being as a biochemical machine would be an untruthful image as it was the mechanical or electrical one.

Both physical and biochemical processes cannot be understood without taking into account the adaptative role of structure or function in the life of an organism. That means that the mentioned processes are built up in such a way and have such a type of mobility and of stability that they are able to answer at every movement to all the life necessities of an organism. So the third type of biological processes are those that result in maintaining some more or less free individual, at first very simple, or some individualized structures to be found in more complicated individuals.

The fourth type of biological processes are to be understood as the historical steps leading to the appearance and development of a structure and/or a phenomenon. Every biological structure or phenomenon is the result of an evolutionary process and undergoes in every moment evolutionary modifications. The evolutionary processes were understood by determinists as taking place under strict causal external control.

We have also to take into account that physical, biochemical, adaptative and evolutionary causation applies not only to individuals but also to what is to be called biological organisational-units. For example the relation between coyotes and rabbits in some determined field is of this type: if the coyotes which are eating rabbits are all killed the rabbits will reproduce with such a speed as to become a peril for the vegetation.

The limits of the strict deterministic approach in Biology have been felt since long: from the fact that phenomena of life seem to have in view an aim of value and that they seem to direct themselves to possible future conditions the so-called "final causes" became obvious.

Out of this in every science there is a remainder of undetermined phenomena, sometimes a very big one; we may add that even the most stable cause-effect concatenation established at one period is in peril to show their non-correspondence when a new explanation appears. There is in the biological science, as in other sciences, a necessity to change the sets of explanations from time to time; a scientific truth as well established it would seem to be may have a very short life. As an example we may remind the conception

of animal-machine, or electrical-animal, which was once prevailing. This image although completely justified in the context and for the moment they were affirmed, now makes us only smile.


It would be perhaps safe to ask ourselves also about the future fate of our present conceptions of the biological realities! So a convinced determinist as was the great French¹ physiologist of the XIXth century Claude Bernard, author of an epoch making book, *Introduction à l'Étude de la Médecine Expérimentale*. (*Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine*) says, raising also the question of the value of scientific truth itself and also the question of what would impel people to accept deterministic frame-works, the following:

"The great problem dominating everything else is to find out whether logical relationships occurring in events of the mind do indeed tally inevitably and in all cases with external reality and whether the links we establish between events, for the purpose of satisfying our logical requirements, do indeed really exist. There might be a series of evolutive events following one another in time which need not necessarily be determinative; a chain in which each link has no cause-and-effect connection either with the one preceding it or with the one coming after it. We shall never search absolute determinism for everything. There will always be indeterminism in the sciences. But the intellectual conquest of men consists in lessening and rejecting indeterminism as, with the aid of experimental method determinism gains ground. Only by this can he satisfy his ambition because it is thus that he extends and will extend step by step his power over Nature." (cit. by Suñer, August Pi in *Classics of Biology*, London, Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1955, p. 238).

But soon with the advances of physics when every structure came to be considered in terms of relativity, quantum theory and indeterminacy it appeared clear that any stiff deterministic system of thought is no more possible to be advocated.

Applied to some Biological facts only a continuum theory something like the physical one would account, for example, for the individuation of the developing tissues into a self-regulating and organized unity. And this is clear especially for all who had the occasion to observe how, in an embryo, the tissues are appearing from non-differentiated cells. Then from the tissues the organs, all having normal shapes and normal relation to one another. Although the genes are considered from an atomistic point of view the same continuum theory may be applied also to the activity of the genes as carrying out activities which interact with one another

in such a way that they are organized into systems. As regards the type of causation which could apply to this mutual influencing and ever in move structures the cy-bernetic feed-back interaction may be the most suitable.



This self-regulating activity of living matter is something very striking; if for example the tail or even a leg of some lower batracian is cut at a sufficient early stage, they finish by producing a new tail or new leg. There are then the phenomena of regionality: parts of a chick embryo which are supposed to build a fore leg if they are cut even before the fore leg is formed and placed in another region, the abdominal region for example, of the same embryo, will build there a rudiment of a fore leg. ("Development" in *The Nature of Life* by C. H. Waddington, Unwin 1961, p. 63.)

Simply deterministic causation could never have accounted for all these biological realities: The strict deterministic point of view in biology suffered another set-back with the theory of evolution. It is believed now-a-day that all the variety of living species appeared through a process of transformation. The older idea of creation of the species at some definite historical point began to be replaced by the idea of species having appeared through gradual development from other preexistent species even in the seventeenth century with Francis Bacon. Since then the evolution theory had many contributors among them the French Lamarck (XVII-XIX century) and especially Charles Darwin (1859) and R. R. Wallace with their book: *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*.

Darwin's theory replaces the deterministic causation by the causation by chance; so probabilistic causation or stochastic is to be considered more adequate than strict causal determinism. It may be used to all situations where we have to handle a very big number of units should they be small or big; probabilistic treatment of causation applies to the movement of the particles of the atoms as to the human societies too.

Leaving aside the problem, as Schrödinger puts it, of the very existence of some fundamental reality of Cause-Effect relations, it is sure that even if causation would not be negated, causation comes to be placed beyond our practical research. What to speak about scholars like the specialist in comparative psychology, Buytendjik, who is expressing on probability a view like this in concluding his book on the *Psychology of the Animals*:

"To consider that the actions a pair of swallows are doing in constructing their nest are due to chance it is like affirming that by taking a hand-full of letters and by throwing them up, the letters, falling down would arrange themselves by chance, in a verse from Homer's Iliad." (Buytendjik *Psychologie des Animaux—Psychology of the Animals*—Paris, Presses Universitaires de France)

So the abandoning of strict causal determinism has been done for the benefit of the idea of organization or cybernetic causation and that of random or chance or stochastic causation. But it was not enough.

For the explanation of some biological activities "quasi-finalistic" mechanisms have been imagined; they would work like the automatic target-tracking gun sight used against planes. A signal sent by the machine is reflected back to it by the target. The signal causes the gun to point in the direction of the target, fire, and hit the target; it would be a combination of cybernetic organization and chance response. ("Evolution" in *The Nature of Life* by C. H. Waddington, Unwin 1261, p. 85.)

Why, these mechanisms, having appeared in the aim to fulfil a future scope out of the present condition of a being, are not to be considered finalistic as such is difficult to understand! Without saying that there is no explanation about who imagined the mechanism and who created it!

As a fourth possibility, together with cybernetic models, probabilistic causation and the quasi-finalistic one, scholars are drawn more and more to admit is due to the importance of mind or at least of behaviour as greatly significant in biological causation. We are in a way nearer now to the assumptions of Lamarck who was thinking that an Act of will may bring into being even hereditary variations.

There is the instance of animals which have a "cryptic" coloration: they are covered with such tones and colors that sometimes it is impossible to detect them in some definite environment. But this cryptic coloration serves the purpose of hiding the animal only if the animal behaves itself in a manner corresponding to his covering: and so it is. Animals are behaving so as they would know exactly the qualities of their camouflage. For instance a snake having alternative coloration of irregular brown-green patches on its skin will never lay straight on the leaf litter on a forest floor but will coil up in such a way to be practically unseen. The leaf-butterfly whose wings when closed are exactly similar to a leaf,

rests only on the small twings and in such a position that it could be taken as a leaf. The cat-fish which is counter-shaded in a manner reverse to the normal having light backs and dark under-sides habitually swims upside down. More than this, if through some mutation a warning coloration becomes a cryptic coloration in a given environment this new coloration would not serve the animal if not used in an appropriate manner. For example in some industrial areas from England and Germany where soot from the smoke makes dark patches on the tree trunks in the woods the salt-and-pepper moth changed through evolution its colour and a new black species appeared. It has been shown that this new black species, which would be easily visible while resting on some unstained parts of the tree trunks, which still remain, sits now on the dark patches of the trees where the moth is completely concealed. So it is as the moth chose the environment it liked, adapted itself to it, and now it is behaving itself in an adequate manner! ("The Creative Power of Selection" p. 125-152 in *The Stream of Life* by Sir Alister Hardy Collins, London 1965.)

Now the exclusive atomistic image of life as based on the physics of Newton and Faraday and the chemistry of Dalten, which gave to Laplace justification enough to affirm a strict materialist determinism is no more to be accepted. We have perhaps to admit in Biology also the continuum theories which try to embrace the Biological reality into a more suitable image. We have also to take into account the probabilistic or stochastic causality which is trying to systematize the events as considered of having appeared by chance. The "quasi finalistic" systems of causation are combining both cybernetic and stochastic causation. And finally the importance of mind begins of to be stressed also as a possibility of psychological causation.

So the difficulty experienced by the determinist and finalist school to find a common ground is supposed to be solved. The materialistic-atomistic point of view which based its assumptions only on the without of things is only a part of the reality; it is more and more clear that there exists also a within of the things. This is the idea put forth by J. B. S. Haldane.

"We do not find obvious evidence of life or mind in so called inert matter, and we naturally study them most easily where they are most completely manifested; but if the scientific point of view is correct, we shall ultimately find them, at least in rudimentary forms, all through the Universe." (cit. by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in *The Phenomenon of Man*, Fontana Books, Collins London 1965 p. 62)

The same idea is clearly expressed again by P. T. de Chardin in his *The Phenomenon of Man*:

"In the eyes of the physicist, nothing exists legitimately, at least up to now, except the without of things. The same intellectual attitude is still permissible in the bacteriologist, whose cultures (apart from some substantial difficulties) are treated as laboratory reagents. But it is already more difficult in the realm of plants. It tends to become a gamble in the case of a biologist studying the behaviour of insects or coelenterates. It seems merely futile with regard to the vertebrates. Finally, it breaks down completely with man, in whom the existence of a within can no longer be evaded, because it is the object of a direct intuition and the substance of all knowledge." (p. 60.) And:

"It is impossible to deny that, deep within ourselves, an 'interior' appears at the heart of beings, as it were seen through a rent. This is enough to ensure that, in one degree or another, this 'interior' should obtrude itself as existing every-where in nature from all time. Since the stuff of the universe has an inner aspect at one point of itself, there is necessarily a *double aspect to its structure*, that is to say in every region of space and time in the same way, for instance, as it is granular: *co-extensive with their without, there is a within to things.*" (p. 61.)

This within of the things may be responsible for what is to be recognized as creative in all biological phenomena and forms. "Now it is probably true that nothing worthy of being considered creative can occur in a fully deterministic universe ruled by the operations of simple causation." ("Evolution" in *The Nature of Life* by Waddington, Unwin, London, 1961. p. 86.)

The future comprehensive image of causality in Biology will have to take into account all the forms of causality: deterministic, organismic or cybernetic, probabilistic or stochastic, quasi-finalistic and behavioural or mind determined causation without forgetting that through all these types Nature works creatively a thing which could mean with conscious purpose and free will.

P. Nagaraja Rao

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

The human being partakes a two fold nature; he is a product of the physical forces and has also a spiritual core. Both nature and his unique personality reside in him in combination. He is at once under the sway of two different laws. Determinism is the reigning principle of Nature, and that of human life is freedom. The human being is not constructed by Nature out of any specific ingredients that have gone into the composition of the less exalted creatures, the animals. The laws of physics are inexorable, man is not an object, but is a subject. Even some of those philosophers who pride on their scientific and rational outlook have discerned in man specific excellences that are not there in his ancestor. There is a great gap between man and the previous evolutes. That is the verdict of Julian Huxley and like-minded men. The thinking aspect in man is an object. The objective physical laws operate on it. The heavy hand of mortality treats him with no distinction in its operations. In the memorable words of Russell, 'no heroism, no fire, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave, that all the labour of ages, all the devotion, and all the noon day brightness of human genius are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habituation henceforth be safely built.'

The scientist holds that Nature and the physical aspects of things are governed by strict laws. No longer do men believe that demons create diseases and priests cure them.

The doctrine of Determinism makes for science, If the forces of Nature do not abide by certain laws, if the laws are not in Nature, science cannot invent the laws and put them into Nature. They are able to discover the laws because the phenomena are law-abiding and not erratic. Determinism makes our expectancy bear fruit. It fortifies us, that at the heart of the universe there is a design and purpose which we may not know, which may be rational or not as we understand reason. There are some who believe that Nature and her process thwart human desires with malignity and further a few others with intensions. Those who hold to the doctrine of Determinism in its different forms see a law in Nature's workings. This makes us *depend* on its laws and act safely. Reflective minds have discerned determinism only in some aspects of Reality.

The theists hold that the *laws* are built within the frame-work of Nature by God, and the universe is *moral* and not amoral. Hence the importance of the law of *karma*. From the movements of atom to the happenings in history there is law governing them. The deterministic outlook is central to all sciences and is the basis of all prediction. Without some specified determinants, we will have anarchy and confusion.

In fact most Vedāntic schools of theism have attempted to venerate *God*, because he is the determiner of all things. He is described as the only free uncaused cause remaining the root cause of all. The *Brahma Sutra* describes the Lord as the originator of the universe (*janmādyasya yataḥ*). Determinism is present in one or other aspect in all systems of philosophy and schools of religion.

But the human being, sharing as he does a dual nature, is not completely under the sway and grip of the operation of the laws. He is free in his thought and ideals. The dual nature of man is not final. The ethical imperatives of our saints and seers exhort men to overcome their dualism, to rise above the world of necessity to that of freedom.

Freedom of will may be limited, but it is not non-existent. The condition under which a man lives, physical, biological and environmental, may be determined, but the conditioned agent is free to pursue his activity or not. The cards one gets in the shuffle may be determined, but it is open to us to make the call or not and cleverly make or not make the rubber.

In the words of the poet, man is born under one law of necessity but is asked to rise above it. He has passions, but is asked to overcome it. There will be absolutely little point or no

point in asking man to choose the right path and tell him in the same breath that he is not a master of his actions. Man is certainly free, though he is the product physically determined by *prakṛti*. He has the urge in him to know and outgrow his finitude. He is in the words of Bosanquet *finite and infinite* at the same time. He is capable of self-correction and is objective in thought. It is the moral freedom that distinguishes him from animals. It is in the exercise of his moral freedom that man is free. He does not become free by exercising his freedom as Sartre would have it, but he is free to exercise his freedom. Śaṅkara commenting on a Taittiriya text observes that the distinction of man from the rest of creation lies in his eligibility for freedom and capacity for knowledge.

The advent of man marks a distinct creative epoch in the evolution of Nature. Man has to take care of himself to survive. It is no longer the responsibility of nature to see him live, as in the case of animals. He can rise heaven-high or sink hell-deep to animal savagery or remain dead like stocks and stones. The struggles between the clamant urges of Nature on the one side and the call of the ethical imperatives on the other is there at the heart of man. Pascal testifies to this fact with unmatched clarity in a memorable passage. "Man having both Reason and Passion, cannot be without strife, being unable to be at peace with the one, without being at war with the other." Self-division is a fact of his nature. He has to overcome the lower-nature by the effort of his will. The progress is not automatic. He has to work it out in the teeth of opposition with a resolute mind and must not be infirm of purpose. "Wonders there are many, but there is no wonder wilder than man" declared Sophocles.

The real danger to man and civilization is the denial of the fact of moral freedom and man's capacity to assert it against the swarm of emotion and lure of appetites. The integration of man is not possible without the postulate of moral freedom. The lives of all great moral heroes and saints have been an eloquent commentary on the fact of moral freedom. The upholders of all ideals, truth, non-violence, charity, fidelity, and courage, e. g. a Harischandra, a Yudhiṣṭhira and a Savitri have all shown to an unbelieving world the fact of moral freedom. It is only in the exercise of moral freedom that man's dignity stands out.

The moral freedom of man is not caprice. He sees what the *ought* is by the power of his knowledge and vision, and trains his will to will it into action. In the exercise of moral freedom man functions totally and not in parts. When the human being

exercises his moral freedom he not only has knowledge of the end, but has also a resolute will to bring it to operation by withstanding the call of impulses and inclination. Living up to our duty is the exercise of moral freedom. Moral life is knowledge and will. It is not mere knowledge; nor is it an empty will. It is both. He who exercises moral freedom should keep in mind the two definitions of virtue one given by Socrates ('Virtue is Knowledge') and the other given by Kant (it is 'the work of a will'). The struggle is there and it can be overcome only by the exercise of the freedom of man. Eucken says "spirit is struggle and life is a deed". When we understand the different aspects of freedom, we see that there is outer freedom and an inner freedom. We have no freedom only when we are determined by external factors. Self-determination is not the denial of freedom. Freedom and necessity both are necessary. Spinoza puts it: "freedom is the recognition of necessity". Tagore has some instructive things to say. "Outer freedom is freedom from pleasure and pain; our inner freedom is freedom from narrowness and selfish desires". The two are complementary parts of a moral order. Moral life in its essence begins with freedom and develops through law and does not reject it. At some stage afterwards we feel law itself is a source of joy, and duty itself is fulfilment. Tagore puts them in two of his famous utterances synthesising the concept of law and freedom. He observes "The banks of a river are not its limitations, but they regulate it".

It saves the danger of inundation. Freedom is not flinging oneself wherever one likes. It is elevating oneself to the plane of self-control. Tagore writes "He who knows that joy and freedom express themselves in law has already transcended law. Not that he is no longer bound by anything, but that bond itself is an instrument of bliss like the arms of the beloved encircling him". In conclusion it can be asserted that the realm of determinism holds good only in the physical world and man is free in the exercise of his moral freedom. To deny such a freedom to him, makes ethical life meaningless and moral attributes pointless.

S. Rajagopala Sastri

DETERMINISM AND MORAL FREEDOM

This is a very old and difficult problem that has up till now evaded a solution and one which has been answered in various ways by the several thinkers according to their philosophical bias and inclinations. It has given rise to two opposed schools, viz. the Indeterminists and the Determinists. The indeterminists argue that while it may be true in the physical world that the reign of causal law operates, the same cannot be accepted as being true in the moral sphere. The human being, essentially moral and spiritual has the capacity to get away from this determinate causal sequence and behave or make decisions in an entirely novel and unpredictable way. Hence in the moral sphere nothing is determined and man is free to make any decisions. This theory has taken various forms but the core of it is the same. The other school emphasises that what is true in the empirical reality is true in the moral world also and that the claim of law and cause holds good even in the moral sphere. As a physical being living in the physical world, man is limited and in the same way in his mental and moral world also he is limited to causes and their efficacy. It may be we do not know completely all the details or circumstances but mental states and moral decisions also are caused. Like the principle of indeterminism, this theory also has various forms but the central principle is the same. William James has distinguished between the hard determinist and the soft determinist. The former is a determinist to the very core and is not afraid to argue in favour of fatality and bondage of the will. This is the principle of extreme determinism according to which there is nothing like freedom and every thing is predetermined. Freedom of the will is an illusion since it is always bound. By the term 'soft determinism', James implies the moderate form of determinism which according to him, is a quagmire of evasion. It repudiates fatality, necessity and even predetermination. James

has an aversion for this soft determinism and it is quite likely that he had wrong notions about what was advocated by both the schools of determinists. In between these two groups of the determinists and the indeterminists, a third group has emerged which is essentially a compromise between the two opposing stands. This maintains that while man is free to decide in his own way, his freedom is self-determined and not determined by any extraneous factors and hence he is free. In Indian Philosophy, we have an identical problem in the principle of *karma*; and how far is it compatible with freedom?

This traditional question has been discussed threadbare by philosophers and moralists and most of the arguments advanced for and against have been rather superficial. The arguments were more or less dogmatic and had little relevance to either psychology or metaphysics. But it should be admitted that this problem is probably the most difficult one in ethics. Determinism may be defined as the view that all human actions follow according to causal laws from the past and that this is true in the mental sphere also. It is easier to define determinism than indeterminism. When we say that an event is caused, we mean that the event is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter has occurred, the former would not have occurred. We may say that every event is so connected with a subsequent event that given the former the latter should take place. There are some indeterminists who deny this and argue that moral decisions are uncaused in the sense that we cannot fix their basis anywhere. These persons claim that the will is absolutely free. But since freedom in the absolute sense is not possible, some mitigate their position and say that their contention is not that there are uncaused volitions, i. e. that free choices are uncaused, but that they are caused in such a way that they are not fixed fully by anything existing or occurring prior to them.

We need not examine the extreme position advocated by both these schools of thought. Extreme determinism ends in fatalism while extreme indeterminism leads to a type of will which seems to be entirely unrelated to the empirical affairs of ordinary human beings. The less restrained theories seem to conform more to reason and experience. We may note at the outset why as a rule the indeterministic position is accepted by thinking people. Blanshard in his paper on "Determinism", suggests that there is first of all the stubborn feeling of freedom which is impervious to all logical reasoning. Secondly he suggests that there is a feeling that science teaches indeterminism. More than all these,

there is the conviction that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. It is also felt that determinism reduces us to the position of mere machines. With reference to the first point that we feel free and hence freedom exists with reference to moral choices, the answer is given by Sidgwick as follows. If at any given moment we stop to think about it we always feel that there are many courses open to us. One may sit or stand or talk and so on. This gives us the feeling that we are free. But this does not imply indeterminism for the question is not whether we can do what we choose to do but whether we can choose our own choice and whether that choice is made due to some previous antecedent. Hence the argument that our will is free since we feel it so, does not appear correct.

As for the second contention that the new physics supports the contention of indeterminism, it has to be accepted with some reservations because while Heisenberg and Eddington have accepted the indeterminacy of matter, others like Russell, Einstein and Plank have not. Further the unstable behaviour of protons and electrons in the realm of subatomic physics need not be true in human behaviour also. The indeterminist theory of matter is after all just one interpretation of recent discoveries and even if it were true, it is no argument for indetermination of human choice.

The objection that determinism is unable to explain satisfactorily the problem of morality has taken many forms. It is argued that man is or is made to become a mere machine since even his thinking and will are determined by other causes. But the determinists deny emphatically that their position involves either mechanism or materialism. It is true that the principle of causality which is operative in the realm of matter operates in the moral sphere also. But it is a different kind of causality. Blanshard argues that the law of association is a law of mental events and even though we do not understand how one idea calls up another idea, association represents the working of a causal law. There is a higher causal level in more complicated cases of thinking or composing of music, e. g., our mental processes do not move in one level alone. The higher is always supervening on the lower and taking over partial control. Moral choices also in the same way move in different causal levels and become free only when they are governed by their own appropriate necessity. The determinist makes the point that nothing could be absolutely unrelated to any thing and that even moral choices are ultimately based on certain factors in the personality which may be obvious or which may not be so. The moral will is free in the sense not that it

is entirely uncaused but that it may not be entirely explainable on the basis of the known causes. Thus the essential difference between the two schools seems to lie in the fact that while in both the schools there is moral responsibility, one maintains complete causality while the other upholds partial causality. The extreme school of indeterminism argues that it is not caused while the more moderate section accepts that it is not uncaused but that we do not know all the causes. The moderate determinist accepts this view and has his point gained since the other accepts that the moral choice is determined but not completely. The school of thought calling itself as self-determination and which argues that it is different from both indeterminism and determinism does not seem to be original and comes in the scope of determinism. In his "Second Thoughts On Moral Philosophy", Ewing very clearly brings out the fact that whether it is the case that every event is caused or not, it is quite clear that I cannot be said to be responsible for an act of choice or volition unless it is caused, i. e. by myself. It should have been fixed, settled and decided by myself and this is the same thing as saying that I caused it. If it is not determined by any thing at all, I should be no more responsible for it than if another person had brought it about. My responsibility implies that the action is due to myself. Unless the so called free acts are caused by me, I cannot be held responsible for them. Indeterminism cannot prove that I am responsible for my moral choice by saying that they are entirely uncaused and perfectly free. It is no doubt true that the agent cannot be said to be the whole cause. To argue that our moral will is not based on anything at all or that it is entirely spontaneous having no origin at all is an exaggerated statement which does not lead us any where. Nor are statements made by some moralists that free will represents the most distinctive endowment of man or that conscience and will go together seem to be relevant in the context of determinism and moral responsibility and hence need not be taken seriously.

We seem to be on definite grounds when we state that even moral volitions are caused. The question may be raised whether in the realm of morality the causes as we ordinarily understand in science are applicable. It is one thing to accept that causes are operative in the moral sphere also and quite another to disclaim the knowledge of how they operate. We have to make a distinction between cause and ground or reason, the latter implying all the relevant and operative factors in the arising of the effect. It may be that we are not conversant with all the factors operative in the causal situation. But this may not go

against the general position that all events are caused or that they have an explanation. Moral factors are no exception to this principle though it may not be possible in all cases to find out all the operative elements. A great source of confusion in all the cases of determination of causation is the fact that the principle of causation is geared to epistemology and ontology and each must be kept relatively distinct. "A is causally related to B" is an ontological statement. But this is different from saying that B can be inferred or predicted whenever A is present. If I am unable to predict this, it does not imply that A and B are not causally related. In sociological, psychological and in biological phenomena or situations we do not know what are all the specific and relevant causal factors in any one particular situation. It is clear that this is quite different from saying that there are no causes in these situations. Mr. Wilson in his treatment of the subject maintains that causal necessity in such cases should be taken as holistic with respect to the relevant controlling factors rather than fragmental with respect to those factors. In his own words, "Causal necessity is a concept that is meaningful only as a function of all the relevant causal factors whether known or unknown taken collectively." Applying this to the subject on hand he says that a basic heuristic postulate for determinism is that it is worth while without limit to formulate and if possible to test experimentally such hypotheses regarding currently missing causal factors. Since the determinist assumes that every instance of apparent lack of causal necessity is an instance of fragmental knowledge of the relevant causal factors, the above procedure becomes necessary.

There is another view-point regarding the meaning of the term freedom. The term may mean either absence of causes or being uncaused or it may also mean that the agent was not compelled or constrained to perform it. When a person acts through the influence of a drug, or of threats or of post-hypnotic suggestions, he is not free since he is constrained to act in that way. On other occasions human beings act in certain ways because of their own rational desires, because of their own unimpeded efforts. In other words, they have chosen to act in these ways. On these occasions they are free agents although their actions are just as much caused as actions that are not deemed free. Even in this distinction between free and unfree actions, we do not so much mark the presence and absence of causes but attempt to indicate the *kind* of causes that are present.

From the standpoint of Indian thinking, it has been argued by the free-willists that while it is true that causes are operative

in nature, man who is preeminently a moral and spiritual being, has the capacity of thinking, deciding and acting above and beyond the limiting environment and that herein lies his superiority to other beings who have no such ability. It is glibly argued that since man is the crown of creation, he is necessarily free in his moral behaviour, and that he is untrammelled by the limitations in the material sphere. In his spiritual moments he is in the supra-causal sphere and this state is beyond the empirical. But even in such cases we cannot say that the moral will is absolutely unconnected with the several factors that determine it. The two acid tests are: (1) has it any basis or reason or ground or is it uncaused and unrelated to any other things? (2) did the moral will come out spontaneously, as it were, without recourse to any discursive thinking, without undergoing any moral conflict, as though by intuition? The alleged free will is neither the one nor the other.

Advocates of the *karma* theory, once again are divided into two schools, one arguing that *karma* determines once and for all our course of actions and that hence if we accept the *karma* theory, we have to give up the principle of moral freedom. Another school advocates that the *karma* theory is not so tight and rigid and that it is not inconsistent with the freedom of the will. In the material world actions and reactions are strictly propotional and relevant to each other but man has to some limited extent the capacity of modifying some of the links which in its turn modifies the general nature of the action. The will is not necessarily bound to the chariot wheels of action and reaction, for in changing one constituent in the causal fibre, he effects a change which gradually modifies the causal chain. An individual may have some bad trait in his character but if he is conscious of it and regularly has by meditation or regular thinking a different and opposite picture of this trait, in course of time it vanishes leaving the good trait in its place. But even here one may say that the change has come about by a previous antecedent, viz, a deliberate thinking of the opposite, and that the alleged free will is only caused. We need not quarrel about words and if this is likely to give any satisfaction to the determinist, it is no great matter. But this should not lead us to the extreme conclusion that man is always free. If the individual is too lazy or apathetic to do this he cannot be free in the sense of overcoming the limitations of the enviroment. He is bound to lead a mechanical and limited life.

We may conclude as follows: Both determinism and indeterminism become fallacious when we push them to their logical conclusion.

Determinism is right in asserting the supremacy of the law of cause and effect. Every thing that happens is a necessary outcome of a preceding state of things. It is an inevitable conclusion of modern science and also an a priori fundamentum of thought itself. Indeterminism does not seem to be right in positing a "will" that stands outside the chain of causation absolutely uninfluenced by the previous state of things or situation. But if determinism identifies itself with materialism and argues that since every effect has a cause that hence even in human action this causation is only purely physical or chemical it goes wrong. If the contention is that the human mind or will can originate nothing, then it becomes incorrect. It is true that there is some connection between body and mind. We know very little of the connection between the two. "In Evolution in Action", Julian Huxley says that the mind is more than a mere mechanical nervous system. The mind transmutes quantity into quality. Hence we are not justified in projecting the mechanical causation even in the sphere of mind.

Nor should determinism be identified with the doctrine of fatalism. This implies that irrespective of what one may do to promote or prevent, a given event will somehow take place. This exaggerated determinism commits the fundamental fallacy of ignoring the capacity of the wishes, choices and decisions of the individual or the agent. As Hazlitt says in his "Foundations of Morality", fatalism would make us all quietists and inactivists, disregarding all human initiative and will. But determinists merely assert that nothing happens without a cause and that every state of affairs is the outcome of a preceding state of affairs.

Also when we argue that the will is free, what exactly is the implication? The will is not free from causation. We are not absolutely free. We have only freedom to act, freedom to aim at definite ends, freedom to choose between alternatives, freedom to act in accordance with the pronouncements of reason. Freedom is only from external constraint or coercion and freedom from the compulsion of momentary appetite or impulse. Determinism thus does not exempt any one from moral responsibility. A. J. Ayer in his *Philosophical Essays*, writes, "That my actions should be capable of being explained is all that is required by the postulate of determinism..."

There is thus no irreconcilable antithesis between determinism and free will when both are rightly understood.

T. M. P. Mahadevan

CONCLUDING ADDRESS

My first word is one of thanks to all those who have participated in this seminar and contributed to its success. Most of you have attended previous seminars and therefore the task of the Director was made very much easy during these three days of seminar discussions; especially since we were discussing Determination and Moral Freedom and we were assured by many of the participants that the reconciliation is to be found in the concept of self-determination. The Director naturally felt that each participant must self-determine so far as his part in the seminar was concerned. I must say that this has been one of the most fruitful seminars that we have had so far. We did anticipate that more time would be spent in unravelling the nuances that lie within the term "Determinism" than in what the other part of the caption might need, that is "Moral Freedom". Naturally several of the papers were more concerned with explication of the meaning of Determinism than with tackling the problem of Moral Freedom. Even in regard to Freedom I did also anticipate that it would be discussed in a much wider context than in the context of ethics. That is what exactly has happened.

We were discussing more 'Determinism and Freedom' than 'Determinism and Moral Freedom'. That was as it should be. Probably if the theme was not so defined we might have cast our nets much wider than what we did attempt in these three days. Several types of determinism, determination at different levels, were considered by the participants—physical determinism, vital or biological determinism, psychological determinism, ethical, moral, zoological determinism, etc.—and I have not kept count of the other types of determinism that were either mentioned or expounded during these sessions of the seminar.

More than one speaker referred to the relevance of the principle of indeterminacy for understanding the problem of moral freedom. I am one of those who believe that it is not very wise for the philosopher or the metaphysician to welcome any new discovery in the field of science and exploit it for the purpose of what he might imagine as proving his conclusion. Moral freedom cannot be proved to be significant because some of the physicists today are inclined to believe that there is no strict determinism in the sub-atomic world. If moral freedom was significant before this discovery of the theory, it cannot become more significant today. The significance of moral freedom must be considered without too much reliance, I would underline the word "too much", on what may happen in the exact sciences. For the logical difficulty would be this:

Was the concept of moral freedom non-significant before and has it become significant now? If tomorrow—or even at present—, some physicists believe that the principle of indeterminacy does not mean the absence of determination, are we prepared to say that moral freedom is not a worthwhile concept? But I would welcome the help that we may derive from such a theory, in order to expound the doctrine that we believe to be intrinsically true. I am reminded of Cassirer's words in this context. He, I believe, says: "Ethics should not be forced to build its nests in the gaps of physical causation". But at the same time if a certain theory in physics removes the obstacle in the way, we would certainly welcome that step. So, it is more a negative view of some of the scientific discoveries that we must welcome rather than any positive help.

I do not want to traverse those grounds which have been covered more than once during the discussions at the seminar. I am interested in understanding the meaning of freedom, moral freedom. Freedom certainly means absence of constraint. This is the irreducible minimum of the significance of the term 'freedom'. While referring to the *mukta*, the liberated person, or the one who has realized perfection, a text of the Upaniṣad says:

sa uṭtama-puruṣaḥ sa tatra paryeti jakṣan-kṛīḍan ramamāṇaḥ strībhir-vā yānair-vā jñātibhir-vā nopajanam smarannidam śarīram sa yathā prayogya ācaraṇe yukta evamevāyamasmiñcharīre prāṇo yuktaḥ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VIII, xii, 3).

Now, this is a crucial passage because here the Upaniṣad says that the liberated man may act in any way he likes, even in ways which are considered to be not only non-moral but immoral.


He may court with women, enjoy vehicles, and so on. He can laugh, he may sport, he may use chariots, he may keep the company of the people who are not respectable. Now fishing out this passage, critics of Vedānta say that Vedānta does not lay stress on morality. If the perfect man does not obey moral rules, it means that morality has not any significance for Vedānta. That is the criticism that has been made especially by some of the Orientalists of the West. Even Hume, the well known translator of the Upaniṣads, makes this criticism in his introduction. Our reply is that these words should be taken in a figurative sense. They should not be interpreted literally. The meaning is that the realized one is above law, above moral rules. It does not mean that he can act in any immoral way. It means that he does not act under the pressure of any sense of 'ought'. Virtue becomes natural to him, that is what Śaṅkara and others say. Virtue is not in his case some quality acquired through effort and preserved through conscious effort, but virtue is natural to him even as fragrance is natural to a flower and is not put into it artificially. Virtues like truth and non-violence are natural to the *jñānī*, to the *mukta*. That is the meaning. But I am trying to draw another implication from this text on this occasion. The question is 'what is freedom?', 'who is free?' One who is not under the sense of any constraint, one who has no limitation, even the distinction that we make between good and evil, one who has gone beyond even good and evil, is perfectly free. Now from our empirical standpoint, so far as our wordly experience goes, whom do we call a free man? One who does not obey any rule, one who is erratic and one whose conduct cannot be predicted and one who behaves as he feels, one who is not under any compulsion, one who is non-conformist: him we call free. This is the sub-moral level. In the sub-moral level we know of free people. We call them perfectly free in this empirical sense. They do not conform to any rule. They are not afraid of public opinion. They do not expect your approbation. They do not mind your condemnation. They are free, they are sub-moral. Similarly, those who have gone beyond the moral realm are also free. So, at the sub-moral level, there is freedom with which we are acquainted only too well, and the Upaniṣad makes use of this idea in order to indicate to us what perfect freedom is, what the nature is of the man who has gone beyond the realm of claims and counter-claims.

We are acquainted with pseudo freedom; but the real freedom is there when there is no other self at all; when there is no possibility of constraint, there you have perfect freedom. But in between the two extremes is the moral world. In the moral world you have freedom and

also constraint, determination and freedom, because the moral world, I believe, is necessarily a world which is at conflict with itself, and which endeavours by stages to overcome the contradiction. Dr Gopalan, I think, referred to sociology or the social realm as a field of claims and counter-claims. This is true of morality as a whole. The moral world is a world of claims and counter-claims, and therefore so long as we are bound to this world we have to say that there is this contradiction and that it may be reconciled in the concept of self-determination. What does self-determination mean? The difficulty was pointed out by Dr Narayana Pillai; self-determination implies the identity of the determining self and the determined self. How can these be identical unless you are specifying selfhood, one part of it determining the other part, and how without this division can you speak of self-determination? How can one and the same self be both the subject of determination and the object which is determined? So there is a contradiction, and that is why we believe that perfect freedom is possible only when one goes beyond the moral realm. So long as there is a sense of ought there cannot be freedom in the plenary sense of the term. At the lower level there is an 'is-ness' but there is no 'oughtness', and we say there is freedom. At the higher level one has gone beyond the sense of ought. In between, in this middle region of morality, we have necessarily to face a contradiction. We might say, we have to say, that there is determinism as well as freedom. In the moral world there is necessarily oughtness. But when the oughtness becomes is-ness we have perfect freedom. You do not pass moral judgement on infants, the insane and the disembodied spirits, because there is no real action there, there is no governance by a rule or even an attempt to be governed. That is why we say that the insane and the infants are exempted from the application of laws and rules. The *muktas* behave like children, the insane and the disembodied spirits. For them there is perfect freedom. But as long as we have not reached that goal we have to struggle. The moral realm is a world of struggle, and in this struggle we have necessarily to make compromises. Without compromise there can be no progress at all; and it was with this in view that the theme was framed as 'determinism and moral freedom.' We have endeavoured to consider this perennial question, in this seminar, from a variety of standpoints. This perennial question, I think, has received some clarification. I thank all of you for the contributions you have made towards this end.

PART TWO

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR
ON
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
IN PHILOSOPHY



T. M. P. Mahadevan

INAUGURAL ADDRESS — I

Friends,

On behalf of the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy in the University of Madras I extend to you a warm welcome to this joint seminar of the three Centres of Advanced Study in Philosophy. Soon after these Centres of Advanced Study were set up in 1964, the Directors of these Centres felt that they should plan the projects of these Centres in consultation with one another—that these Centres, besides having their own individual programmes of work, should also undertake some projects together. In June 1965 the three Directors met in Madras and made certain proposals which would promote mutual co-operation among the three Centres of Advanced Study. One of the proposals was that periodically the three Centres should hold joint seminars.

Under the U. G. C. scheme for seminars, each Centre arranges for two seminars of an All-India character every calendar year; but the Directors felt that periodically there should be seminars sponsored by the three Centres together. Early this year, the second meeting of the Directors of these Centres was held in Banaras and the proposal for the first joint seminar was finalised. The arrangement was that the first joint seminar should be held in Madras and that the members of the other two Centres should come to Madras to participate in this seminar. The subject that was chosen is a very important one in the world of philosophy today: "The Problem of Philosophical Method".

Besides these periodical joint seminars, we are also having other projects which would bring the three Centres together. One of the projects is to prepare a bibliography on recent Indian philosophy—the country being divided into three regions and the three Centres

being responsible for collecting data in regard to the bibliography pertaining to the regions concerned. We have also a scheme for exchange of the members of the three Centres of Advanced Study. Although we feel that this is an item of work which is difficult to accomplish, the idea is that a member from one Centre may stay in any of the other two Centres for a period of not less than a month and not more than three months and get acquainted with the work of the Centre concerned and participate in the activities of that Centre. The implementation of this proposal will naturally take time, and I hope shortly some effort will be made in the direction of exchanging teachers for short periods. As most of you know, these three Centres have been publishing works relating to philosophy in different areas of study and also periodicals which include the papers presented at the various seminars and special articles. I am sure those who are interested in the progress of philosophy in this country will take advantage of these publications.

I said the theme that has been chosen for this seminar is an important one. There is a school of philosophy prevalent in the West and beginning to be felt in our own country which believes that there is nothing more for philosophers to do than to consider the method of enquiry. It is a challenge to those philosophers who still have a soft corner for systematic philosophy, and I am sure that the members of the three Centres will be discussing this problem, either substantiating this challenge or proposing counter-challenges. Those who would attend these sessions of the seminar are welcome to join in the discussions after the presentation of these papers. I am glad that in Madras there is a fairly substantial section of knowing people or knowledgeable people who are interested in the work of this Centre and in philosophy in general. I should thank all of them for the sustained interest they have been taking in the philosophical activities that are being carried on at the Centre; and I welcome one and all of you to this unique seminar where the members of the three Centres are coming together to discuss one of the vital problems in current philosophy.

I have requested my two esteemed colleagues who hail from the other two Centres to address this inaugural session. Dr Santosh Sengupta comes from Santiniketan. He is deputising for the Director cum Vice-Chancellor of Visva Bharati Dr Kalidas Bhattacharya. Ever since Dr Bhattacharya became the Vice-Chancellor, the burden of the Directorship of this Centre has fallen on the shoulders of my colleague Dr Santosh Sengupta. Only recently he was in Vienna participating in the International Congress of Philosophy; and I am sure he has fresh things to say about the state of things obtaining

in the world of philosophy. I invite him to address this inaugural meeting. After him Dr Tripathi will speak. The Director of the Advanced Centre in the Banaras Hindu University, Dr. N.K. Devaraja, was expected this morning and possibly he has arrived. But at my request, in the absence of Dr Devaraja, Dr Tripathi has agreed to speak. So my thanks are due to him in a double measure. He is not new to this Centre. He has participated in some of the former seminars here; and those of you who have heard him speak will naturally be glad that he is going to speak at this inaugural session.

Santosh Sengupta

INAUGURAL ADDRESS — 2.

Professor Mahadevan and Friends,

I bring to you all warm greetings from Visva-Bharati and Santiniketan. We meet here this morning for the Inaugural Session of the Joint Seminar of the three Centres of Advanced Study in Philosophy. Since the inception of the three Centres each Centre organised on the average two All-India Seminars each year. To each of the seminars scholars from different parts of India were invited to present papers on a specified topic. Our experience of the seminars is that each seminar provided an opportunity for the needed communication or dialogue among the scholars from different institutions, which apart from its social value, is basic to philosophical understanding. In the course of the organisation of the seminars we too, however, felt the need for greater communication among the teachers and scholars of the three Centres and it was decided at the meeting of the Directors of the three Centres to hold a joint seminar of the three Centres. It is good that the members of the staff of the three Centres are here to exchange ideas and to discuss the research projects in which they are engaged. I have no doubt that this meeting will promote the co-ordination among the three Centres. The representation from Visva-Bharati is not adequate for certain unavoidable reasons. The unavoidable clash of the time of the seminar with the days of the most popular religious festival in Bengal, i. e., the Durga Puja, prevented some colleagues from participating in the seminar. Besides, the U. G. C.'s guideline to restrict the number of delegates from the three Centres to the main participants and to the minimum created some confusion and uncertainty.

2. It will be relevant to say a few words about the activities of our Centre. Our Centre which started in 1964 has a formidable staff. We have three full Professors, four Readers, six Lecturers, three

Research Associates, two Senior Research Fellows, three Junior Research Fellows and six Research Scholars. Since the inception of the Centre our endeavour has been to promote, as in accordance with the objective of the U. G. C. 'excellence in teaching and research'. Our Centre is called the Centre of Advanced Study in Metaphysics, and as Metaphysics is as comprehensive as philosophy itself our scholars are engaged in research on varied philosophical subjects. One distinctive feature of our activity is freedom both in respect of subject and standpoint. The range of the subject of our philosophical investigation extends from symbolic logic to comparative religion. The scope of the mode of approach to philosophical subjects is equally wide enough and this has resulted in the climate of continued debate. The dominant feature of this debate is the dialogue between the Positivists and those who have set themselves to restore or reconstruct metaphysics on the basis of the examination of the positivistic challenge. A considerable part of our research output has been published. The publications include 19 books and a good number of papers. Besides, we bring out regularly a bi-annual journal (known as the Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy) under the editorship of our Vice-Chancellor and Director Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya. We have so far published nine issues of the Journal. I may state, in this connection, that we publish contributions from outside. One distinctive feature of our activities is the organisation of seminars at all levels. We have regular research scholars' and teachers' seminars. Besides, we organise two seminars each year. Since the inception of the Centre we had seven All-India Seminars and one Regional Seminar. We had also a good number of distinguished scholars from this country and abroad. Our Centre has a separate Library. The books and the periodicals now number 20549 and 90 respectively. We cannot have all the books we need for restricted foreign exchange. Besides, the book grant is not at all adequate.

3. There is no doubt that the three Centres have contributed to advance philosophical studies in India. Nevertheless, the Centres have important tasks ahead. One distinctive feature of the present philosophical situation of this country is that the considerable growth of philosophical interest has not meant the corresponding rise of independent and constructive thinking. It is no exaggeration to state that, on the whole, philosophical activity in our country is rather imitative. Generally we are busy defending or rejecting what the contemporary and the current western philosophical pundits of different brands say or state. I earnestly believe that the three Centres have a responsibility with regard to promoting a climate in which philosophical activity can be directed to the initiation and

the systematisation of independent reflections and the building of our schools of philosophy. In the conversation I had with the Western philosophers in the 14th session of International Philosophical Congress which was held in Vienna this month I had the impression that the philosophers of the West are interested in what *we* have to say on the philosophical problems. This was evident from my encounter with the persistent query: What schools of Philosophy are you building at the Centres? This query represents a challenge to us. In meeting this challenge we shall not only be true to our philosophical conviction but also recover the heritage of Indian philosophical thought which is the heritage of independent and constructive thinking.

4. The subject for the Seminar is the problem of method in philosophy. The main participants will approach the subject from different standpoints and the discussion on the varied theses will naturally yield the needed clarification of and the illumination on the subject in question. I have no paper to add to the list. I shall only make a few ad-hoc observations on the subject.

(a) The question at once arises: Why do we talk of the *problem* of method in philosophy? The negative way of formulating the query is: why don't we talk of any such problem, i. e., the problem of method in the context of say, science, (empirical study) and mathematics. The answer to the second question which is a partial answer to the first is that science and mathematics are bodies of knowledge which are determinate in respect of (a) nature or scope, (b) the boundaries or the limits and (c) the results and the conclusions arrived at. For instance, we are all agreed on the nature of (a) (b) (c) of science and mathematics. We know that the two follow the methods of observation and experiment and of analysis and deduction respectively. But we do not have this situation (this is the problem or the predicament) in the case of philosophy. There are varying views of philosophy and correspondingly different views of methods of philosophy. This is not the place to indicate the range of such variation. This range extends from philosophy as a body of intuitive truths to philosophy as an activity i. e., an act of clarification and 'of uncovering nonsense'. Thus on the one hand philosophy unlike poetry has an essential cognitive claim and, on the other hand, it unlike mathematics or science appears as indeterminate and variable and this gives rise to the problem or the predicament. The point is that there should be agreement on the nature or the scope and the method of an enquiry that claims to be a body of knowledge, i. e., there should be reasonably a clear idea of the object that is enquired into and of the mode or path of investigation.

(b) Now, the principal reason for the disagreement on the nature and the method of philosophy and the consequential predicament is the bias for a certain model and the resultant attempt to base philosophy on such a model. The typical of such models are (a) mathematics, (b) science or empirical study, (c) language. Now the viewing of philosophy on the model or analogy of some other discipline is to miss the nature of philosophy as a distinct body of knowledge having a distinct method. The minimum of philosophy is that it is autonomous so far as it investigates a type of object which is beyond the scope of mathematics or any other discipline to which philosophy is subordinated.

(c) I call such object being (not in the singular but in the plural). Being is the ground which the data concerned point to. The nature of such being is that it is partly manifest and partly hidden, i. e., it has an essential beyond-character. Now there are three different types of data, types corresponding to different types of awareness which are, broadly speaking, object-awareness, self-awareness and value-awareness. It follows that correspondingly there are different types of being. That is, philosophy is ontology.

(d) Now the ontology which philosophy is, cannot be, in view of the nature of being, an empirical study or a deductive discipline, as the tools of experience and analysis or deduction cannot fathom the nature of the ontic correlates to the data in question. We can say that each of the correlates to the data is of the nature of a mystery so far as it is manifest and is yet hidden. I shall, therefore, characterise the mode of approach to beings as mystical, mystical not in the sense of the spiritual but in what I call its deeper meaning. The ontology which philosophy is has to rely ultimately on the mystical approach. I say 'ultimately' because in the initial stage of philosophical or metaphysical enquiry the methods of experience, analysis and clarification are employed. This is so because the stand-point of philosophical investigation is awareness of different types, and an enquiry thereinto is possible through empirical inspection. In the course of the enquiry one is aware of the implications of the states of awareness, the implications which the operation of reason in the form of analysis or clarification unfolds. Now an empirical inspection of awareness and the unfolding of the implications of the data cannot reveal being-in-itself, the beyond, and this is the mystical. If it is urged that what I call the mystical approach cannot be a method *qua* a method must be fully adequate to the object of enquiry, the answer is that it is enough if the method we adopt can be a pointer to or a hint at the nature of being. The way of pointers as ex-

pressed through symbols, metaphors and analogies is assuredly a method. We can, therefore, legitimately talk of methods in philosophy. The belief that philosophy can have only one method is superstition. We have to distinguish between the initial and the ultimate mode of approach of philosophical enquiry.

5. Before I close I offer on behalf of Visva-Bharati and you all grateful thanks to Professor T. M. P. Mahadevan and his colleagues for the trouble they have taken to organise the joint seminar. When I suggested at the last meeting of the Directors that Madras should be the venue of the seminar Professor Mahadevan readily accepted my proposal. Personally I always look forward to a visit to Madras and to the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy. It is rewarding to meet a scholar of Prof. Mahadevan's stature. Let us hope that we shall have another joint seminar before long. We shall be happy to have the next joint seminar at Santiniketan. I on behalf of our Vice-Chancellor and Director invite you all to Santiniketan. At Santiniketan we cannot offer you all the amenities which we have here but we can assure you of the warmth of our heart and the earnestness of our hospitality. Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore desired that Visva-Bharati should be a meeting ground of scholars from different parts of the world. We eagerly look forward to your visit to Santiniketan in the near future.

The contemporary scene in Philosophy would appear to an observer from outside, rather bizzare and bewildering. There seems to be a kind of anarchy prevailing in the sphere of philosophy today. The erstwhile Queen of sciences does not look today even like a discipline, much less a spiritual discipline. There seem to be no rules of the game: there seems to be neither a direction nor a goal. Every player is playing the game in his own way. What is more surprising is that even after centuries of cultivation, philosophy is asking all kinds of questions about itself today. It is called upon to explain its function, to declare its programme, to justify its existence and to demonstrate its validity. Indeed, philosophy appears to be in the dock today and seems to be having a rather precarious existence.

To a philosopher, however, all this would not appear to be unusual or unnatural and deplorable. For one thing, philosophy is easily the most self-conscious intellectual activity of man. Naturally therefore the philosopher, instead of positively philosophising, asks questions regarding the nature of philosophy, its goal and its method. In fact, this itself is part of philosophising. These questions are not extra-philosophical questions but questions that arise from within philosophy and are essentially philosophical. To be sure, there seems to be an inner dialectic always operating in philosophy and forcing it to have some kind of stock-taking or self-examination from time to time. This has happened in the past also and has proved wholesome.

It seems to us that the chaotic condition prevailing in western philosophy today is mainly due to one reason. The European thinker is not yet clear as to what kind of knowledge philosophy is expected to give. Does philosophy extend the frontiers of knowledge

like science? If so, how does it do that? If not, what does philosophy do? So the question regarding the method of philosophy is really the question whether philosophy gives any useful knowledge or any knowledge at that. It is thus obvious that the problem of method in philosophy is closely linked up with the problem of its worthwhileness and value. In this connection, it is possible to generalise that a particular method of philosophy is correlated to a certain ideal of knowledge which in its turn is related to the kind of value attached to philosophy.

In the west, there seem to be broadly speaking, two ideals of knowledge between which western philosophy has been oscillating down the ages, sometimes leaning to the one and then swinging to the other producing scepticism in the process. The two ideals are represented by mathematics on the one hand and positive sciences on the other. Right from the time of Pythagoras down to Bradley and Whitehead, it is mathematics that seems to have furnished the ideal of knowledge for the great speculative philosophers of the west. However, there has also been a line of thinkers who have revolted against the high a priori method and who have tried to replace the mathematical ideal by the ideal of scientific knowledge. The see-saw between rationalism and scientism or empiricism, as we may briefly describe them, continues even today.

II

There is no doubt that mathematics has something very attractive about it. In mathematics, propositions are universal and necessary; there is no scope for difference of opinion or individualism. Personal whims and fancies find no place in mathematics. It is in mathematics that we find a well knit system in which the different propositions are coherently and logically related; it is a perfectly deductive system. Finally, mathematics (and this is its most important and attractive feature) is wholly a priori, it depends wholly on reason and not on experience. From all this, the western thinker seems to have drawn two conclusions. Firstly, the human intellect is independently capable of universal and necessary knowledge.¹ Secondly if philosophy aspires to give universal and necessary knowledge, it must follow the a priori method of mathematics—Plato the father of western philosophy regarded proficiency in mathematics as a necessary condition or qualification for training in philosophy. Descartes the father of modern philosophy was a mathematician. Spinoza, a close follower of his, went to the length of saying that truth would have remained "hidden to

human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and property of figures without regard to their final causes". (*Ethics*, Appendix to Part I). Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz too regarded mathematics as the paragon of all science; in fact apriorism reaches its peak in his philosophy. All knowledge seems to be innate and there is no need of experience or intuition. In spite of the Kantian criticism against apriorism, the story is repeated in the philosophy of Hegel where reason is not only one with knowledge but also with reality.

Philosophy follows the high a priori method of mathematics with the ambition of achieving universal and necessary knowledge and with the hope of ending all controversies and conflicts. But the result seems to have been quite the reverse, innumerable a priori speculative systems each claiming final truth have come into existence. Verily apriorism has defeated its own purpose. This alone ought to have been an effective self-condemnation of rationalism. But it has not been, and so time and again criticism and empiricism alike have had to raise their voice in protest against 'armchair-philosophy' or the ambitious a priori method. Aristotle protested against Plato and insisted on the role of experience in knowledge. Modern empiricists started by refuting the doctrine of innate ideas, and Kant exploded the superstition of the rationalists by pointing out the antinomies in which one is involved while extending the categories beyond experience with the hope of comprehending the unconditioned. Contemporary positivists refute rationalism by means of their doctrine of meaning or verifiability.

In spite of these repeated and varied attacks, the shadow of rationalism did not and does not leave philosophy and this for certain reasons. Firstly in all these criticisms of rationalism, there seems to have been some lacuna or other. Aristotle and Locke were themselves rationalists, to a certain extent at least. Kant denied the validity of metaphysical propositions but admitted the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions in mathematics and science. Contemporary positivists go further and deny a priori synthetic propositions even in mathematics and science, but as their denial is based on a dogmatic theory of meaning, it is not effective. The other reason why rationalism persists in the west is that if rationalism is abandoned, there occurs a vacuum which is not filled by anything better. The only alternative to rationalism is empiricism which seems to be worse. The only useful purpose which positivism has served is to insist that if

philosophy claims to give us knowledge it must have the support of experience or else it is meaningless.

III

As pointed out above, being disillusioned about the pretensions of the rationalist, the western thinker has no other option before him but to take science as the ideal of knowledge. Scientific knowledge has attractions of its own and is no less charming than mathematics. Firstly, it is verifiable knowledge, it is open to all and there is no mystery about it. Science is progressive and does not swear by finality; it is at all stages receptive to correction and change. And finally, scientific knowledge is useful knowledge; science along with technology promises to materialise the dream of bringing the kingdom of Heaven to earth. In contrast, metaphysical propositions are unverifiable; they claim finality and seem to be quite useless and unnecessary so far as life is concerned. The world would not be the poorer for banishing metaphysics. The only worthwhile knowledge seems to be science and so the only proper method of knowledge is the scientific method. What cannot be had by scientific methods is not knowledge.

It is thus that the vacuum created by the rejection of rationalism is filled by scientism. All the same the western thinker does not seem to feel happy; there is something that makes him feel uneasy. Science has shortcomings peculiar to it; being utterly objective, it ignores the human soul and its aspirations; it lacks idealism and provides nothing to sustain the cultural life of man. In fact, the pursuit of science regardless of spiritual values seems to have brought humanity to the brink of doom and destruction. Rationalism is bad but the overthrow of rationalism seems to have been worse. Rationalism had at least some spirit and was concerned with the unconditioned, but scientism is lifeless and is not even concerned with the unconditioned. The pendulum therefore seems to be once more swinging back to some form of rationalism. This is how the west goes on oscillating between rationalism and scientism; the whole of western philosophy may be regarded as a record of the oscillation of the human mind between rationalist apriorism and empiricistic scientism.

IV

Centuries of cultivation have by now fully brought out the weaknesses of both rationalism and scientism. Rational speculation is empty and unverifiable. Pure reason cannot take us beyond mere concepts; it lands us in conflicts and antinomies. Empiricism,

on the other hand, is tentative and hazardous; it is limited in scope and sceptical in tendency; it suffers from spiritual poverty and is indifferent to the inner aspirations of man. In spite of all this, the western thinker finds that he has no other choice. This narrowing down of choice to these two approaches seem to be, according to us, primarily due to two basic fads or fallacies from which the west as a whole suffers.

Firstly, there is the craze that philosophy must be autonomous; it is a free rational enquiry and so it cannot accept anything from outside reason. This is a false kind of idealism because it is accepted without a criticism of the powers and limits of human reason; it is blind faith in the capacities of reason. Before raising the banner of the autonomy of reason, it must be enquired as to what reason can know or cannot know. Human intellect is neither a storehouse of all knowledge as conceived by Plato nor a source of the first principles as imagined by Descartes and other rationalists, nor one with reality itself as assumed by Hegel. All these are pre-critical assumptions rooted in the rationalist faith in the power of reason. Reason is merely formal and is therefore empty without some intuition which gives content; this is the limit of reason. It is therefore absurd to say that to discover the limit of reason is to go beyond that limit. To discover a limit to reason is nothing but to appreciate the need for some external help. To realize that pure reason cannot tell us whether there is a needle in the next room is to appreciate the need of perception. Similarly, if it is found out that reason cannot take us to the transcendent, then it would be sheer obstinacy, fanaticism and lack of humility not to listen to revelation which claims to give us a knowledge of the transcendent. After all, philosophy is not a mere worship of reason but an earnest search for truth; it is an existential concern, because our happiness which depends on truth is at stake here. The western thinker fails to appreciate the spirit of philosophy when he proposes to return to empiricism after the fall of rationalism. He does not see that philosophy arises in the wake of our discovery that the empirical cannot be ultimate and so a return to the empirical is ruled out once for ever—whether rationalism succeeds or fails. If rationalism fails we should turn to some other source and try that rather than come back to what has been thrown away, namely, the empirical. In the language of the Vedāntins, one cannot take what has once been vomitted (the empirical) however miserably one has failed in searching for food (truth).

The other fallacy of western thought seems to be an assumption that philosophy extends our knowledge of things. Reflection on the

nature of philosophy would show that philosophy is not an objective mode of consciousness but a reflection on objective modes of consciousness and as such it cannot add to the stock of objective knowledge. The philosopher does not have a sixth sense; he too has the same resources of knowledge which every one else has. He cannot therefore know something which is not already accessible to us all. He can only examine our common experience and make us aware of what is hidden or implicit. Critical analysis of experience (and not linguistic analysis) is the main function of the philosopher; he can only disentangle and distinguish, and make explicit what is implicit in experience. There is therefore no question regarding a special method of knowledge for philosophy. It is only when philosophy is regarded as a kind of objective knowledge that the questions regarding method and proof arise.

V

In India neither mathematics nor science is the ideal of knowledge: neither reason is extolled above sense-experience nor is sense-experience extolled above reason. There is no system of philosophy which may be called rationalist in the western sense of the term; there is none that regards reason as the source of metaphysical knowledge. Similarly there is no such thing as pure empiricism in India. Carvaka alone tries to approximate to the empiricistic ideal, but he has never been taken seriously. There has been no such thing as the conflict of rationalism and empiricism here. Nor do we have here the dogmatic idealism regarding the autonomy of philosophy, because philosophy here is not an exclusive worship of reason but a complete search for truth; the search is completed by passing on from reason to revelation. Reason therefore is not discarded but disciplined, that is, it is kept within its limits. Reason is only formal and can be helpful only in achieving consistency: unaided it can give us neither science nor philosophy. For science reason gets data from sense experience, and for philosophy it requires the aid of revelation. All the spiritual systems of Indian philosophy accept the indispensability of *śruti*. Jainism and Buddhism reject the Vedas but cannot dispense with the words of their prophets. The reason is that a categorical assurance about the transcendent can be had only from *śruti* or the words of one who has had experience. Reason can at best indicate the possibility but cannot categorically assert the existence or reality of the transcendent. To accept *śruti* is to accept the fact that the transcendent is known and knowable.

The acceptance of *śruti* is no doubt a matter of faith, because the validity of *śruti* cannot be demonstrated by any other means of knowledge; *śruti* has to be accepted just because all other sources fail to give us the transcendent. But it must be pointed out that the acceptance of *śruti* in philosophy is only initial and not final; the culmination of philosophy is in intuition. In fact, the acceptance of *śruti* means implicitly the acceptance of the possibility of experiencing what *śruti* conveys; because *śruti* is itself some one's experience. So faith here is not mere faith but the beginning of knowledge. This is the secret of the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*; truth revealed by *śruti* can be experienced even in this life, here and now and does not remain purely a matter of faith in the present life. Acceptance of *śruti* is therefore not dogmatism. Without accepting *śruti* philosophy will be empty speculation; without reason *śruti* cannot be properly understood and without experience (*anubhūti*) philosophy will not be knowledge but mere faith. So in India we have a synthesis of *śruti*, *yukti* and *anubhūti*.

It has been said above that philosophy is not an objective mode of consciousness; it is critical and reflective and therefore cannot be expected to add to our objective knowledge. This view would seem to come in conflict with the *pramāṇa-vāda* of Indian philosophy. Do the *pramāṇas* not give objective knowledge? It is true that *pramāṇas* other than *śruti* have been accepted by the different systems. But it may be pointed out that philosophically, only *śruti* is important; no other *pramāṇa* is really concerned with the transcendent and only with the transcendent. All other *pramāṇas* are only *laukika* or *vyāvahārika*. The absolutistic systems like Advaitism and the Mādhyamika do not attach much importance to other *pramāṇas*; only realist systems which are philosophically not reflective and critical, attach importance to other *pramāṇas*. They do not realize that if the *pramāṇas* were to determine a philosophy, how could we settle questions about *pramāṇas* themselves, questions such as those regarding the number and nature of *pramāṇas*, their relative importance and their scope. Questions concerning *pramāṇas* cannot themselves be answered by *pramāṇas* and so the *pramāṇas* cannot be ultimate. The *pramāṇas* themselves need the support of a philosophy. Moreover, as already noted, all other *pramāṇas* are necessarily limited to sense-experience; if they are extended beyond experience, they give only possibility and not reality. The case of *śruti* is different; it cannot be dispensed with as *śruti* alone gives us the message of the transcendent, and it tells us only of the transcendent and nothing else, and so it has no other importance except the philosophical. Moreover, *śruti* being based on experience gives us reality and not mere possibility.

We conclude then that the plague of positivism is an inevitable reaction against rationalistic apriorism and will persist so long as philosophy continues to be pure speculation in the name of autonomy, and the conflict between rationalism and empiricism will breed scepticism and encourage materialism in the process. Rationalism and empiricism both miss the point that philosophy is not an extension of objective knowledge and so neither the scientific ideal nor the mathematical ideal of knowledge can be accepted in philosophy. Empiricism has to rise above the animal faith in the reality of the empirical world while rationalism has to give up the natural disposition of the human mind to believe that it can comprehend the unconditioned. Empiricism has to be critical and criticism has to be receptive; it has to listen to *śruti*. This listening to *śruti* is not dogmatism as it is neither blind nor final; the acceptance of *śruti* permits criticism but not scepticism; it begins with faith but ends in experience. Philosophy is listening to *śruti* critically; it is directed reflection and not wayward thinking or speculation.

N. K. Devaraja

PRAMĀṆAS AND THE
MODES OF PHILOSOPHI-
CAL REASONING IN
INDIAN THOUGHT

Ancient and medieval Indian Philosophy is justly famed for its sustained interest in the nature and significance of the *Pramāṇas*. These latter stand, as we know, both for sources of knowledge and for the means of proof. The *Pramāṇas* are held in high regard by the Indian philosophers particularly those belonging to the realistic schools, e. g. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya. These systems attempt to establish their first principles such as God, Prakṛti and Puruṣa on the basis of the *Pramāṇas* particularly inference. However, the idealistic systems such as the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita schools of Vedānta, and the Mahāyāna systems of the Buddhists, do not attach as much importance to the *pramāṇas*. The different Vedāntic Schools of thought invariably declare the *śruti* to be the sole source of knowledge of the Ultimate. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja give expression to distrust of inference as an instrument of the cognition and proof of *Brahman*. Dialecticians like Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa give their own reasons for rejecting the claim of the *pramāṇas* as revealers of reality. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, no less than Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha, denounce the *pramāṇas* in order to make room for the *Śruti*; the dialecticians, on the contrary, seem to be driven by sheer iconoclastic zeal in demolishing the *pramāṇas* one after another.

II

Ancient and medieval Indian thinkers did not draw any distinction between science and philosophy. Science as a rigorous intellectual discipline was a commodity largely unknown to the Indian thinkers; they were acquainted with the two important branches of mathematics, namely Arithmetic and Algebra, but these hardly attracted the attention of the philosophers and logicians. Other sciences were cultivated on the practical plane, rather than

cherished or contemplated as theoretical enterprizes. As a consequence it never occurred to them to draw any distinction in respect of either the subject-matter or the method between philosophy on the one hand and the sciences on the other. It will not be too much to claim that the distinction is being brought to light only in our own time. Ancient and medieval thinkers all over the world identified philosophy with metaphysics, whose special task was to prove the existence and determine the essential nature of the ultimate reality or realities. However, *qua* philosophers, they were compelled to raise and discuss a number of non-metaphysical or non-ontological questions; but they failed to develop the awareness of the methods employed in the discussion of those questions. The dialecticians assailed the *pramāṇas*, but even they failed to see the distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical issues as also the distinction between methods employed in debating the two varieties of philosophical questions. We propose to clarify and substantiate these remarks in the following paragraphs. In our view both the votaries of the *pramāṇas* and their critics, i. e. the dialecticians, were unaware of the true character of philosophical reasoning. While the dialecticians used a type of philosophical reasoning for discrediting the views of their rivals, they failed to show how that reasoning could be used for more constructive purposes. But the constructive modes of philosophizing, not reducible to the employment of the *pramāṇas*, were not unknown to the Indian thinkers. One of our contentions is that the Indian thinkers and logicians failed to analyse the characteristic modes of philosophical reasoning. As metaphysicians, they made use not only of inference but also of the typically modern method called the hypothetico-deductive method. But the method was never analysed and systematically formulated by Indian logicians: The dialecticians of the variety of Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa were too much interested in the work of destruction, and too little concerned to analyse and illustrate the method of construction. Failing to evolve and use any such methods with proper awareness, they fell upon the evasive remedy of intuition or *Sākṣātkāra* as the mode of the apprehension of reality. If, however, it be conceded that the business of philosophy does not consist in delineating the structure of the factual reality or realities—since the investigation of these realities is both the burden and the prerogative of the sciences alone—then the problem of defining the nature and method of philosophy assumes altogether different complexion. We shall, however, attempt to expose the limitations of both the method of the *pramāṇas* and the method of dialectical criticism as applied to the field of philosophy.

III

The dialecticians, in criticizing the method of the *pramāṇas* in its application to the field of philosophy, were guided by a sure instinct. Philosophizing does not consist in the use either of perception or of inference. However, the motives that impelled the dialecticians to assail the *pramāṇas* were not ostensibly connected with the consideration of philosophical method. The Mādhyamikas led by Nāgārjuna were interested in establishing the unreality or *Sūnyatā* of all objects or entities including the *pramāṇas*: this led them to denounce the *pramāṇas* at the very outset. The later Vedāntists were concerned mainly to discredit the categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. The Naiyāyikas had declared that an object is established through definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and *pramāṇas*. This was taken to imply that an object that could not be defined was in some sense unreal. The Vedāntic dialecticians repudiated the ontological categories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by discrediting them dialectically. By the same logic they also repudiated the *pramāṇas*. Like their Mādhyamika predecessors, however, these Vedāntists too were not interested in re-defining the philosophical method.

The question is: what is the method or methods being implied by the Mādhyamika in his criticisms of the categories of the realists including the *pramāṇas*? It may be granted that the Mādhyamika dialectician does not appeal to perception or inference in his tirade against the realist categories, but it would be wrong to say that he uses no method at all. Furthermore, that method, whatever its nature, cannot be the exclusive property of the Mādhyamika philosophers. For unless the opponents of the Mādhyamika see the force of his criticism, and thus give their tacit approval to the Mādhyamika way of reasoning, the mode of reasoning exemplified in the Mādhyamika criticisms would not be valid or acceptable to observers. The opponents of the Mādhyamika can admit the force of the latter's criticisms only when they feel that his mode of reasoning is valid and acceptable. And the validity and acceptability of such mode or modes of reasoning is quite independent of whether the Mādhyamika cares to claim them or not. Our position is that there are valid forms of reasoning in philosophy which cannot be assimilated to one or other of the *pramāṇas*. The dialectical critic often makes implicit appeal to the law of contradiction; he frequently uses the argument called *reductio ad absurdum*. The latter type of argument, it will be seen, depends on an assumed premise or assumption, with which the proposed statement is shown to be incompatible. An example will clear the point. While criticising the concept of production Acārya

Buddhapālita is reported as having said that objects cannot be produced out of no-cause (*ahetutaḥ*) for in that case all things will become possible anywhere. Now this argument depends on a sort of common-sense notion in regard to the consequences of uncaused origination. Our common sense vouches for the intellectual perception that if things were to be produced from no-causes, anything would be possible anywhere. Similar remarks apply to the following statement of Nāgārjuna: 'whatever is produced through this or that (cause or condition), is not (therefore) produced through its own nature'.¹ This particular statement, which is enunciated as a principle by Nāgārjuna, is an assumption supposed to be acceptable to common sense. The assumption seems to be justified partly on account of the vagueness of the term *svabhāva*. Nāgārjuna is too clever to attempt a definition of *svabhāva*. Surely, there is no logical difficulty in supposing that the *svabhāva* of a thing includes the possibility of its production through causes and conditions.² But this latter supposition might have been contrary to the prevailing commonsensical, or seemingly commonsensical, supposition that *svabhāva* excluded all reference to entities other than the one being talked about. This example tends to show how philosophical arguments may depend for their plausibility on the assumptions and presuppositions of a particular age. Inasmuch as Nāgārjuna's proofs for the *śūnyatā* of things depend on the supposition under reference, his philosophy may fail to appeal to the modern mind. In this connection Nāgārjuna commits another fallacy; he refuses to distinguish between dependence in the causal sense and that understood in the logical sense. Thus, while the son considered as a physical being depends on his father in the causal sense, the applicability of the description 'father' to a person logically depends on the birth of a son or daughter to him.

The Vedāntic criterion of the real as that which maintains a steadfast or unchanging nature is again a sheer assumption or a presupposition. The criterion cannot be arrived at inductively except in an extremely vague sense, for nothing known in experience exhibits such a nature. It is interesting to contrast the Vedāntic notion of the real with that of the Vaibhāṣikas; according to the latter only that is real which has causal efficiency and so is liable to disappear into the effect.

It was observed above that Nāgārjuna, while criticizing the protagonists of the *pramāṇas*, fails to raise the problem of philosophical method; he uses a peculiar method without caring to analyse and characterize it. The procedure of the great Vedāntin Śrīharṣa is slightly superior to that of his Mādhyamika predecessors. He

explicitly raises, in his *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya*, the issue whether or not a discussion can proceed without acceptance of the so-called *pramāṇas* against the protagonists of the *pramāṇas*. He argues in a matter-of-fact manner that the Cārvākas and the Mādhyamikas proceed with their discussions without admitting the validity of the *pramāṇas*. In this connection he makes a very significant observation. He says: 'it is not the non-acceptance of the *pramāṇas* that can affect the capacity of a discourse to prove or disprove a view; what must be accepted is the condition that the discourse should be reasonable and proper (*sadvacana*).'⁸ Elucidating his proposal Śrīharṣa suggests that the parties in a dispute should proceed on the basis of some practical maxims that may be acceptable to all concerned. This proposal is eminently reasonable, but it cannot be a substitute for a careful analysis of the characteristic nature of philosophical reasoning. The reason why ancient and medieval Indian philosophers did not undertake a special analysis of philosophical reasoning, as already suggested, was that they did not see the distinction between scientific reasoning, i. e. reasoning applicable in factual discourse, and reasoning applicable in the realm of philosophical discourse which is conceptual rather than factual.

IV

Our last remark need not be taken to imply that we accept in *toto* the modern Anglo-American conception of philosophy as linguistic or conceptual analysis. In regard to this conception the present writer has definite reservations. However, I am fully convinced that philosophical reasoning in most cases, perhaps in all cases, is not reducible to inferential reasoning as practised in factual discourse. I shall now notice some other forms of reasoning employed by ancient and medieval Indian thinkers. Before doing that, however, I would like to take note of the ambiguity that attaches to the terms *tarka*, *yukti*, etc. as used in Indian logical literature.

The Nyāya writers, on the whole, are inclined to distinguish *tarka* from the *pramāṇas* proper. Vātsyāyana, in his *Bhāṣya*, describes *tarka* as auxiliary of the *pramāṇas*, which proceeds on the basis of causal considerations. Sometimes *tarka* is described as *anigṣṭa-prasanga*,⁴ which is a weaker form of *reductio ad absurdum*. *Tarka* is used to show that the non-acceptance of a certain inference may lead to violation of common sense. A yet another definition of *tarka* states: *tarka* consists in imputing the pervader (*vyāpaka*) through imputation of the pervaded (*vyāpya*).⁵ Thus the Naiyāyikas first impute effecthood (*kāryatva*) to the world and through it

prove it to be "made by an agent" (*karṭṛ-janya*). Is this sort of *tarka* the same as inference? One distinction of this type of argument is that it imputes an attribute which is not a visible mark in the manner of smoke in relation to fire. Effecthood is a conceptual attribute and not a visible attribute. The term *yukti* is often used as a synonym of *tarka*. Commenting on the sūtra 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' Śaṅkara observes that *yukti* is nearer to experience than *śruti*. Under the sūtra II. 2. 2. Śaṅkara remarks that the unseen is proved on the basis of the seen.⁶ He also avers that *anumāna* or inference depends on *pratyakṣa* or direct experience.⁷ These utterances seem to suggest that according to Śaṅkara inference and *yukti* or reasoning are identical. In one place the *Bhāmati* identifies *yukti* or argument with *arthāpatti* (presumption) and *anumāna* (inference).⁸ This description seems to subsume reasoning under *pramāṇas* as conceived by the Mīmāsakas and the later Vedāntins.

Hemacandra, the celebrated Jaina writer and philosopher, uses the term *ūha* to indicate reasoning. The term is also used in *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*. However, Hemacandra significantly adds that the sort of *vyāpti* whose knowledge constitutes *ūha* is not always cognized through direct perception. The relation of *vyāpti* can subsist among inferential objects as well. This makes *ūha*⁹ different from inference as conceived by the Nyāya logicians. All this would seem to indicate that reasoning as used in philosophical discourse is not generally reducible to inferences grounded in perceptual experience.

(1) The Naiyāyikas prove the existence of atoms as follows. Every whole consists of parts; it also has a beginning and an end. A whole can be broken into its smaller parts. But there is a limit to which the breaking or division of a whole can be carried on. The supposition of infinite divisibility of a whole would lead to the absurd conclusion that the mountain Meru and the mustard seed are equal in magnitude. In this argument the thesis of infinite divisibility of a whole is refuted by the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. This is supposed to prove the contrary thesis that a given whole is divisible only to a finite extent. This proof is different both from inference and from presumption.

(2) In his *Sārīraka Bhāṣya* Sankara establishes the existence of the self by a proof which reminds one of the transcendental proof of the validity of the categories offered by Kant under Transcendental Analytic in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant argues that without the operation of the categories or concepts of the understanding the experience of objects would not be possible. The categories alone make it possible for us to know anything as an object. Śaṅkara's argument for the existence of self, as interpreted

by his commentators and exponents, resembles this proof. The self in Śaṅkara's system is the *Prius* of experience or knowledge of objects. Says Śaṅkara: 'The knowledge of the self is not adventitious; on the contrary, the self is self-established..the self uses the *pramānas* such as perception and the like to establish the existence of objects previously unknown; it itself stands in no need of the *pramānas*..The *pramānas* being dependent on the self for their employment, the self itself is established before the operation of the *pramānas*.'¹⁰ The same point is made by Sureśvarācārya when he rhetorically asks: 'How can that from which the *pramānas* derive their validity, be made known by those *pramānas*?'

(3) Here is another example of a *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) which obtains between concepts rather than between visible things. Śaṅkara avers: 'An already existent is known through *pramānas* other than *śruti*, e. g. earth.'¹¹ How a *vyāpti* of this order is ascertained is a moot question. The relation of *vyāpti* here is not visible to the physical senses. Elsewhere Śaṅkara endorses the following argument: 'Unless there were something eternal already present, the word eternal could not make a compound with non *nañ* prefixed to it.' This argument, which is certainly fallacious, suggests a general principle on the basis of the prevalence of a certain linguistic usage.

(4) Indian philosophers recommend certain very general rules of propriety with respect to philosophizing. Such a rule is technically known as a *nyāya*. Thus we are told: 'It is simpler to imagine or presume the prevalence of a quality or characteristic than that of an entity'¹² and when the purpose can be served by the seen, the unseen should not be imagined or posited.'¹³ These rules of philosophizing follow from the ideals of simplicity and elegance in thinking; the well-known insistence on *kalpanā-lāghava* is another such rule which reminds one of Occam's Razor. No Indian logician or theorist of knowledge ever sought to indicate the origin of these rules, nor attempted to give their justification. Probably this is true of logicians and epistemologists of the western countries as well.

(5) Almost all the important thinkers of India make use of the hypothetico-deductive method in their speculative constructions. But the method was never consciously formulated by the Indian logicians and theorists of knowledge. Thus, neither the Naiyāyikas nor the Buddhist logicians ever cared to tell us how they had come by their peculiar definitions or conceptions of perception, inference, etc. The Buddhists believe only in two *pramānas*, perception and inference. But the peculiar definition or conception of perceptual cognition offered by Dīṇāga or Vasubandhu could not possibly have been

either obtained or justified by either of the two *pramāṇas*. The definitions or conceptions are taken to be justified, if at all, in their logical system by their success in giving a complete and connected account of all known forms of knowledge and reasoning. At the close of his famous manual *Tarka-Saṅgraha* Annam Bhatta remarks: 'Since all the entities in the world are exhaustively included under the *padārthas* described here, it follows that these are only seven in number'. This method of proving the fundamental propositions or presuppositions of a system is nowhere clearly enunciated by the Indian logicians and philosophers. Similar remarks apply to the assumption of such hypothetical entities and attributes by Indian thinkers as: the state of the equilibrium of *Prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya system; the assumption of such entities as *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* in the Vedāntic theory of perception; the assumption that cognition reveals at the same time the object of knowledge, the knower and itself (*trupuṣi-pratyakṣa*) in the epistemology of the Prābhākaras, etc.. All such assumptions are justified, if at all, by the simplicity and thoroughness with which the schemes embodying the assumptions in question are able to unify and explain the relevant conceptual phenomena or perceptions. It may be noted here that almost all the facts or factors to which the rival theorists appeal in the course of their arguments are of the nature of conceptual intuitions rather than perceptions of the physical type.

Through the processes of emergence and growth of different kinds of knowledge and through continuing analysis of experiences involved in cognitions, etc., the data relevant for philosophical reflection and explanation are constantly changing in quality and growing in bulk. Hence arises the need of attempting fresh statements and new explanations of those data. Thus the new scheme of elements formulated by modern chemistry makes necessary a drastic revision in the Vaiśeṣika account of the *dravyas* or substances; our growing knowledge of the chemical properties of diverse elements and compounds has similarly discredited the all too simple Sāṅkhya scheme of the three *guṇas*. The sciences of optics and physiology have rendered obsolete the delineations of the perceptual process by the Indian thinkers. Our acquaintance with the explanatory mechanisms of such diverse disciplines as physics and biology, history and economics, etc. has made us peculiarly sensitive to methodological issues; we are likewise more alive to varieties of viewpoints and possibilities of revolutionary changes in man's technical and historical environment. No such awareness of diversities and possibilities seriously disturbed the minds and/or affect the outlook of our ancient and medieval thinkers.

1. *Tat-tat prāpya yadupannam notpannam tat svabhāvataḥ*—*Mādhyaṃika-Kārikā*, quoted by Candrekīrti in Introduction to his commentary.

2. The pain caused by an insult does not cease to have a recognisable character simply because it is a function of that insult on the one hand, and the temperament of the person who receives the insult on the other. Not only does the pain have no character apart from the insult and temperament, it has no being at all without them. Objects and forces in the universe are undoubtedly interconnected (or relative) as Nāgārjuna and Bradley suggest; but for the purposes of contemplating and reacting to, different kinds of wholes are carved out by the human mind. Those wholes are real, relative to the interests and purposes of man. To the extent to which these interest can be called real, the objects contemplated by man are also real. It is in this sense that my wife and children and my country are real to me. Nāgārjuna and other Indian philosophers seem quite unaware of the role of human interests and purposes in determining the character of human knowledge and discourse.

3. *pramāṇādy anabhyupagamyā pravartitattvam tadyā sādhanā-bādhana-kṣamatāyāṃ na niyāmakam, kintu sadvacanābhāsa-lakṣaṇa-yogitvam ity avasyam abhyupeyam.*

4. See *Nyāya-Kośa* by Bhīmācārya, Nirṇaya-sagara press, 1928, p. 322.

5. *Vyāpyāropaka vyāpakāropaka.*

6. *drṣṭāntādṛṣṭa-siddhiḥ, Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya. II. I. 4.*

7. See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya, 1. 2. 2. Pratyakṣa-Pārvataśāstra-anumānaya.*

8. *Yuktiśāstra-pattir anumānam eva, Bhāmali on 1. 1. 2.*

9. See *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, Singhi Jain Granthamālā, 1939, pp. 36-37

10. *Bhāṣya on II. 3. 7.*

11. *Pariniṣpanne ca vastuni pramāṇāntarāṅgam asy avakāśo yathā prthivyādigu Bhāṣya, 1. 3. 4.*

12. *Dharmi-kalpanāto dharmā-kalpanaiva laghyasi iti nyāyat.* Quoted in *Nyāya-Siddhi-śika on Prakaraṇa-pāncikā*, Banaras Hindu University, 1961, p. 169.

13. *Drṣṭāntakāryopapattau ca nādrṣṭa-parikalpanā*—*Tattva bindu* of Vācaspati Miśra, edited by V. A. R. Sastri, Annamalai University, 1936, p. 8.

R. R. David

PRAMĀṆAS AND THE
MODES OF PHILOSOPHI-
CAL REASONING IN
INDIAN THOUGHT :
A CRITICAL REVIEW

Dr Devaraja deserves to be congratulated for having presented a very stimulating paper. One may or may not agree with all that he says, but one cannot deny that he has made some very important points concerning *pramāṇas* and the various modes of philosophical reasoning in Indian Philosophy.

I must observe at the very outset that Dr. Devaraja's paper devotes more space to proving what Indian philosophers failed to do rather than it does to analysing and evaluating the various modes of philosophical reasoning employed by Indian thinkers. Dr. Devaraja starts with the assertion that although all the systems of Indian philosophy were interested in the question of "the nature and significance" of *pramāṇas*, yet only realistic systems, viz., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya, held them in high regard and the "idealistic" systems, viz., Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism, did not pay much importance to them. He further asserts that all the schools of Vedānta "denounce the *pramāṇas* in order to make room for *śruti*".

To me there seems to be some inaccuracy here. It does not seem correct to describe Viśiṣṭādvaita as an idealistic system, inasmuch as it advocates the objectivity of all knowledge including error. Even the Advaita cannot be characterised as an idealistic system without qualification. Further, when Dr. Devaraja asserts that all the schools of Vedānta "denounce the *pramāṇas* in order to make room for *śruti*", he gives the impression that *śruti* was not held by them as one of the *pramāṇas*. As a matter of fact, *śruti* was regarded as one of the *pramāṇas*, and when the Vedāntic schools declare *śruti* to be the only source of the knowledge of ultimate reality, they are not rejecting the other *pramāṇas* as valueless, but only delimiting the respective realms of the *pramāṇas*.

I entirely agree with Dr Devaraja in his view that Indian philosophers never drew any distinction between science and philosophy. The result was a confusion between the subject matters and the methods of these two disciplines. I would however add that Indian philosophers never advanced their theories as scientific theories; they, in fact, advanced them as philosophical theories. I would also agree with Dr Devaraja's view that philosophy was generally identified with metaphysics, and even when discussing non-metaphysical questions, Indian philosophers "failed to develop the awareness of the method" employed in these discussions.

Dr Devaraja asserts that "both the votaries of the *pramāṇas* and their critics, i. e., the dialecticians, were unaware of the true character of philosophical reasoning". But what, according to him, is the true character of philosophical reasoning, he does not tell us. He further contends that "Indian thinkers and logicians failed to analyse the characteristic modes of philosophical reasoning". This does not seem to be entirely true. Indian Logicians did distinguish between the various kinds of *anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, the various forms of *tarka*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā* and so on. What Dr Devaraja means by "the characteristic modes of philosophical reasoning" is not clear. Further, the dialecticians like Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa, Dr Devaraja complains, "were too much interested in the work of destruction and too little concerned to analyse and illustrate the method of construction". Even if this be true, it is not clear why a philosopher must be interested in construction. A philosopher who is aware of the drawbacks of all philosophical constructions may refuse to indulge in such an activity. Moreover, Nāgārjuna who was the critic of all constructive philosophy was the last person to be expected to advance a method of construction. Cannot philosophy consist also in the critical awareness of the inherent conflicts of all philosophical constructions? This would certainly be a meta-philosophy. Therefore, it seems quite unjustified to say, as Dr Devaraja does, that the dialecticians 'fell, upon the evasive remedy of intuition or *sakṣātkāra* as the mode of the apprehension of reality", because they failed to evolve any constructive method with "proper success".

The method that the Mādhyamika uses in his criticisms of the realist categories and *pramāṇas* could be "valid or acceptable", according to Dr. Devaraja, only when his opponent "sees the force of his criticism" and gives his "tacit approval". And the opponent can admit the force of the Mādhyamika criticism only when he "feels" that the latter's "mode of reasoning is valid and acceptable". This amounts to saying that we can accept the Mādhyamika method of criticism as valid only when his opponent whom he criticises

"feels" that his mode of reasoning as valid. Does Dr. Devaraja propose this as a criterion of validity? He seems to identify the validity of a method with approval. By this criterion, I am afraid, it will be impossible to establish the validity of any method of criticism whatsoever.

There are valid forms of reasoning in Indian philosophy which, according to Dr. Devaraja, cannot be assimilated to one or the other of the *pramāṇas*, and the *reductio ad absurdum* method used by the dialectician is one of them. This type of argument, he maintains, depends upon an "assumed premise" with which "the proposed statement is shown to be incompatible". This description of the *reductio ad absurdum* argument seems to me to be incorrect. At least the argument as used by the Mādhyamika is of a different character. It does not consist in making arbitrary assumptions and then showing the statements of the opponent to be incompatible with them. As a matter of fact, it consists in showing the self-contradictory character of any view by drawing out its implications.

The "plausibility" of a philosophical argument, Dr. Devaraja holds, may be said to depend on "the assumptions and presuppositions of a particular age". And inasmuch as Nāgārjuna's proofs for the *śūnyatā* of things depend on such assumptions, "his philosophy may fail to appeal to the modern mind". I fail to see how Nāgārjuna's arguments involve the particular assumptions of his age. Dr. Devaraja's arguments to this effect are not convincing. Nāgārjuna's arguments do involve a particular conception of *svabhāva*. But that has nothing to do with his age, for in his own age an opposite conception of *svabhāva*, which Dr. Devaraja seems to approve, was also held, e.g., by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Jaina and others. Moreover, are there assumptions peculiar to any age? And even if there are, do all philosophical arguments depend on such assumptions? Frankly, I do not think so.

The Vedānta conception of reality as eternal and unchanging Being is, according to Dr. Devaraja, an unproved assumption, just like the Vāibhāṣika conception of the real as causally efficacious moment. Clearly, Dr. Devaraja is rejecting the ontologies of both the Vedānta and the Vāibhāṣika, as he does the *śūnyatā* of the Mādhyamika, on the ground that they are not proved. Thus he rejects, by implication, *śruti* and direct apprehension as valid means of knowledge. But what are his grounds for this latter rejection he does not tell us.

Dr. Devaraja maintains that Indian philosophers failed to undertake "a special analysis of philosophical reasoning" because

"they did not see the distinction between scientific reasoning, i.e. reasoning applicable to factual discourse and reasoning applicable in the realm of philosophical discourse which is conceptual rather than factual". But what, according to him, is the "special analysis of philosophical reasoning"? Dr. Devaraja first points out that philosophical reasoning "is not reducible to inferential reasoning as practised in factual discourse"; secondly the analysis of the various applications of *tarka* and *yukti* in Indian Philosophy indicate that philosophical reasoning is not reducible also "to inferences grounded on perceptual experience".

Dr. Devaraja cites a number of examples of reasoning advanced by the various systems of Indian philosophy and maintains that they are not reducible to any one of the known *pramāṇas*. Indian philosophers prescribed certain general rules of philosophising such as those of 'simplicity' and 'economy' (*kalpanālāghava*). These rules follow from the ideals of simplicity and elegance in thinking. But no Indian logician "ever sought to indicate the origin of these rules nor attempted to give their justification". In the same way hypothetical deductive method was used by almost all Indian thinkers in their speculative constructions, but none of them ever tried to give a precise formulation of it. I would generally agree with Dr. Devaraja on all these points.

The most important question that Dr Devaraja raises in this connection is : how are the different conceptions of *pramāṇas* held by different systems of Indian philosophy justified? The Naiyāyika holds one conception of *pramāṇas* and the Buddhist another. But neither the Naiyāyikas nor the Buddhists ever tell us how they arrive at their peculiar conceptions of *pramāṇas*. These conceptions could not evidently be justified by those *pramāṇas* themselves. Dr Devaraja thinks that a particular conception of *pramāṇas* held by a particular school is taken to be justified by that school for the simple reason that it succeeds in giving "a complete and connected account of all known forms of knowledge and reasoning" in its "logical system". But, in my view, the reason is deeper; it is not logical, but ontological. A system admits a particular conception of *pramāṇas* because it suits the particular ontology it embraces. The ultimate justification of *pramāṇas* is ontological, though no system explicitly says so. This would explain why the Buddhist insists on a particular conception of perception as a *pramāṇa* and also why he advocates *pramāṇaviplavavāda*. It would explain also why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejects the Buddhist conceptions of perception and inference and advocates *pramāṇasamplavavāda*. It would also explain why the Vedānta delimits the application

of *pramāṇas* other than *śruti* to the empirical world and allows *śruti* to have a free reign in the realm of the transcendent.

In the concluding paragraph Dr Devaraja emphasises the need of a "drastic revision" of many of the old philosophical theories, such as the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *dravya*, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of three *guṇas* and the various theories of perception advanced by different systems, in the light of the new data received from the positive sciences. There is an urgent need, according to him, of attempting fresh statements and new explanations of those data. Does Dr Devaraja hold the view that philosophy must be subservient to science? Nobody would deny the need of revision in a scientific theory in the light of new data. But are the theories mentioned above proposed as scientific theories? If they are, they must be revised, and if they are not, there is no occasion for revision. One may however accept or reject them. The reason for revising a philosophical theory, in my view, must also be philosophical. In our zeal for fresh statements and new explanations of ancient philosophical theories we must not forget, I submit, the distinction between the scientific and the philosophical, on the one hand, and that between what is abiding and what is not abiding in them, on the other.

K. Sivaraman

METHOD AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM

There are various ways of approaching the problem of method in philosophy. One may raise specific methodological questions in philosophy concerning the types of argumentation which philosophers sometime use. In an equally important way it can concern more generally and basically questions about the aims which are characteristic and distinctive of the procedure of philosophy as a mode of inquiry. These are by no means new questions. A partial reconsideration of them in the light of traditions that have become 'classical' in philosophy, and not merely under the spot-light of strictly contemporary interests may help us to avoid that intellectual provincialism which threaten those engrossed by the problem of the present. In this paper I intend to confine my attention to concerns which prepare for me in a personal way the context of meaningfulness within which to localise the subject of our discussion. I have no way of thinking about philosophical method except as part of what I try to do in my philosophical work bringing it into conformity with my ideal of it.

I do not want to offer elaborate apologies for the inclusion of a personal standpoint. Philosophical questions are not like the questions about the sum of the angles in a triangle, which could be answered impersonally and once for all. Philosophical questions can be asked and answered only if I am myself brought into it for I am myself called in question in them. I am both the one who asks and part of what is being asked about even when the question happens to be method in philosophy. I make myself known to a certain extent while also making known, as I hope to, the subject of discussion. From this it also follows that such questions cannot be answered once for all. A genuine philosophical question cannot be settled by mere statements and explanations but has as its goal understanding (*mīmāṃsā*). The very circumstance of assembling philosophers, officially committed to the task of 'advancing' philosophical studies over a seminar

discussion and dialogue on the subject of method justifies the presupposition of my present paper, viz., that the subject must be approached in a spirit of accomplishing, winning anew, understanding. I have striven to keep what philosophers of the past and present, Indian and Western, have said and done about the problem, as far as possible, in the shade even when I happen to be confronting them. The aim is to have the spot-light constantly on the problem itself.

I

Philosophers in recent years have grown sensitive to the question of the methods of their own inquiry. This may be a symptom of professional philosophers becoming conscious of their professional stature, or, equally, or the philosophers losing their sense of vocation. Ryle attributes it to a certain professional hypochondria induced as a consequence of the conspicuous progress made by other studies. Corresponding to the application of modern logical theory to the processes of mathematical and inductive sciences is posed in a painful light the question about the foundations of philosophical doctrines. This may well be the case historically speaking. The search for a method which would render philosophy 'scientific' has had the consequence of dephilosophising philosophy. It looks as though there has been a concerted drive to convert 'philosophy' into something other than itself. For every time a method is proposed it turns philosophy into something else, either psychology or logic or sociology or mathematics or linguistics. The latest proposal about method in philosophy is the view that philosophy itself is a kind of methodology in relation to special sciences which are presumably without methodological self-awareness.

An undue preoccupation with the problem of method to the point of neglecting what method is a method of may be a special feature of our age. But sensitiveness to the issue of method seems to be inherent to the very nature of philosophic activity. While this is true in general of the activity of thinking, it is peculiar to philosophy. Reflection upon the nature, objectives and methods of philosophy is part of philosophy itself. True, a scientist also may have his dual interests. He may pause before solving his questions and inquire what it is that he is doing, why he poses his questions and whether they are the right questions to pose. He may, in consequence, even prove a better scientist. History is not without instances of great scientists who are also good philosophers of science. But with philosophy such duality of interests seems both necessary and desirable. A philosopher without self-reflection cannot go very far. For him the *concept* of philosophy is not merely a possible question. It is an inevitable question that sooner or later is bound to arise in the course

of his philosophic thinking. The difference between synthesis and analysis, or construction and criticism in philosophy is a difference only of degree. Every philosophy is covertly or overtly also at once a philosophy of philosophy. I am afraid I shall be repeating myself here through the entire paper.

The reflexivity distinctive of philosophical thinking may, however, prove an embarrassment when we come to the question of method. What is embarrassing is the feeling of being caught in an unavoidable circle here. The question of method is but part of the question about the nature of philosophy. Like the latter it also arises, phenomenologically speaking, as a post-facto question. Methodological reflection follows and does not precede the actual application of a method. The concept of method is derived from a preceding understanding and experience of philosophical work, i. e., of taking a position in philosophy and working it through. As such it anticipates that in the service of which it is applied. Now arises the problem: on the one hand we would wish to tackle the question *about* philosophy and philosophical method without committing ourselves to any position *in* philosophy itself in order to know without pre-judging what it is that we are about to do. We innocently hope to have a philosophically neutral access to the concept first. But, on the other hand, alas, it seems not open to us to be able to do it. It is not open to us of course so long as we persist in our endeavours as philosophers, and do not slip into a way of speaking about philosophy from a standpoint lying outside philosophy itself. The philosopher after all needs no apologies for letting only philosophy dictate what philosophy or philosophical method shall be. Avowedly for him there is no cognitive sphere above it which could make the decision for him.

It is open for one to hold this or that conception in science and scientific method without committing oneself to one scientific theory or doctrine as against another. A theory of science is not a scientific theory not even when it happens to be advanced and defended by a scientist. A theory about historical explanation is, conceivably, no part of history. But with philosophy, it is and has understandably been, a different story. To ask a question about philosophy, to theorize about philosophical knowledge, to ask what is philosophical evidence as makes for true knowledge, all these commit one to certain philosophical positions relating to knowledge, reality, truth and so on. I do not mean merely the circumstance that one who uses these words and concepts, perhaps unawares, is determined by the history of philosophical thought which has given them the meanings in which he uses them. That is also a sense

in which all thinking, not merely the philosophical, is conditioned by philosophy. I mean more definitely philosophical commitment to and against certain positions in philosophy.

Likewise it works the other way round also. Any self-critical 'doing' of philosophy propounding and defending of philosophical theories would seem to involve some concept of what one is doing when he 'does' philosophy and is involved in the process of propounding and defending his philosophical theories. Every position taken inside philosophy regarding, say, the modes of being and the types of existence entails an incipient or articulated concept of the nature and kind of thing one is doing, and also a sense of the adequacy or otherwise of the method employed. Here again, I do not mean it merely as a factual and historical phenomenon. I refer to commitment in the logical or ontological sense.

The circularity is not, however, of the vicious kind. A distinction of order or levels is involved here. Questions about the concept of philosophy and the concept of method, like questions about the nature of science or scientific method, are of one order. Questions pertaining to what is real or true, what is its number or nature are of another order. Either may take precedence over the other. It is arbitrary whether one starts stating and defending theories and then adverts to the conception of philosophy involved in such theorizing, or starts the other way round. We may, however, signify the logical or ontological priority of questions inside philosophy over questions about philosophy, by distinguishing them as inquiries belonging respectively to first-order thinking and second-order thinking. The second are *prima facie* questions about our first-order knowledge, about the contents expressed and the ways in which we express them in that knowledge or thinking. The answers to such questions might be implied in the first-order knowledge but they are raised to an explicit level or awareness in what we have called the second-order thinking. It is however to be acknowledged that such answers are themselves determined or affected by their answers to more primary questions arising inside as part of it. The reciprocity is understandable. The same quest or evaluation underlies both kinds of inquiry. What is accented in one is implicit in the other. I would therefore use a common label for both, viz., ontology. Philosophy understood in its root-sense of ontological thinking underlies and over-reaches the distinction of first-order and second-order philosophy.

II

It may be asked: why at all make this distinction and admit circularity, and then acknowledge it as unavoidable and intrinsic

to philosophy conceived basically and comprehensively as ontology? May we not equate philosophy, more simply and neatly, with pure reflection or analysis? Philosophy is not taking a particular philosophical standpoint or even implying one, but having an analytic attitude to the data presented. We can still speak of 'doing' of philosophy by which we shall mean doing it at a higher level of reflection. It is still inquiry which does not add or amount to new knowledge, but merely clarifies what one knows already. The question of mediation of a 'valid method of knowledge' by which to acquire knowledge previously not acquired, like the question of a standpoint in philosophy, belongs to the pre-reflective level, and is not organically related to the higher level function of analysis.

Nor may one doubt the possibility of a notion of pure analysis without any philosophical pre-supposition. The idea of a 'neuter philosophic discipline' free from every kind of ontological commitment is not a mere dream but a distinct possibility. It may even be held a necessity ideally speaking. That such ideal is necessary is demonstrated in the following way. Take the thesis itself, viz., that no statement about philosophical method is possible to make without being committed to a stand inside philosophy. Is not this 'statement' itself and the 'knowledge' that it gives, somewhat peculiar? It is, surely, a statement about philosophy and philosophical method, and yet, does making it call for any fresh commitment within philosophy against it? Methodological reflection on the circular character of method in use in philosophy, this is not itself a species of philosophical knowledge, so that it may be thought to entail, paradoxically of course, other elements of a system of knowledge. If so, is not this a vindication of an 'ontologically neutral' concept of philosophy? — of one whose function is, from the very nature of the case, to give no new knowledge but only a better understanding of what is already known naturally by commonsense or by other disciplines?

Thus runs the argument of Meta-philosophy, a standpoint that defines itself as amounting to no standpoint in philosophy. Itself inspired negatively by considerations of circularity and mutuality characteristic of method in relation to conclusion in philosophy, it seeks to obviate the necessity for method by calling into question the very enterprise of construction in philosophic thinking. In answer, it may be conceded at the very outset that analysis is a legitimate function of philosophy as second-order thinking but that can neither take the place of nor 'sterilise' the primary concern of philosophy which is characterisable, broadly speaking, as concern for being. Philosophic standpoint in the radical sense of ontology underlies even the iconoclasm of meta-philosophy. Taking a particular standpoint in

philosophy is not a radically different kind of activity, different from that of analysing or criticising that standpoint treated as a mere datum for analysis. The latter is not any less 'committed' in spirit though not committed to this or that position in philosophy, and, indeed, its very disavowal is proof of it. Philosophy is, basically and inescapably, knowledge of being. It is knowledge of a type different from the factual kind as in science or history which purports to be informative and add to our stock of knowledge, and yet is distinguishable typologically as first-order knowledge from the kind which avowedly sets for itself just only the task of analysing what is given to it. Philosophy, viewed philosophically, is never a source of information. Philosophical knowledge is not, strictly, knowing something that I did not know already, as in the case of factual knowledge. It is knowing better something which in some sense I knew already. To know it better again is not to know more about it additively, but coming to know it in a different and better way. This was the great Socratic principle which illustrates the 'philosophic' feature of philosophical thinking, and effectively counters the charge of lack of cojency of philosophic thinking even because it is circular.

The ideal of analysis, therefore, does not stand exempt from ontology in so far as ontology itself is implicitly and by intent analytical, reflective, a gaining in depth rather than in extension. Philosophical systems with their unequivocal standpoints and logics should rather be viewed as systems of knowledge in the depth. They are, equally, attempts of a digging at the foundation as well as a raising of edifices. The critical function is not super-added to that of construction. It is also my submission that the converse of this is true. Every analysis purporting to be 'mere' analysis, a mere epistemology is willy nilly rooted in ontological structure. The claim on behalf of analysis is that it is only negation and does not amount to any positive gain. For example, negation of the legitimacy of the concept of method, this itself does not mean again of addition to one's stock of knowledge. Negation merely separates what has been uncritically held together, and merely removes the appearance or illusion of gaining in knowlegde. But is this claim valid? Is negation devoid of ontological entailment?

Even negation as significant must have its logical structure. It must have it in so far as it is different from meaningless silence (meaningful silence like laughter is ontologically loaded) and also different from a mere manipulation of possible relations. If it has a logical structure it must be rooted in ontology. The relevant question here would be not whether or not negation of a judgment is also a kind of judgment but the following: what is the structure which

makes negation of a judgment possible? This question will take one into ontology, may be an ontology of non-being. It will point to the ontological character of non-being participation in which makes it possible for man to be able to negate. Negation in the sense of 'retrospective annihilation' of an error or illusion is, surely, not a case of 'nihilating' or making not what is. But, it nevertheless implies, on pain of ceasing to be significant in the very sense in which it is meant, having a structure as a condition which makes it possible to transcend the immediately given empirical level, and fall into error or illusion. Error or illusion in so far as it is not a mere thinking error is a species of the transcendental implying leaving the plane of sheer empiricity. Unless there is presupposed man, again a structural presupposition, which makes for a dialectical participation of non-being in being, no negation of any kind is possible. In this way it may be seen that philosophic discussions of the kind that philosophies claiming to stand on the pedestal of meta-philosophy aimed to eschew could be introduced in their very core.

I am aware of the powerful contemporary reaction against justifying first-order philosophising in the name of ontological commitment. Questions of 'being' and 'non-being' in the sense intended are considered as lacking theoretical significance and as only misleadingly ontological. Answer to such 'questions' can only mean the decision adopted concerning the use of language. But as was pointed out by Quine, himself celebratedly a philosopher to whom 'to be' meant only 'to be the value of a variable', is not some standard of ontological commitment needed even to say meaningfully that a given theory depends on or dispenses with the assumptions of such and such objects? The attitude which prohibits against philosophy and vetoes questions of a certain kind, in so far as it is not arbitrary whim, is based on or committed to certain assumptions and evaluations about being. Being has a character which makes this attitude the only legitimate method of cognitive approach. Being itself cannot be approached cognitively except in those of its manifestations which are theoretically significant in the sense of being open to analysis and verification. Such will be the ontological commitments underlying an attitude of rejection of any commitment. Being is a necessary concept for every philosophy even for those who reject it with arguments derived as they are from a definite understanding of what it means to have being.

III

I would like to refer to yet another source of embarrassment in a discussion of method which also on inspection may prove rewarding. Views about the nature of method in philosophy, notoriously, do

not seem to permit of demonstration. In this regard, again, the scientist is in a more enviable position. His method is justified in practice. He is easily able to make good his claim for an adequate method for discovering new facts: he presents indisputably more and more facts. The philosopher has no such means of conviction at his disposal. Facts have no evidential force in the resolution of philosophical problems, and do not help him one way or another in demonstrating his own method to others. Are there at all facts of such kind as may be presented, let alone whether they are presented — this is itself part of what is on the anvil ready for the philosopher's hammer.

Philosophers debate endlessly evaluating 'evidential proof' for cognitive claims. They are the commonplace of Indian philosophy. When there is a dispute about the credentials of a candidate for hard-core evidence in philosophy, how is the philosopher able to set the discussion on its feet, and even more, hope to settle it? Surely he cannot appeal to a possible 'outcome' of an application of his method for support. For that is not more demonstrably evident than the method employed in evidence of it. It is not open to him to appeal to it any more than it is open to appeal to his very theory of evidence as evidence of itself. Nor does any other kind of demonstration seem possible from the nature of the case.

It may be objected that, after all, we must begin with something to get a theory underway. We cannot spend for ever just getting started. Arguing against those who raise dialectical difficulties of this kind about the reality of initial phenomena, Aristotle writes: "There cannot be demonstration of everything in general. For there will then be an infinite regress, and hence there would still be no final demonstration". (*Metaphysics* 1006a, 7, 8) A philosopher must know as part of his 'education' (presumably as philosopher) that it is necessary to seek demonstration of some propositions *and not of others*. The caution and impatience need not be taken as merely, 'commonsensical' on Aristotle's part. He is inspired from within his considerations of 'First Philosophy' itself. For he proceeds, somewhat paradoxically, to demonstrate by way of refutation that a contrary position to his view that everything cannot be demonstrated is untenable.

Let us go a little further with Aristotle. His demonstration of the indemonstrability of a thing 'altogether' is of some moment in the present context. Demonstration by refutation, says Aristotle, is not mere demonstration with its built-in feature of circularity. Is there something which is known without proof and one who denies

it assumes its truth? This has been the dream and despair of philosophers. Aristotle says there is. It is the law of contradiction. This law is not merely known intuitively like axioms of Geometry, but one who denies it assumes it. If its denial is taken as true it cannot also be taken as false, and if the denial is taken as false, then one is denying the law of contradiction and also denying the denial. What Aristotle understands him in effect to be doing is obscure. Does he (Aristotle's man) thereby fall into contradiction? But that would be circular. Does he merely fail to say anything definite or meaningful? In that case it does not follow that the law of contradiction is capable of being demonstrated irrefutably. If the demonstration is on the ground of indubitability as with the Cartesian Proof, and Aristotle does urge such considerations, the validity of such arguments would only presuppose, and not prove, the truth of the law.

Aristotle is right to the extent he implies that we do not think *from* the law as from an axiom, but only *with* it and that one who denies it says nothing definite and therefore says or thinks nothing at all. Admission of the law of contradiction cannot amount to an *apriori* vindication of the adequacy of method of evidence in philosophy. Philosophy can have no axioms or axiom-like starting point, nor definitions with which to begin. There are no 'demonstrative proofs' in philosophy of the kind in which we start from something self-evident to proceed from point to point in a chain of grounds and consequents. Philosophical proofs, if they may be so called, are as Kant has shown correcting Descartes, 'acromatie'. One must go back and revise one's premises, when errors show themselves up in the conclusion and not in the premises — the very reverse of what is implied in the use of axioms and postulates.

IV

The predicament of philosophy not being able to justify its own starting point is the predicament of method which is unable to justify itself in practice in the cognitive process, as it does in sciences, inductive and deductive. But this only means again that method in philosophy differs from method in science not merely as things but as concepts. Problems of method in philosophy encountered here are a demand for a truly 'philosophical' understanding of philosophy. Such is for me ontology. Ontology is only a paraphrase of the admission that philosophical reflection cannot go behind being but must start with it. Thinking demands to be based on being. It cannot think away this basis, though it can think away, i.e., negate *what* is. It cannot negate that which is always thought implicitly or otherwise when something is said to be. Ontology is

not the name for a type of philosophy but is a basic understanding of philosophy standing broadly for any characterisation of being entailed by its vision. To know in the primordial sense is to recognise something as being, and in this sense ontology precedes every other cognitive approach to reality (The implications of ontology as preceding even the distinction of the cognitive and the non-cognitive were drawn by me in another paper). Every philosophical question is implicitly a question of the structure of being which we encounter in every meeting with reality, and implies answers in ontological terms (*tattvas*, *archai*, categories). Ontology may thus be viewed as analysis. It analyses things, people, ourselves, our worlds, our knowing itself, our discursive activity — the encountered reality in short—in order to discover the structural elements which make possible a direct participation of being in being, i.e., individual in other — individuals and also of individuals in that which makes for individualization. The latter is Being whose presence, or as we should say, which presence it is that is eventually disclosed in all such analyses. Analysis discloses it as its *basis* and not its *object*. It is not the subject matter analysed as such with which philosophy in the sense of ontology deals but with the constitutive reality of being, that which is always present and is itself known in no other way save as that which is *astiti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate?*

Ontology as method, then, is the primordial way of explication in which something is comprehended as *being* this or that. Such comprehension implies disclosure or discovery of the underlying phenomenon. This is the root-sense of the concept of method, as every method conceivably terminates in this kind of unveiling. Revelation and unveiling or discovery are not two distinct processes, one belonging to the order of the transcendent and the other epistemic. Truth revealing itself is one's unveiling or discovering it. Knowing is carried over to the side of being, being understood dynamically in an inverted sense as the power that resists that which resists it, or negates negation. (*Sat* implies *śakti*: *śaktis-sivas-ca sacchabda prakṛti pratyayoditau*).

In the light of our understanding of ontology as something universally philosophical, precisely in its methodological elaboration, we are in a position to appreciate the pervasive but paradoxical demand of method that it cannot be 'indifferent' to the reality to which it 'leads'. It cannot 'lead' without at the same time being an element of the 'led'. A method of philosophy is similar to cognitive relation in this respect. In a cognitive relation the relation is not neutral in the function of relation but is revelatory of the kind of terms that it relates.

No method in action in philosophy can proceed as a kind of free adventure, a 'directionless voyage'. It must have a prior knowledge of the destination in the 'light' of which it is able to progress. Plato asks: "How will you search for that which you do not know, and how can you plan to search for that which you do not know, and if you found it how could you recognise that which you do not know?" (*Meno*, 80, D. 8). The philosopher's quest for meaning is itself a state of being imbued with meaning. He has and does not have that which he asks (*yat prasiddham anati-prasiddham ca*). His attitude of interrogation is at the same time an attitude of listening.

R. K. Tripathi

METHOD AS A
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM :
A REVIEW

I must first of all congratulate Dr Sivaraman for attacking the problem of method in philosophy in a novel way. I am specially glad that while pointing out the inherent difficulties of the problem, he has also made an admirable attempt to solve them. I find myself in agreement with him on a number of points. It is quite legitimate to say that sensitiveness to the issue of method is inherent to the very nature of philosophic activity. It is not a problem imposed on philosophy from outside ; in philosophy everything is self-imposition. But more than that, there is an inner dialectic always operating in philosophy and forcing it to make explicit what is only implicit in it. In this sense, questions regarding the concept of philosophy, the aim of philosophy, the method of philosophy and the language of philosophy are inevitable questions though they are by no means the first questions to be asked. These questions are neither temporally nor logically prior to philosophy ; all the same, their importance is not any the less, because answers to these questions form part of the philosophy which answers them. Therefore Dr. Sivaraman rightly emphasises that there can be no such thing as a neutral way of approaching these problems. We cannot hope to start with a unanimously accepted view of philosophy or method of philosophy ; that would betray a pathetic ignorance of the immanent nature of philosophy. One can say nothing about philosophy without a philosophy. Innocence is criminal in philosophy.

Dr. Sivaraman notices a circularity between a concept of philosophy and the philosophy which presents the concept ; the two seem to be mutually dependent. He seeks to get out of the circle by suggesting that the two belong to two different levels or orders. This is, I think, perfectly true. Philosophising as a forward mode of consciousness must be distinguished from the analysis of philosophising as a reflective mode of consciousness. The two modes of consciousness

cannot by their very nature belong to one order or level, and that is for the simple reason that the one (reflection) acts or operates on the other (philosophising). In fact the two are even opposed to each other in as much as the two cannot go on simultaneously; philosophising is held up when reflection on philosophy sets in and vice versa. I can go with Dr. Sivaraman only so far, because I am unable to share his view that it is arbitrary whether one starts stating theories and then adverts to the conception of philosophy. To me it is not a matter of indifference; because reflection on philosophy must of necessity come after philosophy. The order cannot be changed; not because of the nature of philosophy but because of the nature of reflection.

Turning to the more positive part of the paper, Dr. Sivaraman states his position by way of answering two possible objections. One may try to dissolve the duality of the two orders noted above by suggesting that philosophy is mere reflection and nothing else. In this view which is probably the *Mādhyaṃika* view, the very question of a valid method does not arise, because philosophy is not a positive way of knowing what is otherwise not known but mere analysis of what is already known; it is not adding to knowledge but adding to clarity. Secondly it may be held that it is quite possible to have a neutral approach. Suppose we take the proposition that no method of philosophy is neutral and ask the question: Is this proposition neutral or integrally related to a philosophy? To say that it is neutral would go against the thesis that nothing in philosophy is neutral, and to say that it belongs to a philosophy would make it non-neutral and unacceptable to another philosophy.

Dr. Sivaraman's answer to these objections is worth examining. He says that taking a standpoint in philosophy is not radically different from reflecting on that stand-point or criticising it so that there is only a difference of degree between construction and criticism. Criticism is no less committed than construction and so the ideal of analysis does not stand exempt from ontology. He supports his thesis by propounding a view of significant negation. Negation must be rooted in ontology because the question is: What is the structure which makes negation of a judgment possible? This is the beginning of ontology whether of being or of non-being.

I do not know whether Hegel or Heidegger is speaking through Dr. Sivaraman concerning significant negation. I do feel, however, that here Dr. Sivaraman is contradicting himself. He says in the beginning that construction and criticism are of two orders and then later while answering the two possible objections he seems to take

them as co-ordinate or as two aspects of philosophy. I submit that if they are co-ordinate they cannot belong to two levels and if they belong to two levels they cannot be treated as co-ordinate. Recognition of levels means transcendence and negation. In whatever sense we take the concept of order, there is negation, as one cannot attend to two orders at the same time. It seems to me that Dr. Sivaraman is not distinguishing between mere refutation and self-reflection or critical awareness. While it may be true that a system of philosophy has both a positive and a negative or critical aspect, it is not true that every system is aware of the inherent conflict of reason or the inherently antinomical nature of reason. The former is the acceptance of one standpoint and rejection of others on the basis of reason while the latter is the rejection of the tendency to take a standpoint, i.e. of reason itself. The former is a forward mode of consciousness while the latter is mere reflection on that.

There is no doubt that there is in all negation some kind of transcendence, explicit or implicit, and in this sense all philosophy is necessarily ontology. But that transcendence is not given by negation; rather it is the basis of negation. It is not construction. It must be given by some extra-rational source. However, if philosophy is necessarily ontology, the question persists: how are we obliged to accept a particular ontology as against another? Is there any ground for preference? I contend that every system of philosophy or philosophical method including that of the *Mādhyamika* and the analytical philosopher exercises some kind of preference. That for me would constitute the method of philosophy—the ground on which we exercise preference. For me philosophy is the discovery of the ground of preferring truth to error. This ground must be necessarily immanent in experience itself; it cannot be a matter of arbitrary choice or definition. Knowledge or Truth has to stand on its own legs; it must be self-luminous as nothing else can illumine it. This is not knowledge of being; it may be being itself.

I must now hasten to note another point made by Dr. Sivaraman in the last part of his paper. He points out that in philosophy one cannot hope to make much headway by resorting to "evidential proofs", because the question of the evaluation of those proofs cannot be settled by an appeal to them. He quotes Aristotle to say that a philosopher must know that everything cannot be proved. I wonder whether Dr. Sivaraman takes this to be proved. Is there anything that can be accepted without proof? Aristotle would suggest that only the law of contradiction can be accepted without proof. But the admission of this law, according to Dr. Sivaraman, does not amount to an *a priori* vindication of the adequacy of the method of evidence

in philosophy. For him it is a predicament of philosophy that it cannot prove its starting point. I for one do not look upon it as a predicament. For me it is nothing but the recognition of the fact that knowledge must be in the last resort self-validating. When western philosophers tell us that the first principles are self-evident or intuitively known, they are implicitly accepting the principle of the self-validity of knowledge. The problem therefore is not to add to knowledge or acquire knowledge but only to distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge. Knowledge does not need proof or evidence.

I would conclude my remarks by making an observation regarding the law of contradiction. This law, though it has the merit of being universally accepted, has two handicaps: Firstly it is purely formal. It can say nothing about the content of a proposition; it can only regulate the form. Secondly, it is negative. It can prove the falsity of a thesis by pointing out self-contradiction, but it cannot prove the truth of a proposition. Although this is so, the law of contradiction can be useful, albeit in a negative way, in the process of discovering truth. If there is in a situation a fixed number of alternatives, the law of contradiction can help us in eliminating the false alternatives and discovering the true one. I concede that in philosophy it is difficult to have an exhaustive list of alternatives but if and when it is possible, the law of contradiction can prove useful. However, it must be noted that even here the law can only point to a possibility. The possibility remains a matter of faith till it is realised in some experience.

In the end let me say that I have learnt a good deal from Dr. Sivaraman's paper and I can truthfully say that my attitude of interrogation "is at the same time an attitude of listening".

R. N. Mukerji

THE ROLE OF DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. *The Place of Direct Experience in Indian Systems :*

Each important Indian system of philosophy presents an outlook that is highly organised on rational lines to the last details. Nevertheless, in most of them, the first and last court of appeal is direct experience. More notable exceptions are Mīmāṃsā, Mādhyaṃika in its starting-point, and agnosticism like that of *Tattoplavasirha*.

The name *darśana* for philosophy indicates this reliance upon direct vision, and has the support of such early statements as, 'ātmāvā are draṣṭavyaḥ'—(Br. Up.) and 'tasmin draṣṭe parāvare (Mu. Up). The other common early usage for philosophy *ānvikṣiki* mentioned in Artha Śāstra etc. also means 'that which follows perception or direct experience',¹ and has the support of such passages as 'atmānamatra puruṣavyavadhānamekamanvikṣate pratiniṣṭtaguṇappravāḥ (Bhāgavata 3-28-35).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) was called the primary (*īyastha*) *pramāṇa*, because other *pramāṇas* also lean heavily on perception for their validity. The starting point of systems like Sāṅkhya, Vedānta and Buddhism are clearly perception. Their special philosophical approaches are also directly borrowed from facts of perceptual experience.

For Sāṅkhya-Yoga our perception of the external world is the most important problem. This has to be explained, and a method of release from this state has to be sought. In Yoga Sūtra it is stated that the cause of a lowered state generally is the relation of *draṣṭā* and the *dṛśya* or the world, 'draṣṭradṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ' (II, 17). The topic gets heightened interest from the fact of Puruṣa's peculiar love-hate ambivalence towards Prakṛti, the latter's evolution being both for enjoyment (*bhoga*) and liberation of Puruṣa.

At an earlier stage of these systems the cosmic evolution was self-manifestation of *Puruṣa-avyakta*, that was *pariṇāmī nitya*, standing as the reverse (*viparyaya*) of the world of products (*vikṛtis*)². Pushing the same logic of reversed duality, *Puruṣa* became *kūṣastha-nitya*, and this threatened his very relation with *Prakṛti*.

Śaṅkara inherited this problem from Sāṅkhya. He also got his criterion of reality, the unchanging (*abādhitā*), *kūṣastha-nitya* from them. Sāṅkhya itself had got the idea of permanence within change from its early associations with sciences like medicine, chemistry, alchemy and metallurgy. In these sciences it was found that, for producing anything, an equivalent amount of material (*upādāna-grahaṇāt*) and energy (*śaktasya-śakyakaraṇāt*) had to be provided. This led to *satkāryavāda*.

Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on *Brahma-Sūtra* starts with this very problem of the relation between the perceived world (*viśaya*) the referent of 'you', and the perceiver (*viśayī*) the referent of 'I'. According to Śaṅkara, they are opposed like darkness and light, and yet they are constantly confused as belonging to each-other.³ This, for him, is the major problem of philosophy. Śaṅkara did not solve this problem. He cut the Gordian knot by denying the ultimate reality of the objective world and the knowledge of it. Thus he was left, to his satisfaction, with only one term of the relation.

2. The Content of Direct Experience :

Even when the primacy of direct knowledge was accepted, its definition presented considerable difficulty. Like the word 'democracy' now-a-days, all schools accepted *pratyakṣa*, but interpreted it according to their metaphysical systems. Sometimes diametrically opposite views about the medium and content of *pratyakṣa* were held and debated. For the Advaitin the true percept is undifferentiated consciousness of pure being (*sattāmātra*), but for the Jaina the undifferentiated consciousness in the *nirvikalpaka* state is not a *pramāṇa* at all. For him the true percept is that of a liberated omniscient being (*kevalī*) who sees things in all their rich details. For the Buddhist the true percept is unmixed with concepts, but for the Naiyāyika the true percept requires the presence of concepts. For both the Advaitin and the Buddhist *nirvikalpaka* is the proper percept. For most Naiyāyikas the *nirvikalpa* state is not perceptible but is only inferred, real perception is always *savikalpaka*. For Rāmānuja there is no such undifferentiated perceptions of pure being as Advaitins claim, all perception being qualified.⁴

3. The Definition of Sense-Perception :

The most popular definition of sense-perception has been that of early Naiyāyikas, that sense-perception is knowledge produced by the

contact of the sense-organ with its proper object, '*indriyārtha-sannikarṣajanyam jñānan*'. This definition no doubt appeals to common-sense, but it is fraught with difficulties. What is *sense-organ* and what is *contact with the object*?

According to Nyāya pleasure and pain are also perceived through mind (*manas*) as the internal sense. If this is correct, memory and inferential knowledge should also be objects of perception, because the mind is in contact with them also. If to avoid this difficulty it is said that the mind is the sense-organ only with respect to pleasure, pain, etc. and not with respect to memory etc., there will be circularity in the definition, *pratyakṣa* being defined by sense-organ, and sense-organ being defined by *pratyakṣa*.⁶

Once this defect in the definition is seen it is easy to extend a similar argument against external sense. No one is clear about the exact nature of a sense-organ, or how inert sense-organs make us conscious of objects.⁶ Therefore efficiency of the sense-organ is inferred from *pratyakṣa*, and if *pratyakṣa* is defined by reference to sense-organs, we do not make much advance. This argument incidentally also exposes a popular fallacy among Advaitins, who argue that the self cannot know itself just as eye does not see itself. The senses show this disability because they have no life by themselves. If the self also showed this disability it would also be unconscious. This led Gaṅgeśa to define *pratyakṣa* as 'the knowledge not mediated by another knowledge', '*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*'. Even this does not end the trouble. As Dharmarāja Adhvarindra points out, if this definition be accepted, memory also should be taken as perception. In this case it might be said in defence that memory was after-all originally produced by another knowledge, but *pratyakṣa* should not be so produced. Then recognition like 'this is the same Devadatta' will also cease to be perception. If to escape these difficulties *pratyakṣa* is defined as knowledge of what is fit for *pratyakṣa* there will result circularity.⁷

Therefore Dharmarāja comes to the conclusion that *jñāna* or knowledge is the real *pratyakṣa* (*jñānatvam pratyakṣatvam*) and argues that even inferential knowledge or knowledge through testimony, if they produce proper *jñāna*, are entitled to be regarded as perceptions. All that is needed is that the object of knowledge should be fit for perception, and with respect to it *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* should get identified.⁸ In the sequel we shall refer to the Vivaraṇa theory that the meaning of words can become direct percepts by themselves.

Actually, such a drastic conclusion does not follow. All that really follows is that the senses are not the primary factors even in

ordinary direct experience or *pratyakṣa*, *Pratyakṣa*, however, remains direct, and inferential or verbal knowledge cannot claim this status.

4. *Role of the Senses—A Limited Removal of Obstruction.*

The Jaina thinkers consider sense-perception as an inferior form of *pratyakṣa* called *savyavahāra* perception in contrast to the true *pratyakṣa* of a liberated saint (*kevali*). Senses not only allow us only limited knowledge, they also very often make it illusory, as when a person sees double-moon because of a squint in the eyes. For Jains it is natural for knowledge to have awareness of all reality, but this omniscience is obscured due to accumulation of *kārmic* matter, in the form of the physical body. Senses are only apertures in this covering, like windows. They play no positive role in producing perception; they have only a negative role of removing obstruction due to accumulated *kārmic* matter.

In criticism of this theory, it was said that if such were the case there would not be different sense-modalities, each sense organ being confined to one kind of perception. In reply Jaina thinkers granted the possibility that one sense-organ might play the role of another also. In *Laghu-Saravajñya-siddhi* it is mentioned that there is a poetic usage that serpents hear with their eyes (*cakṣuśrava*), and this does not appear to be mere imagination, because in serpents no ears are to be seen.⁹ No matter whether serpents actually hear with their eyes or not, it is now an accepted fact in psychology that sense-modalities are not unique. For instance, coloured-hearing called chromesthesia, is common.¹⁰

Śaṅkara also used the fact that no ears are observed in snakes, and no sense-organs in trees, to establish that senses are not essential to perception. In *Yoga Sūtra* and Advaita Vedānta it is held that omniscience of the all-pervasive soul is obscured by the *tāmasic* *ortti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. In this darkness light dawns only so far as *rājasa* removes the veil of *tāmasa* partially at points. While this view is very attractive, Advaitins create the inconsistency of regarding the most *tāmasic* stage of *suṣupti* (dreamless sleep) as close to enlightenment. For this they are severely criticized in the other systems. Rāmānuja also believes that *dharmabūta jñāna* of *jīva* is obstructed by *kārmic* impurities from attaining omniscience.

We think that this theory is correct on the whole. Senses, mind, or body do not play any positive role in *pratyakṣa*. They, however, do the important job of breaking up cosmic consciousness of God into isolated points of light, where from a very modest start, omniscience

can gradually dawn. Thus infinity will realize or unfold itself in its parts again ; *pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇam eva avaśiṣyate* : a definition of infinity that is now accepted in mathematical analysis also.

5. *The First Norm of Pratyakṣa — Tangibility of Touch and Intellectual Clarity of Vision :*

Caraka held that all sense-organs are but modifications of touch, because no *pratyakṣa* is possible without contact and contact is nothing but touch.¹¹ Vācaspati Miśra refers to a similar theory held by some Sāṅkhya thinkers, according to whom tactual organ is the only organ of knowledge capable of assuming various forms and perceiving colour etc.¹²

Modern philosophy and neurology have borne out this brilliant insight. As we now know, different senses have differentiated from primitive senses of contact in unicellular organisms. The interrelation between different sense-modalities noted in the last section follows from this fact.

Even when this theory of the medical school has not been accepted, it has influenced the thinking of almost all Indian philosophies. This influence is clear in the view that for perception the senses must come in contact with the objects, which was generally felt to mean that the mind moved out to the object (somewhat in the form of light-rays) and assumed its form (*prāpyakāri*). While no one denied such contact in the case of touch, taste and smell, Jains denied it in the case of vision, and the Buddhists in cases of vision and hearing. Nevertheless, Buddhists introduced *prāpyakāri* principle with even greater emphasis in their theory that valid knowledge is *prāpaka*, that is, in valid knowledge, we can get hold of what we know, *prāpana śaktiḥ prāmāṇyamiti*.¹³ Here the question arises as to how vision can give proper indication of size and distance of objects without contact so as to enable the hand to grasp them. In the series of *pratītya-samutpāda*, we notice *sparsa*, as the general name for sense-contact, and in *Gītā* also we notice this use (*Gītā* V, 22).

Jainas regarded omniscience possible and conceived it in terms of vision; but maintained that the soul is finite in size and vision, is not *prāpyakāri*. The mere assertion that knowledge has a tendency to know all things, explains nothing and begs the question. The real answer appears to be that finitude of soul like *savyavahārika* sense-perception is also said to be *savyavahārika*. Therefore, in reality, the soul must be all-pervasive. Rāmānuja solved the problems of distant knowledge of the atomic soul by the theory of *dharmabhūta jñāna*.

In fact human manipulative skill, brain, and intelligence, have developed through close hand-eye coordination. The evolution of these two is clearly moving towards a stage when touch will acquire clarity and intellectual explicitness of vision, and vision will acquire the tangible contact of touch.

6. *Second Norm of Perception—Asymptotic Approach of Subject and Object towards Merger in Tādātmya.*

Direct knowledge presupposes two inter-related phases :

(1) There should be a knower and a known.

(2) The two should approach each other in an ever closer degree, as already involved in the *principle of contact* discussed in the previous section. The end might be practically merger, with only a transparens veil between them. As stated in *Gītā*, the devotee knows God, sees him, and enters him, *jñātum, draṣṭum ca tatvena praveṣṭum ca paramtapa* (XI, 54). The external world might be no more than self-manifestation of spirit for such self-discovery and clarification. This is *līlā*.

Any attempt to isolate knower and known, or to deny one of the members fails. As already stated, Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta both fail to give us a correct account of *pratyakṣa* because of these tendencies.

Having isolated *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, Sāṅkhya tries to explain their relation by making *puruṣa* like *prakṛti* and *prakṛti* like *puruṣa* (S.K. 20). The objections against the theories that *puruṣa* is reflected in *antaḥkarana* or *antakaraṇa vṛtti* is reflected in *puruṣa*, or both receive mutual reflections are well-known, and need not be repeated here.

In the case of Advaita Vedānta, we find the philosophers arriving at pure consciousness that is conscious neither of itself nor of anything else, in order to get rid of objectivity entirely. For instance, Citsukha tells us that *ātman* is not knowable, but can be said to be direct, *avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatvam*.¹⁴ This description obviously goes against such Upaniṣadic statements as *brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati* and the very name of the Veda from which Vedānta is derived.¹⁵ The trouble with the Advaitin's *ātman* is that it cannot know itself, for that would make it a *viśaya*, and it cannot know anything else for that would be a finite determination of indeterminate pure consciousness. But this reduces *ātman* to nescience. However frequently the Advaitin might protest that it is *svaprakāśa*, it reverts to *aprakāśa*. The analogy of a lamp that lights itself and others is not

applicable. More appropriate would be 'a pure light that lights neither itself nor another'. In truth Advaitin's Brahman is a pure concept.

7. The Third Norm of Perception—Expressiveness :

Percepts and Concepts : Both Buddhists and Advaitins regard words as elements that stand between the reality and the knower. But the reasons for the distrust are diametrically opposite. Buddhists are suspicious of verbal elaboration of sense-data because words generalize and thus unify where the real percepts are all different. The Advaitin complains that words are discursive, and create differences where there is only unity. For the Buddhist, true *pratyakṣa* is free from mental (verbal) construction and illusion, '*kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam pratyakṣam*',¹⁶ and for the Advaitin ultimately *jñāna* or knowledge is percept. For the Buddhist, the real object of sensation is completely particular, located in a discrete point-instant, a vivid presence for a moment only, which is dynamic and entirely unique, in its differentiation. For the Advaitin the real is entirely universal, all-pervasive, eternal, static and unique (one) in its non-differentiation.

As stated earlier, Sāṅkhya, Advaita Vedānta, Buddhism and other schools got their special philosophic method and the starting point from perceptual experience. In our experience there is a balance of rest and motion or change, unities and diversities. In Sāṅkhya philosophy, in its earlier stages, these different factors were harmonized, and we see this fine synthetic outlook in *Yoga-Sūtra Bhāṣya's* definition of perception.

'*sāmānyaviśeṣātmanāarthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇāpradhāna vṛtti pratyakṣam pramāṇam*'. I, 7. This is not the complete definition, but as much as we need for our purpose. Of this concrete experience Advaita Vedānta took the aspect of *sāmānya* or common factor, and Buddhism took the other aspect of *viśeṣa*, and these were hypostatized into two different principles of reality.

In these systems words fail to give an account of the ultimate reality because of obvious reasons. The Advaitic reality is the summum genus of pure being, whereas the Buddhist *svlakṣana* is the ultimate particular. Neither of these is definable *per genus et differentia*. The first is only genus (*Tait-Up. Bhāṣya*, 2, 1), the second only differentia (*apoḍha*). Advaita Vedānta, however, cannot entirely disown words. Mahāvākya is granted *śabdāparokṣa* status, but by surrendering its express sense.

In contrast to this stand are the realistic theories like Nyāya and Viśiṣṭādvaita. According to Nyāya perception proper must be

meaningful, and of the form of judgement. Moreover, words come before their referents that are called *padārtha* or the meaning of words. In this we find an obvious influence of the doctrine of Śabda-Brahman of the grammarians according to which the objective world is a *vivarta* of *akṣara* Śabda-Brahman. Perhaps the most realistic of Indian systems, Viśiṣṭadvaita, distinguished *savikalpaka* from *nirvikalpaka* only by the addition of recognition in the former. Determinate perception does not add any *vikalpa* or mistake, because the reality itself is determinate. There is no perception of a substance without attributes related to it as adjectives. The substance and its attributes are distinct and not identical as supposed in Advaita Vedānta. Yet the emphasis is on the non-separateness (*āpṛthak-siddhi*) of the two rather than their separateness as in the *samavāya* relation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is because of emphasis on inner unity in spite of distinctions that Rāmānuja holds that all words ultimately refer to Brahman. Therefore words are basically correct in their orientation. Rāmānuja expressly rejects the doctrine of Śabda-Brahman, but gives it a novel interpretation. The original theory is that all creation has emerged from the word as Brahman. Rāmānuja, however, means that all the objects for their reality (soul or *satya*) ultimately depend on Brahman. Therefore the words denoting them ultimately refer to Brahman.

Rāmānuja's theory is very attractive. Even if all words do not always appear to refer to Brahman, it is a glorious norm or ideal for them.

In a previous section (Sec-5) we saw that touch seeks intellectual clarification through vision. It also tries to do so through hearing. However, in us, sound does not give the shape of things. We have in a way compensated for it, by using words as conceptual tools of the intellect to grasp the form of things.

Words, by themselves, are of positive help in grasping the true structure of the presented world. They are vulgarized due to egoism, selfishness, pedantry, and narrow interests. When these are present, corresponding verbal expressions further cement them. Thus words that we use are a reflex of our habitual modes of approach, and these words further augment these processes.

Therefore, if we would get rid of the complexes in our hearts (*hṛdaya-granthi*), we could devise words that truly refer to Brahman. Thus true *sāhitya*, where objects and their meanings or words are integral to each other like *ardhanārīṣvara*, as Kālidāsa puts it, would follow. Such blossoming forth into express manifestation is the ideal of *pratyakṣa*.

8. *Extra-Sensory Direct Experience of Reality :*

We saw in sec. 4, that senses do not play a positive role except by delimiting our direct knowledge to a narrow range. This protects us from confusion and bewilderment of too rich an experience, but also perpetuates our bondage within this narrow range. They thus play the role of an over-indulgent wife curbing the spirit of adventure in her husband.

As this lazy attachment to *tāmasic* life is shed, new horizons rise to vision, endless vistas open out like magic casements. In our attempts to escape these limitations, to shed this *crysalis* both scientific and yogic methods are available.

This brings us to the accounts of yogic perception in the different schools.

In *Yoga-Sūtra* we learn of two main types of yogic experience. One is the great expansion of awareness by which everything is known. The other is a so-called higher state whereby the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is realised, and *puruṣa* leaves the world. The second state is very similar to Advaitin's *mukti*. The first state of *sarvajñya* is the proper goal of perception. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also accepts such a state of omniscience for a *yogi*. But at will he can also lose sight of all the objects. This is thus a reconciliation of the two kinds of yogic experiences in *Yoga-Sūtra*. In Viśiṣṭādvaita also such comprehensive knowledge is admitted when the *dharma-bhūta jñāna* expands everywhere on removal of *kārmic* obstruction. At places Śāṅkara also admits such perception.

Buddhists accept different forms of yogic perceptions according to different schools. For early Buddhists it is a direct intuition of the flash of momentary states of extreme particular *śvalakṣaṇas*. For the Yogācāras it is an insight into the cosmic store of consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), and for the Mādhyamika it is an immediate perception of the *śūnya* as a synthethis of the world at a level above the four categories. In this vision the *saṃsāra* is transformed into *nirvāṇa*.

For the Jainas this perception enables the *yogi* to directly see the complex reality that is broken up into isolated view-points of imperfect knowledge and verbal expressions. That which is *avaktavya* in language is synthetically grasped in yogic intuition of a *kevali*. Therefore yogic perception not only grasps things that are hidden or obscure, it is also the richest of all perceptions.¹⁷ Thus it stands in diametrical opposition to Advaitin's *nirguṇa* Brahman. In it the different isolated views (*vikalādeśā*) like Buddhist's extreme particulars (*paryārtihika naya*),

and Advaitin's extreme universal (*dravyārthika naya*) are synthetically grasped in a total unity of vision (*sakaladeśa*).

There is a family likeness between Mādhyamika and Jaina *sarvajñaya* vision. But in the Mādhyamika case the world is pulverized into a misty equipoise of categories, whereas in the Jaina case it crystallizes into a many-faceted jewel.

9. Direct Experience as Free Receptivity of Consciousness to Reality :

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote : '*vimatam mithyā dṛśyatvāt, jaḍatvāt, paricchinnavāt*'¹⁸

Regarding the first of the grounds stated, one might have a joke with the Advaitin ; 'You probably regard the world as *jada*, because it is identical, or if you like, non-different from Brahman. But we are not convinced that Brahman is *jaḍa*, however *avedya* (according to you) it might be. Therefore, on your own showing, it has not been convincingly established that the world is *jada*.

The fact that the world is visible, is an argument in favour of its reality rather than falsehood. Therefore, it is case of *viruddha* fallacy. It is like telling, 'This thing is light, because an elephant cannot carry it'. That in ordinary vision, *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*, eyes etc. mediate should not cause any trouble to the Advaitin, because none of them is different from Brahman. Moreover, if vision is such a ground of falsity, why should the Advaitin, in the very next breath, speak of Brahman as *svaprakāśa*, borrowing the phrase from vision? In addition, we have to note that Śaṅkara himself has admitted that the *pratyagātma* becomes a *viśaya* in the experience of "I". And Madhusūdana Sarasvatī himself has explained Citsukha's '*aparokṣa vyavahāra-yogyatva*' as *tad-yogyatvatyanabhavāna-adhikarāṇatvam*'.

Therefore the only point that Madhusūdana has convincingly made is that ordinary perception is limited, and these limitations are worth removing. In fact, it is quite wrong to think that anything visible is entirely different from the spirit or the soul. In such a case, there could not be such intimate *tādātmya* relation as we found between them (sec. 6). Once they are isolated like Sāṅkhya *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* we cannot bring them together again, except by making *puruṣa* like *prakṛti*, and *prakṛti* like *puruṣa*. So we return to the starting point with the problem increased two-fold.

Actually we can perceive nothing that is not spiritual. There is this element of truth in *ātma-khyāti-vāda*. All this world is *ātman* and *svamprakāśa* in the true sense. Here Advaitin might say, 'We have

also admitted all this in our principle of *Saguṇa Brahman*. The world is only *vikṣepa* for him, and no *āvaraṇa*'. But *vikṣepa* is a derogatory word. It is a half-hearted concession to inescapable facts. It does not convey the true fact of real, spontaneous, bursting forth into ever new appearances of self-discovery.

Therefore, we might put it thus: the objects are real manifestations of God, who is conscious of each object, where it is, because he is omnipresent. Therefore his omniscience is *prāpyakari*. When the blinkers of *tāmasa* are removed, we share in this cosmic consciousness. In this sense, the objects are *svamprakāśa*, and flood our consciousness, on the slightest occasion.

Jayanta Bhatta raised the question why objects themselves be not considered *pramāṇas*.¹⁹ In a total situation, why isolate one factor like pure consciousness, and regard the rest as accidental accretions.

In *Gītā* and *Bhāgavata* it is said that God manifests himself as all objects, and it is the highest state of vision to see his presence in all objects. (*Gītā*, VI, 29-30, *Bhāg.* 11, 2, 45). Arjuna in his cosmic vision sees all objects in God, and God in all objects. In *Bhāgavata* the creator *Brahmā* is mystified to find *Kṛṣṇa* manifesting himself as the kine and the cowherd boys.

Therefore, taking a cue from *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*'s '*Bhakti-Rasāyana*', we can attempt a correct definition of direct experience. *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* defines *bhakti rasa* thus: 'When the mind of the devotees assumes the forms of God, it is *bhakti*'.²⁰ Similarly we can define direct perception as consciousness, free receptivity to the manifested world. It should be free because it should not be restricted or distorted due to selfishness or narrow outlook. Restrictions are cases of non-observation, just as one might not notice the sufferings of one's neighbours, relatives or friends. Distortions are the cases of illusions. In discussions on illusion in our philosophies not sufficient thought has been given to the affective factors predisposing a person towards illusions. For instance, a greedy man mistakes a shell for silver, and a timid man mistakes a rope for a snake. The world is said to be manifested because it is a manifestation of the cosmic spirit. This definition covers both sense-perception and yogic perception. In sense-perception, whenever the *tāmasic vṛtti* of our consciousness is partially removed, the world floods our consciousness. In yogic perception the hindrance is further removed. In *bhakti* by knowing God one can know all things through God's omniscience.

1. *Nyāya-Mañjari*. (Calcutta University), p. 10.
2. Found in *Caraka-Saṃhita*, *Mahābhārata*, *Buddha-Carita*.
3. *Brahma-sūtra*, *Śāṅkara bhāṣya*. (Nirnayasagar, 1948), p. 1.
4. *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*, pp. 77-78.
5. This is the burden of Gaṅgeśa's argument against the above definition in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.
6. Nāgārjuna puts it thus: The eye cannot see itself, then how can it see another? *Mādhyamikaśāstra*, III, 2.
7. Dharmarāja himself is not free from this circularity, but we have given here the simpler version of the argument as summarised in *Vedānta Darśana* by Prof. Ashutosh Shastri, Vol. II, pp. 101-104.
8. *yogyavartamānaviśayakatve sati pramāṇacaitanyasya viśaya-caitanyabhinnatvamityuktam: Vedānta-paribhāṣa*, p. 35.
9. *Laghiastryādisaṅgraha*, p. 117.
10. *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 191.
11. *Caraka-Saṃhita*, *Sūtrasthāna*, xi, 32.
12. *Bhāmati* ii 2, 10: I am indebted to Prof. J. N. Sinha for both these references. *Indian Psychology*; Cognition p. 28.
13. Ashutosh Shastri, *Op. Cit.*, p. 36.
14. *Tattvapradīpika*, (Banaras, 1956), pp. 15-16.
15. It also goes counter to Śaṅkara's own words in *Taittiriya Upaniṣadbhāṣya* see I. 10. Moreover the material objects are also *aparokṣa vyavahārayogya* according to Citsukha, so that all that pure consciousness gains over matter is to lose 'vedyatva'.
16. *Nyāyabindu*, p. 8.
17. *Akalanāka*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, v. 465.
18. *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 30-31.
19. *Nyaya Manjari*, p. 105.
20. *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana*, II, 1.

Kamlakar Mishra

THE ROLE OF DIRECT
EXPERIENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY :
A REVIEW

Dr. Mukherji in his paper has touched a very vital point concerning the methodology for the exploration of philosophical truth. It is obvious that the question of methodology in philosophy is linked with the question of the nature of philosophy itself. It is implicitly maintained by Dr. Mukherji in his paper that philosophy is search of truth or reality. Now, in the philosophical world it has become quite clear that reason which is the common means of investigating and understanding truth, is really incapable of knowing the real nature of truth. Reason can have real knowledge or synthetic knowledge (in Kantian terms) only through senses, and, therefore, the limit of our ordinary knowledge is what is called the world of sense-data or phenomena. Now, if reason has no access to reality, is there some other means through which reality is accessible? Well, there have been persons all over the world and specially in India who have implicitly or explicitly claimed to have risen above reason and have found out a higher means of knowledge through which they have had the experience of truth. Even if we are not able to trace such persons in history, there is at least a tradition which maintains that there is also a higher means of knowledge, higher to rational or sensory experience, which can have or does have access to reality. We may call it direct experience (*aparokṣānubhūti*). And logically speaking such a position is not impossible. And because it is claimed that truth is experienced here, and the lives of saints and holy men bear witness to this, it is worth considering. The guarantee of truth in this is further enhanced by the admittance that this is not the special privilege of a chosen few, but it can be achieved by all; and the persons who have achieved it have duly explained the way and the method to achieve it. And persons of all time in history have followed the path and have dittoed the same. Thus, this tradition of direct experience has got experimental value

and verifiability. Of course, this verifiability is different from sensory verifiability, but still it is present.

If in this light we review Dr. Mukherji's paper, we find that Dr. Mukherji has rightly emphasized the role of direct experience in philosophy. We broadly agree with him. But there are certain points in his paper which need be clarified. Moreover, Dr. Mukherji should have anticipated certain obvious objections and answered them. Thus our comment is not so much by way of criticism as by way of seeking clarification.

Our first demand for clarification is regarding the precise meaning of direct experience. Dr. Mukherji has not made it quite clear what he actually means by direct experience. He begins with distinguishing direct experience from sense-perception. But later on he says, "We can define direct perception as consciousness' receptivity to God. This will cover both sense-perception and yogic vision". Here he includes sense-perception in direct experience. Now, this position seems to be somewhat self-contradictory. He again in this connection refers to the conception of *svayamprakāśa* advanced by Citsukha, but he does not seem to agree with Citsukha fully. He again mentions direct experience as being *nirvikalpa* (indeterminate). But the meaning of *vikalpa* or of being without *vikalpa* is not quite clear. He refers to the *yoga* conception of *vikalpa* and also refers to the conception of *vikalpa* and *nirvikalpa* in different systems of Indian Philosophy. But still it is not clear what he himself takes the meaning of *nirvikalpa* to be. Does *nirvikalpa* mean something without mental states (*vṛttis*), or does it mean something where subject-object duality is absent? Or does it mean something inaccessible to rational understanding and, therefore, inexpressible through ordinary mode of our language? Or does it mean the *śvalakṣaṇa* of the Buddhist? Or the *śūnya* of the *Mādhyamika*? Or does it mean all this?

On the whole, Dr. Mukherji means by direct experience some kind of yogic vision. Again by yogic vision he seems to mean some kind of supernatural or super-sensory experience or vision. Now, it is proper that he should answer objections raised from different angles against this yogic super-sensory vision. The *Cārvāka*, as well as the *Mīmāṃsaka*, for example, dismisses the whole thing as a big fraud. He maintains that the story of supernatural experience or revelation is concocted by a set of people whose objective is to exploit the rest of the people. Now, one may answer the *Cārvāka* by making an appeal to history and pointing out that the lives of experienced saints and holy men were such that these persons cannot be regarded as cheats, and that

their motives were not at all to exploit others. But the psychologist is there to raise a more serious question. The psychologist may object: the persons in question may not be impostors, but what is the guarantee that they themselves were not deceived? Their experience may be some sort of illusion or hallucination. What you call yogic vision may be some kind of abnormal mood of the mind or psychological perversion. Thus the whole thing may be a kind of illusion or self-deception.

There is another problem also. Dr. Mukherji claims that direct experience is the experience of truth. Then why is it that people differ in relating the knowledge they claim to have achieved through direct experience? In the systems of Indian philosophy itself we are aware of different versions of truth, all based on direct experience. If direct experience leads to truth, this difference *must not* be there. Or is it possible to say that the differences are only apparent, that the real picture of truth is one and the same, or that there are different aspects of one and the same truth, and the different systems of Indian thought are merely emphasizing one aspect or the other?

There is still another problem which is perhaps a more serious one. The nature of direct experience seems to be such that it is beyond the grasp of our understanding. It is beyond sense-experience, it is also *nirvikalpa*. Therefore, it lacks the quality of being caught by the categories of understanding. And as such it cannot be expressed through modes of our language. But we know that it has been expressed, and without its being expressed we cannot even know that some such thing does exist. Therefore, the problem stands: how is or can that which is inexpressible be expressed or be the ground of a systematic philosophy as Dr. Mukherji wants it to be?

In the end, I must express my gratitude to Dr. Mukherji for his illuminating paper. Dr. Mukherji has tried to bring out the real source from where philosophy can acquire reliable data in formulating the real picture of truth; and I must congratulate Dr. Mukherji for reviving this age old wisdom of Indian Philosophy.

Santosh Kumar

METHOD AND
PHILOSOPHIC
UNDERSTANDING

In some important quarters the problem of method is considered to be the "core" of philosophy. A survey of the career of philosophical thought goes to show that whereas the chief preoccupation of Greek thinkers was converged on the problem of Being, the modern period marks a shift and its entire approach to philosophical problems can be easily discerned as method-oriented. But though treated as methodological, philosophical controversies even during the modern period have proved intractable and philosophical debate in recent times is as hot as ever. It is, therefore, fit and opportune to single out for sole consideration the problem of philosophical method itself and focus one's attention upon it.

However, an enquiry and investigation into the problem of philosophical method may itself raise the question of the methodology of methodology, and is not unlikely to spark off lively issues leading, in turn, to disagreement with regard to their solution. What if two philosophers adopting the same method arrive at different and even conflicting conclusions? On the other hand, there may be scope for some sort of collaboration among philosophers belonging to rival camps and pursuing divergent methods. And paradoxical though it may sound perhaps the lesson to be gleaned from one's reflections on philosophical procedures may turn out to be that philosophy must abstain from sticking to any single method as the sole technique for solving philosophical disputes. But the adventure of a probe into the subtleties of philosophical method will not be in vain, because tolerable clarity attained in regard to the method may go some way in precisely determining one's approach to the vast variety of problems that throng the province of philosophy.

But such rocks and reefs apart, the problem of method in philosophy is initially beset with a peculiar difficulty of a logical nature.

The problem of philosophical method being itself a philosophical problem any discussion of the problem is subtly infected with circularity. The reason being that when we start talking about method, we already have some theory in our mind. As has been aptly pointed out in a certain quarter in order to "know what method to adopt one must already have arrived at some metaphysical and some epistemological conclusions".¹ Therefore instead of initiating philosophical enquiry method implies that philosophy has already made some headway. So any decision relating to method in philosophy already betokens the direction in which we are to look for and one's treatment of the subject can hardly be pronounced as bias-free.

II

A brief sampling of the various methods employed in the course of philosophic history will not, we hope, be out of place to lend poignancy to the problem. To commence with the scientific method first which has among its strong advocates thinkers like Bertrand Russell. The contention of these thinkers is that only scientific method provides genuine knowledge, and therefore metaphysics, in order that it may yield knowledge, must adopt the method of science. But, then, metaphysics is not identical with science. Metaphysics is devoted to issues and problems which are of a more inclusive and universal nature, and accordingly, method suited to the sciences may not be equally germane to metaphysics. For, whereas the particular sciences have for their subject-matter the kinds of things that exist, metaphysics is devoted to a study of the nature of existence itself. Though highly suited to its own limited areas of investigation, scientific method need not prove equally appropriate to all possible fields of enquiry. Even within the domain of science the method which is most suited to physics need not prove equally reliable for the science of biology or psychology. Moreover, the utility and fruitfulness of the results and achievements of science is of a nature fundamentally distinct from the value that accrues to philosophic enterprise which succeeds, for the time being, in solving certain philosophical problems. And whereas the achievements of science have, more or less, a permanent value, revolutions in philosophy generally fail and new positions enjoy only a short span of life.

Then there is a section of thinkers according to whom all ultimate truths are revealed and have their source in some Authority which cannot be impugned or subjected to examination. For the truth of such key-notions as self, God, status of the world, etc., these thinkers are immune to any kind of doubt or invective, except for indulging in the pastime of confuting their adversary. This method which consists in invoking Infallible Authority or revelation has no testable answers

to furnish to metaphysical questions, and its claim has a counter-claim in Reason. For one thing, revealed truths may not be concerned with the same issues and problems as is philosophy. Moreover, even if the fact of some kind of revelation be conceded it may be a pertinent question to ask whether in a certain case the revelation was not merely *our own* revelation of, say, God to ourselves.

A similar fatality besets the method of intuition which is invoked to deliver universal truths but which cannot be availed of for testing them. Though the mainspring of much original thought, intuition constitutes a mode of reasoning which seems to be "paradoxically both valuable and at the same time incapable of validation".²

III

A philosophic scheme is founded on certain basic presuppositions and is to a large extent determined by the professed method which had gone into its formation. Philosophers from Socrates downwards had sought to knock off the fog of confusion and aim at clarity concerning philosophical knowledge. Socratic method consisted in the search for definitions of the key-words. For Descartes the inner light of reason leading to propositions consisting of clear and distinct ideas supplied the method which alone could bestow order in philosophy. According to Hume and the empiricists, tautologies apart, sensations provide the yardstick of whatever is indubitably certain. Kant introduced the Transcendental method to guard us against the illusion of metaphysics. Then there is Bradley for whom the criterion of self-consistency provides the measure for distinguishing the true from the false. In our own times linguistic philosophy claims to solve philosophical problems by a reformulation of language or by a better understanding of the language we currently use.

The important lesson to be learned here is that for all the philosophers enlisted above and their schools of philosophy, the methods and techniques employed are as important and significant as the conclusions to which they lead. But what, it may justly be enquired, is the net result? Even after three hundred years since the era of Descartes we find that the anarchy of opinions in philosophy is "its normal condition which no method will change".³ It is said that fashions change in philosophy; likewise, one philosophic method is succeeded by another, the latter showing that all earlier procedures had been barren or abortive.

IV

But one may pause at this stage and pose a question, viz. are the diverse methods really different or are they merely variations of a single method only. As Morris Lazerowitz has shown with characteristic acumen, if one peers deep into the applications of the principal methods in vogue the truth dawns upon him that these methods ultimately resolve themselves to one device only, viz. concept analysis.⁴ What imparts certainty to the assertion, *cogito ergo sum* is its analyticity, its denial verging on self-contradiction. Similarly in Kant the necessity that appertains to an *apriori* proposition is "inherent in the concepts themselves". Kant's method, thus, exhibits itself as some kind of concept analysis. A similar observation is valid with respect to Bradley. Bradley's thesis that "Sentient experience, in short, is reality", is an analytic proposition whose denial, viz., that something is real which does not fall within sentience, amounts to self-contradiction. Thus Bradley is, in fact, toying with a concept and has no traffic with things. Likewise when Hume is all the time grappling with the problem of causation, his undertaking may be said to consist in dissecting the concept of cause in all its multiple aspects.

It is open to question whether Moore advocated any specific method. What, of course, he did was to counsel us against denying what we know already. Thus Moore's device is just the antithesis of the method of Descartes. Whereas Descartes embarked on his journey by doubting everything, Moore is as obdurate in doubting nothing whatsoever. But when Moore seeks to prove the existence of a hand by displaying one, the existence of a body and thereby of a material object, is assumed already. Thus Moore's proof is equally a case of analysis.

Summing up his conclusions, deduced from the aforesaid cases of reasoning, Morris Lazerowitz declares: "At any rate, the various methods employed in technical philosophy have turned out on examination to be dressed up versions of the method of concept analysis".⁵ Thus a short purview of a few main types of philosophizing leads to the interesting conclusion that the techniques of philosophical investigation overtly or covertly practised by philosophers boil down to the method of concept analysis. Now the focal issue is whether the dissection of concepts can indeed be serviceable in yielding information with regard to "real existence". Perhaps retort will be quick that all talk about 'existence' is, when exposed, talk about word usage. If this view is adopted, then suspicion is irresistible as to whether this approach really

amounts to facing squarely the host of philosophical problems or merely evading them. Are the entire states of affairs completely exhausted by our varied and established modes of speech and ways of talking? For example, to reject phenomenalism with one bound on the ground that it departs from the ordinary use of the verb 'to see' amounts almost to revolt against reason. Has not Wittgenstein himself made a departure from ordinary usage when, for example, he assigns new meanings to certain words, e. g., 'move', 'game', and even 'philosophy'?

V

The aim of a philosophical theory is knowledge, but knowledge in the sense of *understanding*, not in the sense of agreement with the other theories in the field. According to some thinkers philosophy has for its point of departure the tacit belief that the world is more than what it appears to be. But even this statement is subject to scrutiny and stands in need of explication and clarification. In what sense exactly the world is more than the immediately presented datum? And what is the immediately given datum? Is it a complete and concrete object itself, e. g., a table or a tree, or is it only certain sense-data like patches of colour or raps of sound? In the latter case we shall have to construct the external world as Russell did, or miss the world as Hume did. If there is more to the world than what we perceive, in what sense exactly is it more?

However that may be, the conviction that there is a world consisting of physical objects and living beings which is directly and immediately given to us must form the initial step in philosophical reflection and enquiry. There is, therefore, no reality 'in itself' except as it is for us. There is no method in our stock so far for transcending the frontiers of our experience. Our approach to the world and its multiple problems can, therefore, only be from the standpoint of human experience.

VI

It redounds to the glory of Descartes to make scepticism the first step in one's pilgrimage to the temple of truth. In the arena of philosophy unlike other disciplines, no step forward can be taken, no advance whatever can be made, except through questioning, doubt or criticism. Only after our doubts relating to a certain problem are quelled, is insight concerning the truth of that problem achieved. But soon fresh doubts emerge in the mind of man, new questions pertaining to the very same problems clamour

for a different approach, old theories are confuted, the fog of obscurity thickens, all this being followed by a new insight and illumination and the cycle goes on and on. But the central pivot around which the entire philosophical discourse and activity revolves is the device of criticism or critical reflection. This also goes to account for the fact that philosophy is an unceasing activity which knows no end or terminus. To take an instance, for Heidegger the key-question of philosophy is: why is not there nothing? For Carnap this constitutes a classic example of a pseudo-question. But, then, both Carnap and Heidegger are seized with an intellectual problem, and the activity which characterizes preoccupation with such problems is philosophical. What is, in fact, important is not that the problem be solved once for all, but that an understanding of the problem be acquired which accompanies an attempt at its solution.

A panoramic view of philosophical investigations down the ages bequeaths another important lesson, viz., that philosophy does not have any *one* single unique problem which can be claimed to constitute, as it were, the root to which various other problems owe their origin, e.g., the problem of Being, or Substance, or Self, or Time or Language. Rather, philosophy is replete with a vast array of issues, questions and problems and it is these which, taken together, constitute the subject-matter of philosophy, e.g., the problems of knowledge, error, universals, causation, meaning, solipsism, freedom, evil, values, etc. etc. The world around us constitutes the datum of our knowledge. Each person, be he a layman, a scientist, a philosopher, a sage or a mystic, in his encounter with the world, is confronted by certain facts and phenomena which are equally the same for all, e.g., that the world is plural and yet it shows signs of unity, that things and events are in constant flux and yet somehow the world is marked by a certain permanence, that there are corporeal bodies as also conscious experiences, and so on. But the spirit of enquiry which forms the essence of philosophy seeks to explore whether in the ultimate analysis the world is one or many, whether inherently it is material or spiritual, etc. And the various philosophical theories and doctrines which are promulgated from time to time, e.g. absolutism, positivism, existentialism, philosophy of analysis and all the rest are so many ingenious attempts to interpret or to account for the phenomena or that which is given to us.

VII

The various metaphysical theories and doctrines must, accordingly, be judged not as finished solutions to the problems which pose a challenge to the intellect of man, but rather as having the character of

hypotheses which in their own characteristic way seek to interpret and explain the facts with which the man has acquaintance in this world. The scope of, what may be called, metaphysical hypotheses is marked by their universality so as to embrace the whole of existence. Proofs and arguments put forward by a metaphysical theory, in fact, amount to the justification of the theses advanced, by showing as to how adequately and expeditiously the disputes in question can be settled.

However, the function of philosophy need not necessarily be a positive one, its role may be negative. According to the philosophy of logical empiricism the task of philosophy consists in the removal of obstacles to philosophic understanding. According to it the nest of problems with which metaphysics is concerned are pseudo-problems and the metaphysical doctrines which are set forth are bereft of any sense, for no technique can be procured whereby they can be tested. Here it may be pertinent to ask that if metaphysics is another name for 'Nonsense', why should the analytic philosophers be so seriously concerned with such nonsense. Philosophy, we are told, must restrict itself to the elucidation of the concepts of science through logical analysis. Here we are entrusted with a method which aims at clarity in philosophical knowledge through a dissolution of philosophical puzzles and obscurities and to that extent its value for philosophy cannot be underrated. But this viewpoint itself is just one among many other approaches meant to take cognizance of the philosophical problems. And this is sought to be accomplished by giving a new interpretation of the term "problem". Only that must be called a 'problem' which is *solvable*. That philosophical problems are inherently insoluble and so must be dissolved, is only *one* of the ways of looking at these problems, and of promoting philosophical clarity.

VIII

Different philosophical systems are, accordingly, relative to the specific standpoint peculiar to a thinker. No greater claim can be advanced for the truth of any one philosophical system than for the other. When a philosopher is able, through critical reflection, to arrive at a certain solution of a particular problem, the main consideration is as to how satisfactorily the solution *seems to him* to explain the facts or how well his intellectual curiosity is satisfied. Extra-logical considerations, therefore, to a large extent go to determine the direction which a philosophical enquiry is prone to take, and the part played by temperamental factors in philosophical construction cannot be entirely ignored.

IX

In the realm of philosophy, therefore, no claim to finality or ultimacy can be vouchsafed. Any attempt to herald a universal method is doomed to failure because it is sure to invite protest and precipitate more problems than it is likely to solve. We can employ any technique having reference to a particular context with a view to greater clarity. Methods which have been found fruitful in the past may not prove equally effective at present or in the future. Knowledge is accumulative and there is no reason why instead of a single method, a collaborative method may not be used by a philosopher devoted to the investigation of certain problems. The common goal on which the philosophers belonging to antagonistic camps can have accord will be the quest for philosophical understanding and the common technique for the realization of this goal will be criticism or critical reflection.

1. Richard Rorty : *The Linguistic Turn*, (University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 2.
2. Rupert Crawshaw-Williams : *Methods and criteria of Reasoning*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 203.
3. Morris Lazerowitz : *Studies in Metaphilosophy* (R & K Paul), p. 2.
4. Ibid : p. 2-37.
5. Ibid : p. 37.

B. N. Singh

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

In this paper I propose to restrict myself to the approach of one well-known Indian philosophical system namely Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. The realist school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopts mainly experimental method. The starting point of this school is *experience* and its avowed method is empirical. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school believes in the commonsense approach to philosophy. Commonsense approach to philosophy is the study of the data of experience of an unsophisticated human mind. It is opposed to speculative method which starts with theorising assumptions. Any preconceived notion is definitely detrimental to the free and impartial enquiry of a philosopher. An assumption weakens the philosophical conclusions and renders them unappealing. This does not mean a complete deadlock of even the most elementary intellectual activity. What it means is a resolute acceptance of the evidentiary value of common experience. The basic and guiding task of philosophy should be the analysis of experience and evolution of a coherent system out of that analysis. Of all the systems of Indian philosophy the realist group seems to be an adherent of the method. The datum of experience is the foundation of philosophical investigation and a metaphysical theory is its logical outcome in realistic schools. In what follows I shall merely elaborate how this method serves in the hands of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to achieve its purpose.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists start with an analysis of common experience. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school lays down a fundamental principle "Experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of reality".¹ This criterion has been originated by an uncompromising realist named Vācaspati Miśra. He means that an individual has to start with the universe of experience. By experience the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school means all varieties of valid knowledge,

whether perceptual or non-perceptual, which have an unerring objective reference, and which, therefore, unmistakably attest the presence of universe of reals in and around us. These reals are absolutely *objective facts*, knowable no doubt, but existing prior to all knowledge referring to them.² Knowledge or cognition as an apprehension of objects, inevitably leads to the conclusion that the objects of knowledge are prior to knowledge itself. All cognitions have a more or less determinate objective reference. So from the fundamental fact of knowledge itself the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher is led to assert the objective order of reals external to and independent of the knowing mind. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism makes out a case for logical necessity in the belief of the reality of objects created by the analysis of experience. Whatever we experience must have external existence.

Thus having asserted the reality of the individual objects in a commonsensical way, the syncretist school, next, proceeds to *classify*, the universe of experience. Here again the guidance is from experience only. The data of experience are not absolutely discrete and dissimilar. The separate individual objects possess community of nature. This needs a *categorisation* or grouping together a number of types. The conception of *padārtha* or a category is a classificatory principle. The universe of experience is full of multiple objects. All objects are comprehended by senses. So all objects are nameable. A nameable object is knowable or a knowable object is nameable. So knowability and nameability is the definition of a *padārtha* or category.³ The categories or *padārthas* are objects of right knowledge.⁴ The categories are the ultimate reals, absolutely objective facts. Thus the *padārthas* or categories are necessary to reduce the bewildering variety of this phenomenal universe in some ultimate reals. This enables a philosopher to achieve a unitary synoptic vision of reality. The point to note here is that the very notion of category as well as its definition is derived from attention to experience. A category is not a subjective imposition on experience but is what is read off from experience itself.

The categories of the syncretist school are not merely logical but ontological, and again realistically ontological. The categories do not only prove the objective reality of objects but also characterise the reality. A category can be either positive or negative. There are six positive categories of reality substance, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence. *Abhāva* is negative category.

The basic principle of the six categories of reality is the essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties (*dharmā dharmibheda*). The six categories follow as corollaries from that basic principle. A property is called a *dharma* which is contained (*ādheya*) in a substance whereas a substance is known as container or *dharmī* (*ādhāra*). This means obviously that a property is basically different from substance.⁵ For instance a white cloth can be analysed into two entities: colour white as the property (*dharma*) and cloth as the substratum (*dharmī*) of the property. The properties residing in a substance can also be experienced as of invariable and variable nature. For instance white colour is an example of the former as well as the movement of body can be set as an example of the latter. The latter type of quality is known as action (*karma*) which is a variable quality. We also experience something common in several individuals by which they are designated. In the case of atoms of the same class, differentiation from one atom to another was assumed to be due to a special property called *viśeṣa* residing in the atoms. Of the five categories the last four, viz. quality (*guṇa*) etc. being of the nature of properties (*dharma*s) are only found to be residing in their substratum (*dharmī*) which is the first category i. e. substance. Universal (*sāmānya*) is held to be residing in *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*. Their relation between the former and the latter cannot be an ordinary one, called conjunction (*samyoga*) which obtains between the two substances that can be connected and separated at will. A sixth category therefore, in the form of *samavāya* was assumed.⁶ The main realistic position of this system, its conception of eternal atoms, and the doctrine of cause, depend on the acceptance of inherence. The inherent relation is conceived to be *eternal*. Inherence cannot be destroyed without destroying the object in which it resides. It exists only among things which are separable, but distinct, as for example, a cloth and the threads of which it is made. This way of conceiving the relation is necessary because the ultimate substantiality of all things cannot be maintained if a product could be explained away as due to mere conjunction. The eternal atoms are manifested to all creation in the relation of inherence. Hence inherence is made into a separate category by this system.⁷ In this way all the six categories of reality are formed on the basis of experiential data. *Abhāva* is reckoned as an independent category. Non-existence as a category cannot be accepted as an experiential fact. It is a logical concept and is serviceable for intellectual distinction. Every entity involves a counter entity of its own. It is known as *pratiyogi* and *anuyogi* relation. This category was not mentioned by Kaṇāda as his metaphysical structure is based on the analysis of experience.

As stated above the analysis of all experiences into seven padārthas is the corner stone of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika edifice. As a principle of classification it has been accepted by various systems of philosophy. Both in the East and in the West philosophers have felt it necessary to begin by arranging the universe into a few elementary classes. Aristotle enumerated ten categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, appurtenance, activity, passivity. Kant and Mill have also used it. The Vedānta reduces everything to one Brahman, the Sāṅkhya to Spirit and matter, the Nyāya philosophy mentions sixteen categories. Thus classification in order to reduce the universal things into a few well-marked units has been accepted by various systems. What distinguishes the Vaiśeṣika system is the principle and purpose of classification. The classification of Aristotle is mainly logical, that of Kaṇāda metaphysical also. One is concerned with notions and propositions, the other with external objects which give rise to those notions.⁸ Though Aristotle is close to realism and commonsense his categories themselves are not derived solely from experience as is the case in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

II

The starting point of Nyāya realism is experience. We experience certain facts as fācts. We may dispute as to their ultimate nature, but not their existence as facts of experience. Of these we experience some by means of the senses. These may, therefore, be called sensible experiences. Now, as such sensible experiences do undoubtedly exist, so there are and must be, other than and outside of ourselves as individual experiencers, things by which such individual experiences are produced.⁹ Thus Nyāya realism holds that the external world is real and exists in the form in which it is experienced. We apprehend an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by us. Thus the content perceived is independent of the act of percept.

On the other hand, the Yogācāra is an out-and-out subjectivist. He does not believe in anything other than the non-substantial ideas. He argues that ideas or cognitions are powerless to know anything other than themselves. The apparent reference to external objects is a mere illusion. It is a fact of experience that something is cognised as having a shape. That which is cognised and that which has a shape are not different, because there is no consciousness of their differentiating properties. The cognition alone is apprehended and the postulation of an external object is unnecessary.

Nyāya realism denies subjectivity altogether. The empirical world does not reduce itself to ideas. The blue and the consciousness of blue are not identical. The object exists independently in the external world apart from and other than our experiences—our ideas and impressions. The latter do not add to or alter the object experienced. Nyāya holds that the postulation of external object is necessary to explain the diversity of cognitions. We are conscious of cognitions having different shapes and this is not possible unless an independent existence of external object is granted.

Knowledge is the revelation of objects which are independent of the knowing mind. Cognition is a quality which belongs to the self. The self cognises an object. Hence a distinction is made between a percept and its content. This distinction based on subject-object relation is the basis of the Nyāya realism. Knowledge is revelation of the objective to a subject. It is the basis of all our practical activities in relation to objects. A successful activity presupposes a correct knowledge of objects. A correct knowledge needs a valid method in order to reveal the nature of the real. So valid knowledge depends upon four factors : a revealer (*pramātā*), a revealed (*prameya*), a mode of revelation (*pramāṇa*) and revelation itself (*pramiti*) as an accomplished result. The whole scheme is meant to imply successful activity in relation to an object. Knowledge sets up certain psychophysical reactions in the knowing subject. Successful activity is the volitional experience (*arthakriyājñāna*) of the expected object (*phalajñāna*). The perceptions of water in a certain place is known to be true when by acting on the perceptions we meet with the expected water. Contrariwise, a knowledge is known to be invalid, when it is contradicted by subsequent volitional experiences (*pravrittivisamvāda*). So successful activity or conative satisfactions is the actual test of knowledge (*pravritisāmarthyā*).¹⁰ The ascertainment of truth depends on some extraneous considerations just as its productions depends on some extraneous factors. At the time of the origination of a cognition there is no knowledge of its truth or falsehood. All Naiyāyikas maintain that it consists in its correspondence to real facts and the test of truth lies in its pragmatic value.

It appears from what has been stated above that evidence of direct experience is the cornerstone of Nyāya realism. All philosophical problems are oriented from common sense standpoint. Its avowed method is empirical.

An analysis of the logical structure of Nyāya shows that it employs a two fold way : *pramāṇa* and *tarka*.

Pramāṇa is operative cause in any valid cognitions of objects. It has a real correspondence with object. It determines the nature of

attributes of objects. In any act of cognitions *pramāṇa* is held to be the predominant factor. It determines the character of cognitions. The objects exist in darkness before the operations of *pramāṇa* which reveals or discovers what was hidden in darkness. It does not make or unmake an object but merely reveals. So knowledge as an act of revelation depends upon a source which reveals. We cannot prove the existence or nonexistence of objects without *pramāṇa*. Thus the realist concludes that a *pramāṇa* is the sole means of determining objects. Regarding the relation between a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and an object of knowledge (*prameya*) three alternatives are put. A source of knowledge is prior or posterior to the object of knowledge or it operates simultaneously with the objects cognised. The main object introducing it appears to be to lay special emphasis upon the fact that the means of knowledge and the object of the knowledge go together and that they are inter-dependent for a proof of their existence. An object of knowledge can also serve the purpose of means of knowledge and vice-versa. We weigh a piece of a gold by some other measures. But other measures are also weighed by a piece of gold. So the piece of gold serves the purpose of both means of knowledge and object of knowledge. A source of knowledge may be before and after but the fact remains that a means of knowledge reveals an object of knowledge.

The principle of *pramāṇa* constitutes the main feature of Nyāya realism. On account of its abundant use the Nyāya is also known as *pramāṇa sāstra*. It shows that the application of *pramāṇa* is of primary importance in the knowledge of category of reality. The reals may exist in an outside world but may not be known to be existent without its operative cause *pramāṇa*. Hence the Naiyāyikas make it a basic principle that determination of the nature and attributes of an object solely depends on *pramāṇa*. But how to determine the nature of *pramāṇa*. The Nyāya school holds that the determination of *pramāṇa* depends on *lakṣaṇa*. *Lakṣaṇa* is the extraordinary characteristic of a thing (*asādhāraṇa dharma*) as for example smell is the extraordinary characteristic or distinguishing feature of earth. But the determination of a thing involves empirical investigation and analysis of experience. Hence a *pramāṇa* is empirically grounded. It is not an assumption but a necessary outcome of experiential facts.

Now coming to *tarka*, it is an aid or auxiliary to *pramāṇa*. Its main function is to dispel doubt. It is employed in inferential reasoning to remove doubt in the ascertainment of universal relation. *Tarka* is employed to support the truth of a given proposition by exposing the falsity of a counter proposition. Thus the universal proposition "all cases of smoke are cases of fire" may be proved to

to be true by proving the falsity of its contradictory proposition "some cases of smoke are not cases of fire". On the basis of empirical evidence, we say the contradictory proposition violates the causal principle that every event has a cause. Any violation of causal principle will lead to chaos. A particular effect needs a particular material cause. Hunger can be appeased by food and thirst can be quenched by water.¹¹ So *tarka* serves as an implicative argument to test the validity of a proposition. *Tarka* does not originate valid knowledge as a *pramāṇa* but supports a fact already established. The function of *tarka* ceases when a *pramāṇa* is confirmed. From our account of the logical structure of *pramāṇa* and *tarka* as understood by the Nyāya, it should be evident how object-oriented the Nyāya, is even in their methods of logic.

1. *samvid eva hi bhavati vastupagame naḥ śaranam* - NVT p. 506.
2. Studies in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics by Sadanand Bhaduri, Chap. 1. p. 1.
3. *abhidheyatvam (jñeyatvam) padārtha sāmānya lakṣaṇam Tarka Samgraha* p. 2.
4. *pramiti visayāḥ padārthāḥ sapta-padārthi* S.D. p. 2
5. *dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhiḥyate* NVT p. 843
6. *Critique of Indian Realism* by D.N. Sastri p. 16
7. *Sapta-padārthi* Introduction XII by D. Gurumurti
8. *Tarkasamgraha* by Annambhatta Sec. II p. 74
9. *Hindu Realism* by Jagdish Chatterjee p. 21
10. *Nyaya Theory of Knowledge* by S.C. Chatterjee p. 80
11. *tarkaḥ kvacit śamkū nivartakaḥ* ; Bhāṣāpariccheda
yāvad śamkūm tāvat tarkānugrahaṇat : Mathuranātha

Kalyan Kumar Bagchi

PHILOSOPHIC METHOD
FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF A PHENOMENOLOGY
OF LANGUAGE

Any discussion on Philosophical Method has to *situate* itself in the contemporary philosophic perspective governed by an almost all-consuming interest in *Language*. Historically, however, the problem of method came to the forefront with Kant's advocacy of a distinctive method for philosophy which he called the 'Transcendental Method'. At the same time, the Kantian speculations concerning method have to be joined with contemporary speculations. This can be done when we discover that Kant's interest in the problem of language was determined by his study of the languages of science and metaphysics with the aim of deciding which one is more fitted to the description of facts. In other words, it is only if we can show that Kant's interest was, at bottom, in the *problem of description* of facts in language that we can join his speculations concerning method with the contemporary discussions on language.

We have to see first of all how Kant came to detect a *problem* in language. It is well known that with all his criticism of the Rationalist Metaphysicians, Kant was not a little enchanted with them. Indeed, his criticism of empirical science was determined largely by his study of those metaphysicians. There was, in Kant's mind a see-saw, so to say, between the claims of empirical science and metaphysics and it is out of this that Kant's philosophy assumed its peculiar character. Kant, in fact, came to raise the problem of language by reflecting on metaphysics from the standpoint of natural science and, at the second stage, by reflecting on natural science after being enlightened by the instructive errors of metaphysics.

Let us begin straightway with Kant's reflections on the metaphysical use of language. A metaphysical use of language, he would tell us, is unavailing in respect of empirical situations. Was,

however, the scientific use of language any better? His observation that concepts without intuitions are empty is apt to be understood today in terms of the theory that concepts are nothing if not empirically instantiated. Unless so instantiated, the concepts are unmeaning. But, then, the question remains: Would Kant come to be satisfied with language if empirical illustrations can be provided for it? And the answer will be 'no'. Why?

The reason is: for Kant, language *as such* is in a way abstract. But, then, does not language, at least apparently, provide us *information* about its contents? Primarily indeed we understand language this way, viz., in the sense of providing us with information. We are not, at least initially, concerned with the metaphysical use of language. No one, unless sophisticated with the idea of a philosophical distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'empirical' uses of language, is prepared to view language as *privative* in any way — it is genuinely believed in untutored commonsense to be revealing some reality. What special reason, then, has Kant for looking askance at even an empirical use of language in which it is, to all appearances, successful in revealing a reality?

It is here that Kant would bring all the lesson that he has derived from his study of the metaphysicians to bear upon his examination of the claim that language is successful in its purpose of representation at least in the empirical context. Here, too, we shall find why metaphysics itself could not remain satisfied with the empiricist's use of language.

Instantiation, from which we seek to derive support for the claim to successfulness on the part of the empirical use of language, does not satisfy the metaphysicians. Did not Plato point out centuries ago that the search for perfect instantiation should be abandoned? Has philosophy been able to lay down any *criterion*, for instantiation *par excellence*? To the metaphysicians' imagination language has an inner hankering, as it were, and this hankering, they frankly tell us, is not going to be satisfied by empirical instances.

If we ask the metaphysicians why they are so such dissatisfied with the empirical use of language, we cannot elicit from them anything more than the answer that standard instantiation corresponding to language there cannot be. If, now, we ask Kant, the same question, we do not, at first sight, elicit from him anything more than the theme that is almost a constant refrain with him: the abstract nature of language — as much in its empirical use as in its metaphysical use.

But, then, the way to future construction lies verily here. Since empirical instantiation did not satisfy them, the metaphysicians went about in search of a non-empirical world which they visualised as corresponding to their metaphysical language. A theory of another world corresponding to (metaphysical) language was thus concocted. But it is significant that in doing so, the metaphysicians did not understand why such concoction became necessary; they, of course, were dissatisfied for want of standard instantiation, but why at all even this demand for standard instantiation arose could not be explained by them. There was something hidden in their psychology which they could not successfully bring to the fore, because there was *something hidden in language itself* which they could not unearth. That something was, what we term as, the 'abstract' nature of language; and once this is unearthed, we find that as much in its metaphysical use as in its empirical use, language is unavailing. It is from this perspective that a study of Kant should be *situated* in the contemporary philosophical perspective dominated by its interest in language.

We have seen that the metaphysicians understood language as referring to *another* world even as the ordinary empiricist or the natural scientist understands empirical language as referring to the *empirical* world. Both, then, understand language to be *informative*. And it is this that Kant does not approve of in respect of the metaphysician. The metaphysician, he would point out, completely threw his insight overboard when, after questioning the scientific use of language, he took language to be informative about a non-empirical world. That language is abstract because of its informative nature was not realised by the metaphysician. Metaphysics used language just in the same *way* it is used in science, i. e., in the informative manner.

We get information of a content when the latter is *meaningfully* talked of. What is regarded as information is what is spoken of and so *constituted by speaking*. That even an empirical use of language cannot get to reality is precisely because here the language has itself constituted the content. Here the language describes only the logical structure of facts, a point insisted upon by the logical empiricists in contrast with the ordinary empiricists. Such a view of language would satisfy the contemporary Formalist, for one: according to him, the relation between language and its content is formal or mathematical — or, better still — isomorphic.

If, now, metaphysics also tries to view language in the informative way and seeks to derive the justification of its use of language,

it will ever be haunted by a sense of want of reality and has to consign itself to the world of the meaningless, to what cannot be spoken. Not satisfied with an empirical use of language, metaphysics mistook its non-empirical use in reference to the *same order* in which science understands the empirical use of language. That language could not get to a reality because of its abstract nature, because, in other words, the content of language is *figured* by it could not be understood by the metaphysician who, precisely on account of *this* failure, took to the informative use of language. No wonder, the contemporary Formalist was led to conceive of an all-too-formal relation between language and its content. The predicament which we are in is this: either we, as much in metaphysics as in the sciences, confine ourselves to the *same order* of language or we acquiesce in the formalist theory of language.

The Formalist, in spite of whatever may in the sequel be found to be his shortcomings, genuinely breaks new ground in as much as he conceives of a *completely new order of language*. He starts with the presupposition that language describes only the logical structure of facts. And then he points out that just as the first order language describes the logical structure of facts, a second order language describes the logical structure of the first order language; similarly, a third order language will describe the logical structure of the second order language and so on.

The Formalist is, after all, confining himself to language. To him, language is not anything more than the logical structure of facts. How much abstract and petrified then, the orders of languages supervening upon the first order language will be?

A fresh point of view is suggested by the Phenomenologist Husserl who goes beyond the formalism or logicism of the contemporary thinkers. Husserl would point out that *in the same use of language in which we describe facts or construct natural science, we cannot demand reality*. Facts are constructed in language in so far as they are spoken. The issue between the Formalist and the Phenomenologist is *whether the speaking of facts can itself be further spoken of*. It is necessary to understand the *significance of the 'spoken'* to settle this issue. The spoken is symbolic of the *speaking 'I'*. While experience can be articulated in language, the *articulating* of experience cannot be articulated that way. The articulating of experience is by the 'I', and it is from this point of view that our analysis should begin. 'Speaking' cannot itself be further spoken, i.e., cannot itself be articulated in language.

What is the ultimate implication of this emphasis upon the symbolic character of language? Language cannot have a meta-

physical import, i.e., does not give any information. It is symbolic of our consciousness and should be appreciated thus from the standpoint of the speaking 'I', i.e., subjectivity *as contrasted with the point of view of information as in science*. The metaphysicians use language with reference to the same order, viz., the informative order; *but in the same use in which language gives rise to information, it cannot be formalised*. Metaphysics, however, did not distinguish the *levels of language* and thereby came to understand its contents to be 'meant' (in the sense of being informatively spoken). But either metaphysics must *reduce* itself to science or, if it claims to be extra-scientific, *it must not use language in the same way*, i.e., must change its order of speaking. If it does not accept such a course—which is the only course left open to it to save its distinctiveness—its contents cannot be meant and that is why, it must be abandoned as 'meaningless'. It is in this way that the positivist would discover the etiology of the meaninglessness of metaphysics. If, however, a way of escape from the positivistic alternative is to be found, *the point of view of our use of language has to be changed*. In philosophy, there is a *distinctive method of using language*, namely, from the standpoint of the consciousness that *symbolises* itself in language, in the spoken word 'I'. So conceived, philosophy is phenomenology of language. Philosophy understands language as incarnation of subjectivity and thus prescribes the transcendence of all speaking—transcendence even of philosophy.

Reena Mookerjee

ON PHILOSOPHICAL
METHODOLOGY
(HERMENEUTIC)

1. Let it be clearly stated that I do not propose to solve any philosophical question or puzzle regarding philosophical method/methodology in this essay or note. I may, however, indicate a few important philosophical questions for our context in the course of the essay. Further, I do not intend to undertake an examination or justification of any particular philosophical method, nor do I wish to enter into a detailed presentation of a particular philosophical system(s) which embodies (embody) (a) certain philosophical method(s).

2. A word about the expression 'method' or 'methodology'. "The word (methodology) comes from the Greek words equivalent to "along" and "way". So that it means literally 'a speaking of the (right) going - along - the - way'. The method is the manner of proceeding in any particular field, that is of organizing activity and of coordinating its objectives. Methodology is the theory of method. (J. M. Bocheński: *The methods of Contemporary Thought*, tr. by Peter Caws; D. Reidel Publishing Company; Dordrecht-Holland, 1965, p. 9.).

3. The question of a method/methodology is common to Science and Philosophy. But as remarked by Peter Caws: "In science methodology is almost superfluous; given all the available information and a reasonably clear idea of what is wanted, there is usually not much ambiguity as to the means of getting it...In philosophy, on the other hand, it is much less clear what is wanted, or what counts as information, and the method employed may have a decisive influence on the formulation of the problem itself, as well as on the nature of any possible solution to it." (Bocheński: *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*. Translator's Introduction, p. ix)

4. For my part, I am greatly, though not completely, in agreement with the above remark, a proper valuation of which enables one to understand the zeal (of some thinkers) to equate philosophy with methodology; that is, philosophy comes to be regarded, not quite infrequently, primarily as a method (or a discipline of methodic significance), a procedure, a type of activity, or even a set of rigid rules for thought; thinking *qua* philosophical thinking happens to be—it is assumed—conditioned by certain set of (rigid) rules.

4. 1. As is well known, such an attempt to equate philosophy with methodology is essentially a modern upsurge, if we thereby take note of the Phenomenological tradition in philosophy, starting its career from Husserl onwards. But, then, the attitude, though not of strict identification, but something very close to it, may be traced back to Descartes, and is evidently present in Kant, as the latter, as for example, expressly states in his Introduction to the Second Edition of the First Critique: that 'transcendental knowledge' is concerned not (so much) with the objects but with the *mode* of our knowledge of objects (Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen)—in so far as this is possible apriori. (B. 25).

4. 2. Of interest is to note that an obvious corollary to the above attitude is—let me say—the ambition to extend to philosophy the status of a science. Following a strict method, philosophy would earn the claim of providing with precise, clear, necessary knowledge. Already with Kant the cry to regard philosophy as a science is apparent: "Die Transzendental-Philosophie ist die Idee einer Wissenschaft". (Critique of Pure Reason, B 28).

5. The question crops up: Is philosophy to have *one single method* (of enquiry)?

6. But, then: Is there only *one single philosophy*?

7. Now I do not think that there is 'One' Philosophy with a capital 'P'. In fact, the noun 'Philosophy' is quite misleading, since it suggests, as if there is one. At best, however, one could speak of 'philosophies', that is, in the plural. (The other way to avoid the present type of difficulty would mean: taking recourse to the verb 'to philosophise').

7. 1. My answer/reaction to the other question (whether philosophy is to have a single method) is now apparent: As there are 'philosophies' so there are standpoints and perspectives, methods in philosophy, that is, there are *alternative modes of philosophising*. Such

'alternative modes' can find their application already within the compass of a single work or in the hands of a single philosopher. As necessary evidence for our context one could very well take note of the thinkers like Hume or even Heidegger, their works, and the methods employed therein.

8. Now, what is the object(s) of philosophy? What is the function(s) of philosophy? And: what kind(s) of knowledge does philosophy give? Such important questions are for their answers dependent on the kind of method which one takes recourse to.

8. 1. Thus the analytic philosophers, by pursual of their method of analysis (conceptual/linguistic) offer us a set of answers to the above questions. The objective or function of philosophy, it is heralded, is analysis of e.g., concepts or propositions, the latter being a sort of a 'picture' or a 'state-of-affairs'. The type of knowledge philosophy is thus in a position to furnish is 'analytic' (and by the same token: apriori). Clarity and precision happen to be the ideal of knowledge.

8. 2. In Kant, as is well known, one finds suggestions of a different kind altogether. The business of philosophy *qua* 'transcendental philosophy' turns out to be that of tackling the problem of (apriori) constitution of objects of experience. More precisely: Kant by employing the apriori method/transcendental method undertakes an enquiry into the (apriori) *mode* of constitution of objects. And philosophical *qua* scientific knowledge comes to be recognised as of the type of synthetic apriori.

9. Without assuming and thus subscribing to the Kantian methodical presuppositions and commitments it is of use to ask: By following what kind of a method, other than that of the transcendental or the strictly Kantian one, could one look forward to philosophy as providing with synthetic apriori knowledge, that is, knowledge which would be informative and apriori as well (i.e., knowledge which would be necessarily and universally true)?

10. The above issue brings me to a method practised in the Continent of Europe since the days of Husserl, and still dominating the scene, whether philosophical or otherwise. This is the method of, as it originally started with Husserl, *Observation* and *Description*. Now, the question is: What is it in relation to which 'observation' etc. may be directed? Well, the famous thesis of Husserl runs: 'Back to the things themselves'! (*Zurück zu den Sachen selbst!*). The implication of the present thesis is, namely, observed can be that only what

is 'given' (das Gegebene). Or, observation *qua* 'intuition', i.e., direct grasping comes into operation in regard to 'Wesenssachlagen' or 'essences'.

10. 1. Important is to note that to speak of observation etc. as a methodical device is to admit the question of a 'content' of observation. Thus the 'given' or the given object (the phenomenon) constitutes the 'content'. (The expression 'phenomenon' is, Heidegger makes it sufficiently precise, derived from Greek and is taken to connote: *what appears, or lies before us, what shows itself, what is self-exhibiting*. Thus Heidegger says: "Phänomenologie sagt dann: ... Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen." Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer Verlag/Tübingen, 1963, p. 34. As a science, Phenomenology grasps its objects and deals with them 'in such a way that they are directly exhibited and demonstrated'.)

10. 2. Here certain other specifications may be made. To observe properly one has to, negatively speaking, (a) eliminate the subject/subjective/subjectivity, (b) exclude all theoretical knowledge and (c) all tradition. Further, (and rather positively speaking) in regard to what has to be observed the attitudes of (a) indifference to existence and (b) concentration on 'essences' have to be instituted. Finally, 'observation' (of essences) need be (a) comprehensive and (b) *descriptive*.

10. 3. In fact the above theses, i.e., the rules of observation, have been rather sharply pin-pointed by Professor Bochénski:

'(The phenomenological method) requires a threefold exclusion or 'reduction'.¹ first, of all subjectivity: what is called for is a purely *objective* standpoint, concentrated single-mindedly on the object....He (the individual) must exclude everything that comes from himself, from the subject, above all his own feelings, desires, personal attitudes, etc...second, of all theoretical knowledge, such as hypotheses, and proofs derived from other sources, so that *only the given* will be admitted, third, of all tradition, i.e., of everything that others have taught about the object in question."²

"The given object ('phenomenon') has, in its turn, to be subjected to a two-fold reduction: first the *existence* of the thing must be disregarded..., second, everything inessential has to be excluded from (the) 'whatness' (of the object), and only the essence of the object analysed."

"There are, however, some positive rules... :

(1) It is imperative to see *everything* that is given, as far as that is possible...we are all too prone to be blind to certain elements in what is given. The first task of phenomenological investigation is therefore the disclosure of phenomena which have been overlooked.

(2) Further, phenomenological observation must be *descriptive*. That is to say, the object must be taken apart, and its elements then described and analysed. For every object is infinitely complex. The clearer the observation, the better the elements can be differentiated and understood in relation to one another." (Bochénski: *The Methods of Contemporary Thought*, pp. 16-17, 19, 23).

11. Now, my interest in giving the above brief exposition of the phenomenological method has been this: I intend to refer to the sort of 'taking over' of the same method by one eminent philosopher, wherein the method has been employed in a different context altogether. In other words, I wish to focus our attention on the particular form/application that the method in question has assumed since the days of Martin Heidegger.

11. 1. When, however, I speak of a 'taking over' of the phenomenological method etc. I do not thereby like to suggest the idea of a 'complete take over', if I am to consider the 'existentialist' thinkers, including Heidegger in the list. The thing is, that so far as the existentialists are concerned, and their making use of the methodical hints contained in the idea of a phenomenological method, one can hardly speak of a 'complete take over'. But, then, whether Heidegger is to be counted as an 'existentialist' in the same sense in which Kierkegaard and others are — remains controversial. I, for my part, however, would refrain from any general marking here, since with Heidegger we have primarily a type of *Ontology*, which containing — as it does — an 'existence-analysis', is nevertheless distinct from the philosophy of, say, Kierkegaard. Moreover, Heidegger clearly tells us that for him the phenomenological method *qua* Phenomenological description constitutes the true method of enquiry.*

12. Now, with Heidegger—and here we further mention the name of Wilhelm Dilthey—the emphasis comes to fall on the expressions: *description* and *structure*. In fact, Heidegger's methodical procedures show decisive influences (or 'a taking-over') of the methodical schemata dominating the philosophies of Husserl and Dilthey as well. Thus, the former (Heidegger), consciously calls his philosophy: 'hermeneutic phenomenology'. In the following, an exposition of the methodology as adopted by Heidegger will be briefly supplemented by that of Dilthey.

12. 1. The question crops up : When is description *philosophically* relevant? The answer is: a description may be so designated only when it happens to be a *structural* one. Philosophy is then an engagement or an attempt to solve problems/deal with questions concerning descriptions of structures of *life* (Leben/Lebensverlauf) (Thus, *life* — and with Heidegger: *Dasein* — takes the place of 'content'.) Precisely here we find Dilthey (and so also Heidegger) terming his philosophical procedures: the *Hermeutics* (Heidegger: *Auslegung*).

12. 2. The concept of 'hermeneutics' owes its origin to the philosopher, Friedrich Schleiermacher. In taking over the term from this great philosopher, Dilthey was in the first place mindful of the firsthand meaning of the term (hermeneutic). Thus, (a) hermeneutics is looked upon as the method of understanding/interpreting "schriftlich fixierter Lebenaüßerungen", i.e., as a method, hermeneutics seeks an understanding/interpretation of 'written documents, embodying certain expressions of life'. Hermeneutics is taken in the sense of interpretation of a particular work (Schriftwerk) of a man (Mensch) or a period of History. (b) Hermeneutics, is, in the next place, viewed as a method of interpretation of all "Schöpfungen des Geistes" (i.e., of all creations/expressions of human mind), the interpretation then proceeding in terms of the whole and the parts, and parts and the whole.⁴

12. 3. Dilthey, however, extends a distinct sense to the concept of hermeneutics and makes a use of the same in his philosophy. As a method of interpretation, Hermeneutics is the interpretation of *human life* as such. Also, world-views (Weltanschauungen) come to constitute the objects of interpretation and speech (Sprache) is taken as the medium of interpretation. Life itself, which is at once considered as the book/text for interpretation is 'pre-given' to the philosopher.⁵

13. As remarked earlier, in Heidegger one notes a combined impact of the thoughts of Husserl and Dilthey. Thus, Heidegger who takes over the phenomenological method of description makes it sufficiently clear in his *Sein und Zeit* that the meaning of the above method (phenomenological description) lies in *interpretation*. ("...der methodische Sinn der phänomenologischen Deskription ist *Auslegung*".) Again: The phenomenology of *Dasein* is a *hermeneutic* in the original sense of the word, according to which it designates the business of interpreting. ("Phänomenologie des Daseins ist *Hermeneutik* in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, wonach es das Geschäft der *Auslegung* bezeichnet." *Sein und Zeit*, p. 37).

13. 1. In the following lines of his *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger then offers further clarifications of his 'hermeneutic phenomenology'⁶, thereby indicating the scope and objective of the same. Thus, (a) insofar as (it is) through a disclosure of the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein (that) the horizon is determined for all further ontological investigation of (the notion of) Beings other than human (*daseinmäßigen*), this hermeneutic turns out to be "Hermeneutik" in the sense of working out of the conditions for the possibility of any ontological investigation.

13. 2. Finally, Heidegger points out, hermeneutic in its specific sense, (which is also the primary) designates an analytic of the *existentiality of existence*. Almost as a corollary to the present thesis it has then been asserted that hermeneutic is a methodology of those sciences which are *historiological* in nature.

13. 3. Briefly speaking, then, with Heidegger, hermeneutic as a definite philosophical method of enquiry or research-attitude⁷ embodies the notion of descriptive interpretation⁸ (or analysis) of the existentiality of existence/Dasein, i.e., of the basic structures of Dasein. Note that an unfoldment of such structures is possible only within the context/horizon of 'temporality' (*Zeitlichkeit*).

14. What, then, is precisely conveyed by the phrase *descriptive interpretation*? Can a *description* be ever *interpretation* and vice versa?⁹

14. 1. In fact the combination 'descriptive interpretation' would appear to be of the same sort as that of e.g., 'round square', if one understands the phrase (or the expressions 'description' and 'interpretation') in its face value. In that way, a description could never be termed 'interpretation' and conversely an 'interpretation' could never be regarded as 'description'. To take one example: One may go on describing, say, 'a house', by pointing out that the house is made of brick, mortar etc., that the house is a two-storyed one, and is a comparatively new one, has a pink-colour, and that it is nicely situated and so on. Thus the example before us serves as a perfect specimen of descriptive-attitude, having, however, nothing to do with interpretative-attitude. But, if one would point out the following: 'Well, a house is after all meant for sheltering one'. The present averment, as it is obvious, expresses an interpretative attitude and, by the same token, has hardly anything to do with the converse-attitude (the descriptive one).

14. 2. To make the phrase 'descriptive interpretation' appear plausible one could turn to a sort of, say, 'depth-analysis', or simply, 'description in depth' (=descriptive interpretation). It won't be

wrong to say that this is what Heidegger intends the whole thing to be. In order to explain the point, a few words regarding the notion of 'description' (as it occurs in the philosophy of Heidegger) would suffice. The term 'description'—with Heidegger—means/refers to a 'disclosure', 'exhibiting', 'showing of', 'unveiling' etc.¹⁰ This being granted, there would then be little sense in 'describing' a house, for example, in the above manner (i.e., in regard to its constituents, colour, shape, position etc.). For, such a 'description' sounds to be more of the nature of 'cataloguing' than 'disclosing'. If 'description' is to 'disclose' the nature (structure) of things (Dasein), then it can only be interpretative.¹¹

15. It is of course relevant to ask: What is it that decides an *actual* disclosure of, say, R as R1? That is, what constitutes the point of transition? Or, how is disclosure made possible?

Any possible answer to the first two questions is likely to remain controversial. It may thus be contended that an actual disclosure would require that one has a *pre-perception* of R1. But, then, it is R1 which *initially* remains *covered* or hidden (Verborgen), as Heidegger would have it. It turns out then that the basic prerequisite in regard to the issue of disclosure cannot be fulfilled.

An answer to the last question may be given by taking one's recourse to the notion of a 'penetrating glance'. But how far the above notion be of any use—remains once again *dabatable*.

16. In the following, I now like to pin-point certain *assumptions/presuppositions* underlying the methodical programme of Heidegger (and also of Dilthey), and, secondly, granting that the business of the method in question is to lay bare before one the Being of Dasein *structurally* (in regard to its depth), my interest would consist in seeking an understanding of the expression 'structure'.

17. Presuppositions of the methodology:

(a) Admission of 'something' (etwas/R) e.g., Existence (Dilthey: life) as pre-given. What philosophy can then hope to do is to make appear that what is thus given 'plausible' and 'illuminating'.

(b) The given (qua pre-given) shows the aspect of *Rätselhaftigkeit* ('mystery'). Heidegger speaks of the *verborgen* (the 'hidden') thus: "yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only in 'disguise', is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of beings..." (Sein und Zeit, p. 35).

(c) There is no absolute beginning or starting point in philosophy—as presumed by Descartes and others. Already with Dilthey, *life* is synonymous with '*Lebensverlauf*' (cycle of life). And, with Heidegger, the structure of *existence* (*Dasein*) is to be *understood* primarily in reference to the moment of *temporality*. (*Zeitlichkeit*).

(d) It is possible for man/life to understand himself/itself. "Leben erfaßt hier Leben." (Dilthey). With Heidegger, man is the *shepherd of Being*—and hence he is in a position to *raise the question of Being*.

18. On the expression *structure* :

The notion *structure* may be said to designate the following : *ground, form, inner form, order, basis*. Dilthey looks upon structure as a fundamental category of life—the concept thereby referring to *inneren Aufbau* (inner constitution/relation). In other words, 'structure' connotes a *mode or a texture of relationship* of parts to a whole, and, accordingly the expressions used by Dilthey are : *Verbindung, Verband, Zusammenhang* etc. A specification follows : The notion of structure designates the '*gleichbleibende Weise des inneren Zusammenhangs*' ('*uniform mode of inner connections*')—in the midst of change of particular contents. This is true of human life too.

19. In Heidegger we meet, a certain simplification or formalisation of the concept of structure. To my mind, structure/structural description simply means the *mode or how* of a thing, of *Existence/Dasein*. Thus to enquire into the structure of a certain 'x' would mean : to enquire into the (possible) mode(s)—descriptively—in and through which that particular 'x' manifests itself or reveals itself (the modes thereby serving as the ground/basis, depth/Being of that 'x,'). The thing is, the modes=structure constitute the ground or basis (depth/Being) of 'x' (e.g. *Dasein*), since the modes are, for our context, no accidental or trivial/inessential ones (like, for example, one's getting irritated at a certain point or having a certain height, weight, complexion) but essential or basic/necessary ones.

20. The question may be asked : What, then, are the (possible) modes of *Dasein/Leben* ? Well, such modes are—what Dilthey calls—*categories* (*Kategorien*), but Heidegger has a special technical designation, namely, *existentials* (*Existenzial*). As basic modes, categories *qua existentials* are *constitutive of Dasein* and are nothing extraneous to it. *Zeitlichkeit* (temporality) or *Geschichtlichkeit* (historicity) is the *model* of such an *Existential*, since all other existentials may be shown to be capable of possible interpretation in terms of temporality.

20.1. To be noted is that Kant, being interested in the question of the *mode of knowing*, was in the look-out for certain fundamental apriori principles/categories which would be constitutive of the objects of experience. Heidegger, and Dilthey as well, on the contrary, being interested in the question of the *mode of being*, were eager to get at features/existentials which would constitute Reality or Being. To characterise his point of view in philosophy, Heidegger calls his philosophy not simply Ontology but a *fundamental* Ontology (*fundamentale Ontologie*) where the question of (the meaning of) Being is taken up and dealt with, thus arriving at a theory of existentials.

1. "... it should be noted that the phenomenological reduction is not the same thing as a denial. The elements excluded are only set aside, and abstracted from while attention is concentrated on what remains!" (Bocheński, p. 17).

2. "In practice these postulates...are uncommonly difficult, indeed impossible to fulfil absolutely. In the human mind seeing is so bound up with inference that we have the utmost difficulty in keeping them apart. Quite involuntarily we project into the object our earlier acquired knowledge." (*ibid.*, p. 22).

3. The question may still persist: Are not Heidegger's methodical commitments indicative of some kind of departure from the Husserlian type? In reply it may be said that the phenomenological method with Heidegger no more consists in a description of '*essences*' — as it was with Husserl —; what the method now aims at is a description of *structures*. With this much shift in research-attitudes, Heidegger seems to have done away with the kind of 'Platonism' characteristic of Husserlian type of thinking.

4. The business of such a methodical procedure consists in getting at a kind of '*verstehende Psychologie*' or '*inner psychology*' of the writer, for example.

5. "Das Leben selbst wird gleichsam als Text aufgefaßt, den den Philosophen Vorgegeben sei und den es jetzt auszulegen gelte..." (O. F. Bollnow: Dilthey, W. Kohlhammer Verlag/Stuttgart 1955, P. 24). To be noted here is that Dilthey's conception of 'life' is nothing static. On the contrary, Life is — as Dilthey looks upon it — to be understood in terms of historicity/in the context of a historical process. And as remarked by Professor Mahta, Dilthey extends (the)... concept of hermeneutics to the whole of historical reality and in all its manifestations." (J. L. Mehta: *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, Banaras Hindu University Varanasi, 1967, p. 18).

6. Distinguishing Phenomenology from other '*logics*' (theology etc.), Heidegger makes it explicit that the title '*phenomenology*' has no reference to the particular object (*Gegenstand*) of which it is the science; it simply denotes the '*how*' of treating regarding all that, that is studied by this science. (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 34-35) Again: '*Phenomenology*' designates neither a '*standpoint*' (*Standpunkt*) nor a particular '*direction*' (*Richtung*) in philosophy. The expression (*phenomenology*) signifies primarily the concept of a method. (*ibid.* p. 27)

7. It has been observed by more than one — that with Heidegger we have just '*the formulation of a task*'. But, then, I think, this is what Heidegger intended to offer!

8. Heidegger's commitment to the method of descriptive interpretation is complete so long as we take note of the *Sein und Zeit*. There is, however, a certain change in Heidegger's attitude regarding the concept of method as such.

(See: J. L. Mehta: *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, pp. 20, 61-69).

9. In a footnote to his article on Descriptive Interpretation Dr. Delius records: "The apparent incompatibility between phenomenological description .. and phenomenological interpretation .. was pointed out by Maximilian Beck as early as 1930." (H. Delius: *Descriptive Interpretation*; in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vI. XIII, nr. 3, p. 305.)

10. *Philosophical reasoning*, with Heidegger, is no more *argumentaion*, if by the latter one understands advancing of 'proofs', 'demonstrations' etc.

11. The difficulties inherent in the nature of a descriptive interpretation have occupied the attention of many present-day philosophers.

Hiranmoy Banerjee

LOGICAL ANALYSIS AS A METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy, as an academic discipline, co-ordinate with the natural and cultural sciences taught in the Universities, is expected to augment our knowledge of the world around us. We cannot, therefore, accept with equanimity the dictum of Wittgenstein that "Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity."¹ or that "Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions."² Philosophy or more specifically metaphysics is generally regarded as having the aim of providing us with a general conception of the universe and it is of utmost importance to note that in this sense the *Tractatus* is definitely a metaphysical treatise. As Max Black puts it, "The ontology of the *Tractatus* is a striking combination of an atomistic conception of the universe as an aggregate of mutually independent atomic facts, and an organic conception of logical form — or what comes to the same, 'logical space'".³ Black goes on to assert, "There is in the book a sharp opposition between the contingent aspect of the world (whatever can be 'said' in language) and its essence (what must *show itself*). The intended subject matter of metaphysics displays regularity, coherence, necessary connexion."⁴ Wittgenstein, therefore, denied the possibility of metaphysics not because metaphysics lacks a subject-matter, for the world does have an essence which can somehow be apprehended or contemplated, but because this essence cannot be talked about. It is only a truncated Wittgenstein that can be said to have inspired the theories of the logical empiricists of Vienna who decried metaphysical propositions as non-sensical.

Wittgenstein, however, landed himself in an impasse when he tried to carry his theory to its logical conclusion. He assigned everything that he thought most valuable to the realm of the unsayable and had, in the end, to repudiate his own propositions.

For him only the empirical contingent propositions of science and ordinary life are the genuine propositions. Even the propositions of logic and mathematics do not say anything and are in principle dispensable. It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone. Wittgenstein did not at this stage believe that necessary truths result from arbitrary linguistic conventions. He says, "Some things are arbitrary in the symbols, some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that express; but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the natural and inevitable signs speaks for itself."⁵ He further says that "the fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal logical properties of language and the world."⁶ He, therefore, believed like the classical philosophers that the world has certain abstract and general features, but what distinguishes him from them is that this logic of the world can only be shown, but not stated in language.

But it is ridiculous to condemn philosophers to a dumb realization of the structure of the world and we find even as sympathetic a reader as Bertrand Russell writing in the introduction to the book, "Mr. Wittgenstein, after all, manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said". The most plausible defence of early Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy has been put up by Max Black. He says that there are two opposites of the word *Sinn* or sense in Wittgenstein, *Sinnlos* or senseless and *unsinnig* or non-sensical. When Wittgenstein described logico-mathematical propositions as senseless, he did not want to belittle them. What he means is that any one who understands how the facts must inevitably be symbolized would apprehend what logico-mathematical propositions must be. "The formal, 'senseless', statements of logic and mathematics are neither ineffable, nor useless. What they show can be shown to anybody who understands their use."⁷ Wittgenstein's philosophical statements also show something that can be shown. A great many of Wittgenstein's remarks belong to "logical syntax" or "logical grammar". "When Wittgenstein says that a proposition is not a complex name, he draws attention to an important feature of the grammar (or the 'logic') of the word 'Proposition'. His remark is no more mysterious in principle than would be the announcement that a bishop is not a rook."⁸

Black himself admits that this defence that Wittgenstein is engaged in constructing some sort of a philosophical grammar would not apply to all of his pronouncements in the *Tractatus* and puts up a different defence for them. But meanwhile it is important to note

that Wittgenstein is being interpreted by him as executing what Gustav Bergmann has called the celebrated "linguistic turn" in contemporary philosophy. This is a gambit as to method which exhorts us to "talk about the world by means of talking about a suitable language."⁹ That philosophy is analysis, rather than construction of speculative systems is a view that has been slowly gaining ground in the English-speaking world from the beginning of the century through the efforts of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. But it is Wittgenstein's enquiry into the essence of symbolization that provided the insight that philosophical analysis is inseparably linked with some kinds of analysis of language.

The Vienna circle philosophers, notably Rudolf Carnap regarded the analysis of the language of science to be the most fundamental task of philosophy. Philosophy is related to science as metalogic is related to a formal system. Whereas logicians are interested in certain properties like consistency and completeness of certain formal systems in their metalogic, Carnap aimed at construction of a general theory of linguistic forms. Carnap had at first thought that the study of the forms of sentences as apart from their meaning would be sufficient to solve certain philosophical problems, e. g., the problem of necessary truth or the nature of the axiom-systems of physics. Under the influence of Tarski, however, he supplemented syntax with pure semantics. Wittgenstein had held that though we can show how language and facts are related we cannot state this relation. But Carnap argued that since it is possible to speak about facts and also about language, it must also be possible to express the relations of language and fact in a metalanguage. Pure semantics provides an exact systematic language for the purpose. In "Logical syntax of language" Carnap had regarded logical truth as a synthetic concept which can be defined on the basis of forms of sentences alone. But when in "Meaning and Necessity" he defines a statement as L-true when and only when it holds in every state-description he obviously takes the help of semantic concepts.

But the more fundamental way in which Carnap departs from Wittgenstein is that he gives up the assumption of early Wittgenstein and Russell that a particular language is the correct language or represents correct logic. He leaves everyone free to choose the rules of his language and thereby his logic in anyway he wishes. Logic has been dethroned from its lofty pedestal and it has been contended by the intuitionistic school in the philosophy of mathematics that since it is impossible to determine either the truth or the falsity of certain mathematical theorems concerning infinite numbers, we should construct a logical system without the classical law of excluded middle.

Reichenbach and Quine have urged that the impossibility of determining simultaneously the position and momentum of an electron also shows that perhaps a non-classical logic may be operative in Quantum Mechanics. Quine draws from it the startling conclusion that after all logical propositions are open to falsification through experience and denies on this ground the traditional dichotomy of synthetic and analytic propositions. A denial of this dogma has for philosophical method the important consequence that there is no sharp boundary between science and philosophy or between linguistic questions or conceptual questions on the one hand and factual questions on the other. It is futile to say that "Man is rational" is a statement about the meaning of the term "man" and therefore analytic and the statement "Man is mortal" is a statement about the objects to which the term applies and is therefore synthetic or factual. I may decide to identify man by the property of rationality and nothing would confute this proposition for nothing which is not rational would be called man. But if I take mortality to the identifying property of man the status of the two propositions would be reversed. Quine's point is that the border line between identifying and therefore necessary marks and additional or contingent marks is hazy and continuously shifting and it would be in the fitness of things to treat all cognitive questions as factual questions.

Carnap, however, draws a sharp distinction between questions about meaning-relations and questions about fact. What is analytic in one system may be synthetic in another. But the fact that a man who is father from one point of view, is a son from another point of view does not nullify the importance of the relation of fatherhood. The possibility of treating one and the same propositions from two different points of view being both analytic and synthetic does not nullify the importance of admitting the distinction between two kinds of propositions. What Quine has overlooked is that beside the question of ascertaining the exact facts, there is also the neo-kantian question of fitting the facts into the strait-jacket of linguistic-cum-conceptual frameworks. Perhaps the most important philosophical doctrine of Carnap is that the choice of a linguistic framework is made not on the basis of theoretical considerations but on grounds of simplicity, convenience and the like. The traditional ontological thesis like idealism, materialism, realism and phenomenalism are to be interpreted as rival linguistic frameworks into which philosophers of different schools want us to fit the facts. Carnap holds that any forms of expression are admissible as soon as sufficient logical rules for their use are given. The introduction of a linguistic framework is legitimate without prior affirmative answer to the question of existence of a certain category of entities. It is not the case that first we have to

apprehend through esoteric means whether the real entities of the world are transient experiences or solid material bodies and then adopt either a phenomenalist or a realist language. Introduction of any linguistic framework containing variables which range over either experiences or material objects, either abstract entities or only concrete entities, is logically permissible. Philosophers have two tasks with regard to linguistic frameworks. First they have to excogitate a sufficiently comprehensive and sufficiently articulate system, specifying in the process which propositions of the system are analytic and immune to falsification and which synthetic. The second task is to decide which linguistic framework would be most advisable to adopt. It is a practical question of language engineering to be decided on the basis of convenience, fruitfulness, simplicity and the like. Carnap compares this task with the task of building a road through a difficult terrain or devising a constitution for a newly independent country. There is no perfect road or constitution laid up in heaven for us to imitate imperfectly. Indeed like riding a bicycle it is not a question of knowing what is the case. It is a case of doing something or achieving a goal most efficiently. What entities should be accepted as real, is to be determined by the linguistic framework found to be most successful in organizing our knowledge.

When a philosopher says that numbers are classes of classes we should interpret him as proposing that numerals should be regarded as expressions belonging to the second level. But it may be asked, what do you mean by proposing to regard numbers as classes of classes? Either this is what they are and in that case your proposal is superfluous or they are not such and then your proposal is preposterous. But what Carnap is proposing is that if philosophical controversies are regarded as grim disagreement about facts, then as the history of philosophy shows, there is no way of resolving the dispute. Indeed philosophical questions are so fundamental that what should be regarded as facts is itself in dispute. Solutions seem nearer when rival theories are looked upon as alternative languages and philosophy as an attempt to assess the merits of those languages.

It is often said that we should not waste our time in studying words, but look at the things instead. But if we once closely examine the questions which have generated philosophical perplexity, we find that no matter how intently we peer at the facts we cannot discover the essence of things. A man who is puzzled by the fact of thinking cannot be mollified by an appeal to introspect carefully when he thinks about something. As later Wittgenstein says we cannot understand what the word "mate" meant in chess merely by examining the last step of a game. This last step draws its importance from what went before in the game. We can get

clear about what thinking is also by carefully studying the role the words expressing the concept of thinking plays in the entire language game we play to talk about mental phenomena. Philosophy is not lexicography and it is not enough to say that it should describe the actually employed linguistic expressions. Any sort of description would not do and a description of the right sort must bear upon conceptual confusions and problems. A Philosopher wishes to increase our conceptual understanding and as Strawson puts it, "the actual use of linguistic expressions remains the sole and essential point of contact with the reality the philosopher wishes to understand, conceptual reality."¹⁰

It must be noted carefully here that this shift from an enquiry into facts to enquiry into language does not mark a sharp break with traditional philosophy. When Spinoza says that there is only one substance, he is not making a statement at par with the scientific statement that there is only one natural satellite of the earth. What he is saying is that if we stop talking roughly in the Aristotalian way about persons and physical objects and start talking about them as dimly seen aspects of a single atemporal being, then one would be unable to state propositions about minds and bodies which so worried the Cartesians or the propositions about God's creation of the world which so worried the Scholastics. It has been noticed that ordinary language and scientific descriptive discourse confront philosophers with the problems crying for metaphysical solutions. Attempts therefore, should be made to construct ideal languages into which all non-philosophical descriptive propositions can be transcribed but no un-reconstructed philosophical propositions can be. Philosophical propositions would be propositions about such an ideal language.¹¹

It has been urged by ordinary language philosophers that construction of ideal language is no part of a philosopher's business. Construction of models of the functioning of unformalized linguistic expressions is said to be helpful in rooting out conceptual confusions. But Strawson asks, "If the clear mode of functioning of constructed concepts is to cast light on problems and difficulties rooted in the unclear mode of functioning of the unconstructed concepts, then precisely the ways in which the constructed concepts are connected with and depart from the unconstructed concepts must be plainly shown. And how can this result be achieved without accurately describing the modes of functioning of the unconstructed concepts?"¹²

This controversy between ideal language philosophers and ordinary language philosophers is difficult to adjudicate upon, but

their aims seem to be more complementary than antagonistic. Eliciting of conceptual truths enshrined in ordinary usage may lead gradually to a systematization on constructionalist lines. Analysis of ordinary usage in any case is not a defence of common sense. Even linguistic analysis of a minute, literal, word-by-word kind is revolutionary both in intention and in effect and is subversive of the opinions of ordinary men. It is, of course, subversive of the opinions of a metaphysician who in the language of Max Black "is a man who is trying to enlarge and extend the given concepts of science and ordinary life in a way which will allow him to arrive at a more extensive, a more penetrating, and in some way a more fundamental view of the universe."¹³ According to Black, Wittgenstein was making metaphysical statements of this sort when he said that the world is the totality of facts, not of things or that the self is not an item in the world, is the limit of the world. Wittgenstein himself came to realize the meaninglessness of such propositions at the end of the book and exhorted us to see the futility of viewing the world as he tried to view it. Metaphysicians dazzle us with the intensity of their partial vision, but the conceptual unbalance which they represent is due to the "temporary domination of one logical mode of operation of expressions or by one way of using language.....or attempts to see, to explain something which is different in terms of, or on analogy with a favoured model."¹⁴ It would seem, therefore, that the need for revisionary metaphysics has been felt merely because the task of descriptive metaphysics had not been done well enough.

In our task of analysis we need not restrict ourselves to a theory which accounts for our actual linguistic behaviour, but proceed to discover the necessary conditions for the possibility of language itself. An empirical enquiry along the lines indicated by J. L. Austin may develop into a discovery of necessary truths about language as such on the lines indicated by P. F. Strawson. Such an enquiry would try to show "how the fundamental categories of our thought hang together and how they relate in turn to those formal notions (such as existence, identity and unity) which range through all our categories."¹⁵ The relations and structures which we shall discover in this way will be sufficiently general and sufficiently far-reaching to satisfy our craving for full metaphysical understanding.

1. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (tr. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness) London, 1961, 4. 112

2. *Ibid.*

3. *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (Cambridge, 1964) p. 10.

4. Ibid, p. 10
5. Op. Cit., 6. 124
6. Op. Cit., 6. 12
7. Op. Cit., p. 380
8. Op. Cit., p. 381
9. Logic and Reality. p. 177. Quoted by R. Ronty in his introduction to the anthology, edited by him, "The Linguistic Turn" (Chicago, 1967) p. 8.
10. "Analysis, Science and Metaphysics", included in Ronty's anthology "The Linguistic Turn". (see above) p. 320.
11. See Ronty's introduction to "The Linguistic Turn". p. 6-8.
12. Op. Cit. p. 316
13. Op. Cit. p. 386
14. Op. Cit. p. 317
15. p. F. Strawson. op. cit. p. 318.

V A. Devasenapathi

PROBLEM OF METHOD IN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY

The basic concepts of theistic philosophy are God (or the infinite Spirit), souls (or finite spirits), immortality, and in some cases pre-existence, the world as a principle of bondage exclusively or also as a means of salvation—and so on. There is no need to make this list exhaustive. For our purposes, this list is enough to raise the question, 'How are these concepts established?' There are two traditional approaches which can be conveniently described as those of Natural Theology and of Revealed Theology. Natural Theology believes in the ability of man to construct a theory of God, souls etc., out of his own reason, i.e. without any need for scriptural authority. For such a theory reasonable probability is claimed. Now, without minimising the powers of reason, one has certainly to face the question, 'How can man, who, so far as we can see, has not made himself, living in a world which is, again, so far as we can see, neither self-made, nor made by such a man, reach by means of reason alone, Him who is Eternal Existence?'

It will not be surprising if this question calls forth various protests—one of which is enough to serve as a sample. 'Why should we', it may be asked, 'resort to scriptural testimony to prove Eternal Existence? Can we not, by reasoning alone go from given contingency to implied necessity thus: 'Then, were we to say in a word, if the one is not, nothing is, would we be right? Most assuredly'. And indeed if the One is that without which nothing else could be, the existence of the whole world must of necessity depend upon some eternally subsisting unity. And can we not, in like manner, derive all the other categories of theistic philosophy? But we have also to note that for theistic philosophy, this One is not an *It* but a *Thou* with whom souls can and ought to live in conscious union. Theistic philosophy draws freely on the records of the experiences of devotees with the Lord. It is not a metaphysical principle which evokes the respect and

love of the devotees but a Merciful Spirit. Recalling the title of a paper read at a session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, I like to say that no theism is a faith in a mere inference but it is rather, if we may say so, faith in a Person—Puruṣottama.

Theistic philosophy starts with certain commitments. Though these need not rule out the use of reason as an aid to one's faith or as a means of persuading another into it, these commitments cannot be justified solely by means of reason. I have neither competence nor time to consider what exactly is meant by 'reason' here—whether it is just ratiocination or something more—a sort of intuition. Briefly, I hold that the human intellect—whether it functions on the level of ratiocination alone or does so on an intuitive level also—is not enough for Theistic philosophy.

The author of the *Śiva-jñāna Siddhiyār*—a text of Southern Śaivism, says in an introductory verse that God is beyond the reach of the scriptures and of the celestials, beyond the reach of human thought and language and so on. If so, can we never know Him or talk about Him? He goes on to say that through grace we can find God revealed in the scriptures, through grace we can attain clarity in our thinking about Him: we can intuit Him in our own experience, getting rid of all delusion.

While without grace, none of the so-called means of valid knowledge will be of any avail, given grace, all these become useful in gaining valid knowledge. In fact, the real *pramāṇa* is considered to be the soul's intelligence-energy (*cit śakti*) illumined by the Lord's intelligence-energy (*Śiva-cit-śakti*). It is, as if the eye is made to open for the first time to behold the glory that has been there all the time. Facts take on a new significance, and fall into a correct perspective. Illumined by Grace, the saints behold God everywhere—sense perception no longer conceals God but reveals Him so much the more clearly. The help thus given to the soul—shall we call it the gift of the divine eye—is described as 'the help of seeing' and 'the help of enabling to see'. A homely example of this would be a teacher explaining a problem by working it out on the blackboard and standing besides the student as the student works it out.

Reasoning is used in support of one's faith and as a means of persuading others into faith; when the views of others (*parapakṣa*) are stated, an attempt is made to meet them on their own ground and persuade them to advance farther on the road. E.g. when the Cārvāka refuses to accept creation or destruction of the universe, as these are not given in sense-perception, the only *pramāṇa* he accepts, he is asked to take note of the fact that whole species of plants come into

existence in one season and go out in another. It is obvious that if this is treated as a piece of reasoning it will commit the fallacy of composition. Hence it is only an invitation to use sense-perception a little more extensively and consider the possibility of similar happenings for all things—once again this is not analogy or *upamāna*. It is perfectly open to the Cārvāka not to budge from his position—seeing others die, he need not have uneasy apprehensions that he will also die. He is welcome to this measure of satisfaction. But then!

Likewise, in expounding the *Siddhānta* also, the theist uses reasoning (1) to meet the objections of those holding other views and (2) to clear the doubts of disciples who may be perplexed in the course of their enquiry. In the *Śiva-jñāna-Siddhiyār* arguments are given for the existence of God, soul and bonds. Commentators have stated their arguments in syllogistic form. One of the commentators has taken pains to show that the argument is free from defects, and has the merits that a valid argument should have.

The purpose of using reason here is not to generate faith. Even at the risk of begging the question, one has to say that only God can do that. All that reasoning can do is to hinder the hindrances to faith and to help faith when it seeks understanding. The spiritual journey, as some one has said, is made by faith. But for reading and interpreting the signs on the road and for seeing the road clearly, reasoning provides the light.

Turning our attention to Western theistic philosophy, we may recall to mind the well-known proofs for the existence of God. These are criticised, no doubt; but the proofs are also defended against criticism. Three points made in their defence are relevant in the present context (1) The proofs have a cumulative strength i.e. each by itself may not be strong enough for the purpose but *together* they do have considerable strength. (2) Proofs need not mean exactly what it means either in the mathematical sciences or in the physical sciences. In fact, many deplore the use of the word 'proof' and heartily wish it were dead in philosophy. Even in mathematics, asked whether he had proved a particular proposition, an examinee is reported to have replied, "No, Sir, but I have made it seem extremely probable".

In fact, even probability is no mean gain. Let us remember that the case against theism appears far stronger than the case for it. The ontological argument calls forth the jibe 'The idea of a currency note does not guarantee its cash value'. The causal argument is countered by elders raising the child's question, 'But who made God? First cause indeed! There can be no first cause'. Not all children,

though ! Of two held in the highest esteem in Southern Saivism, one sang about the First Cause, having beheld It as Father and Mother. The other child provided what is perhaps the shortest philosophical manual for theistic philosophy. The argument from design is not less vulnerable. Cases of dysteleology are sometimes mentioned with evident relish denying the Almighty even the subordinate status of a designer, let alone the glorious role of a creator. The argument based on morality was offered by Kant in the place of the other three arguments which he considered unsustainable by Pure Reason. But others may find even this unsatisfactory. The problem of evil seems to militate against the conception of a moral governor of the universe. Add to this, destruction of whatever beauty there is in the world. A. E. Horsman bursts out in indignation :

We for a certainty are not the first
Have sat in taverns while the tempest hurled
Their hopeful plans to emptiness and cursed
What ever brute and blackguard made the world.

He considers it not Divinity but 'Iniquity on high'.

Thus when a strong case is presented against theism, what is the role of philosophy ? The problems of theistic philosophy may be said to be beyond the pale of meaningful inquiry and not fit for study by scientific methods. On the other hand, the problems may be admitted. But philosophical discussion may be ruled out on other grounds. One way is to leave them to the sphere of art and literature. Another is to keep reason out completely and depend entirely on Faith. Theistic philosophy is an attempt to admit them as philosophical problems and bring them within the province of meaningful inquiry but with a clear apprehension of the difficulty involved in this process. The saints who have provided the inspiration for theistic philosophy do not discourage rational inquiry. They hint that we may not be able to go far on this road. 'Do not', says one of them, 'by means of logical argument and scriptural testimony engage in excessive inquiry. Our Lord is a blazing Light'. Another saint says, 'Direct your thought as far as it can go'. Perhaps we may at this stage take note of the nature of the problems. They are not problems in the sense that, however difficult, they do admit of a clear cut and final solution. To borrow a distinction, made by some writers, between a problem and a mystery, they are in the nature of a mystery—a mystery we can neither ignore nor comprehend fully. It also happens that in attempting to explain a mystery, we are led farther and farther on—gaining more and more understanding. At no stage could we be said to have reached the terminus. It is like a person

at a sea-side. When he touches the water, he is in actual contact with the sea but he cannot thereby claim to have the whole of it in his grasp. Likewise, we may succeed in gaining glimpses of some parts but others baffle our understanding. There are bound to be loose ends.

While recognising the problem as a mystery, two methods may be employed in grappling with it. One is the way of affirmation. This has its obvious limitations. Every determination of Reality in one way may become a negation of it in other ways. The way of negation may be tried. But this too is not free from dangers. It can all too easily lead to scepticism and nihilism. That is why in the spiritual utterances of the saints we find sometimes a series of affirmations and at other times, a series of negations. Presumably neither of them is to be taken alone to the exclusion of the other, in helping us to understand Reality. Taken together they are baffling to our understanding, no doubt. But they do serve a purpose. They enable us to gain an insight into the richness of Reality. Our understanding may operate on three levels. Hearing accounts of Reality (*śruti*), it may go on to make an enquiry (*yukti*). What is thus heard and found to be intelligible, may become a matter of personal experience (*anubhava*). Thus there is an experimental verification of the truths which, to begin with, may only be a matter of hearsay. Sometimes, it may happen in the reverse way also. One may stumble upon an experience. Such a person will naturally examine it to see if it was a delusion. If he finds that it was not only a genuine experience but had the hall-marks of an intelligible one, it will be a matter of additional joy to him to discover that *śruti* records such experiences. There is thus an area of actualities and possibilities. What appears as possible to many, might have been actual experience of some. Hence the value of spiritual biographies for theistic philosophy. They are a source of inspiration and hope; they are a pledge and promise of rich rewards for one's spiritual enquiry.

It may not be out of place to say a word about the need for moral and spiritual discipline. If training of the senses, concentration etc., are necessary for scientific investigation, a similar training is not less so in the spiritual field. 'A saint may have his past'—but the point is that he attunes himself to the will of God precisely at the point which marks his sainthood and, by the Grace of God, is able to wipe out the blemish of his past. Nor does he become morally irresponsible after becoming a saint. 'Love God and do what you will'—it is needless to say does not mean that one who loves God will do whatever he likes in the fashion of the unregenerate, any more than the description of a *jivan-mukta* is to be misunderstood as indi-

cative of his freedom to lead a licentious life. Theism, the world over, stresses the truth 'None but the pure in heart shall see God'. The purity in the initial stages may only be negative—a turning away from evil and may be progressively an increase in positive goodness and holiness. The senses and the mind are cleansed in the process.

Why should theistic philosophy seek support in religious experience? This question need not be a naive one. Whatever be the role of philosophy, whether it is to synthesise, or relate, or interpret, or change, there must be material for these processes. To synthesise or relate—yes, not merely details relating to man and the world on the physical level alone, but also with reference to other levels—to interpret experience, once again, a larger framework is considered necessary than a restricted one of physical and biological dimensions. To change Reality—that part of it called 'man'—we need to ask what is his present state. What are his potentialities? The change will consist in these potentialities becoming actual.

In synthesising or relating or interpreting, some watchwords may provide guidance. I suggest that theistic philosophy may be examined with reference to the following: all-inclusiveness and coherence. The initial forlorn state, and the final state of joy have to find their place in theistic philosophy. In some sense, a journey is admitted to be necessary. Theistic philosophy would say that while one is certainly entitled to relief on completion of the journey, one is not to forget to put it in any account of a spiritual biography—much less to forget to feel grateful to the Merciful Power that guided him all along to the goal.

In regard to the use of language in theistic philosophy, since material is drawn from religion, attention has to be paid to the part played by symbols, myths, analogies, etc. They may not be taken at their face-value. But one need not dismiss them as *mere* myth, or *mere* symbol and so on. This would be to under-rate their significance.

Unlike the proverbial cock, theistic philosophy helps us to recognise that what we have picked up in religious experience is a genuine diamond.

P. K. Sundaram

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD IN ABSOLUTIST PHILOSOPHIES

Absolute idealism in the west is sought to be established in the main by three arguments, the first of which is the epistemological, the second being the argument from the contingent nature of the objects of experience, and the third the ontological argument.

The surd, of the thing-in-itself in the Kantian Thought, has posed a puzzle, in the attempt of solving which, the roots of Absolute Idealism in recent times have assumed diverse dimensions and hues. Since the existence of the thing-in-itself turned out to be a matter of faith and feeling with no adequate philosophical grounds for its proofs, the tendency was to eliminate the mysterious unknowable altogether, and seek in its place a substitute in the constitution of the mind itself which would serve the role of causing the sense-impressions. The so-called thing-in-itself is not extra-mental, but belongs to the mind which splits itself into subject and object. Mind is the sole reality. By this a radical subjectivism was suspected to have issued forth; and hence a theory of objective idealism presenting both mind and its object, as fundamentally identical in essence and as the two aspects of one neutrum which is neither wholly mental nor wholly material but which is the underlying identity in both of them was formulated. Again, the suspicion that the emphasis was perhaps laid rather unjustifiably on a featureless identity gave impetus to the view that to be adequate to facts, the Absolute must be identity-in-difference. (This was Hegel). Perhaps drawing the insight from Kant, Hegel made thought constitutive of nature. The categories and forms of perception determine what sort of objects, what sort of the world of experience we will have. But only in Hegel this thought is Reason which is universal and objective, being the same in all; in fact, this Reason is the Absolute which evolves through the categories. Absolute is infinite and yet not beyond understanding since the finite

thought is the expression of the Infinite Thought. All thinking is of the Absolute or the Absolute Itself.

If we look at the matter from another angle, the successive sensations in knowledge or feelings (Green) are unified by a principle which synthesizes without fusing the multiplicity keeping itself distinct. This principle can only be mind or consciousness. Such a principle cannot be a member of space or time-series. Thus it should be spiritual and supernatural. Being timeless, it is independent and eternal. Again, nature as an inter-related system will be impossible without the unifying consciousness. If understanding is said to make nature only in the sense of constructing out of the given material, and not in the sense of creating, if the things-in-themselves are not compromised, the dualism is unbridgeable between mind and things. But if the things-in-themselves are causes of impressions or feelings, since causality is a category that could be applied only to phenomena, things-in-themselves should fall within the causal scheme and are thinkable as cause. Hence it is better to suppose that mind really makes nature supplying both form and matter. Even the sensations which are the raw-material are not atomic irreducibles but are analysable as products of mental relations. Thus consciousness is absolute in which thoughts and feelings are unified. Things-in-themselves are within this consciousness. To be sure, this is not the individual finite consciousness, as the synthesised manifold is the world with its fixed unalterable laws. The Absolute consciousness is identical with finite consciousness, though labouring under limitations of the human or bodily organism, which again, as parts of nature, are its own creation. Knowledge and its objects are the manifestations of the self-same Absolute which creates another for itself through self-limitation of the body. The epistemological dualism of Kantian Theory of knowledge can be overcome only thus. The reason, however, why the Absolute should limit itself for its own realization cannot possibly be given. Regarding the Absolute we can make only negative statements. One can perhaps say that to the Absolute consciousness the finite world is necessary on the analogy of human mind which cannot be thought of without reference to objects.¹ (So much from T. H. Green).

That the Absolute can be talked about only negatively and that the derivation of the finite from the infinite can only be a mystery is reminiscent of the Kantian Epistemology. Neo-Hegelians try to get over this last element also. Mind and matter are aspects^a of the total Reality, the Spirit, which is self-conscious and where even the identity of opposites like the Self and the not-self is maintained. The contradictions and antinomies to which ideas of

reality are supposed to lead, and the incompetency and failure of the understanding to know Reality are now the sources of our knowledge of Reality because it is in the spirit that one finds a meaning and a synthesis of even contradictions. In knowledge the spirit meets an 'other' which is its own manifestation. Knowing is an act of self-transcendence. Really however this means that the hitherto unknown realms of its own being are being realized. Knowledge is a steady process of recognition and discovery of the Self, the spirit. This self-transcendence is nothing strange because the Self of man surrenders itself, abrogates itself, sacrifices itself in the interests of what it considers to be the larger interests. But in so doing it expands itself, for every interest be it large or small, lies imbedded within itself.³ The self can leave its actual states to realize the potential state. Negating the lower, the higher is achieved. By the negation of the lower, the higher is affirmed. This involves a dialectic of opposition and synthesis. Through this dialectic, the categories of logic and metaphysics, science and religion could be deduced and the evolution and the logical inter-connection of the entire universe could be explained.⁴ The negative element and inexplicability of the relation of the finite to the infinite vanishes. Why should there be any thought of self-transcendence is answered by the idea of spiritual discontent as motive, this being the tendency to self-completion. What moves the world is contradiction,⁵ while the change in the spirit is self-determination. Contradiction and difference are only one side of the picture. There is inevitably related to them the fact of reconciliation. Differences presuppose unity.

All the arguments from the epistemological angle presuppose the pre-eminence of knowledge as indubitable, the self-consciousness in knowledge and the unifying principle of mind.

From another point of view, the objects of nature have no independence. Every finite thing has an other which limits it, is contingent, is at war with itself, is itself and the other to it, has only self-contradictory existence. The whole that contains the finite particulars can alone be real. Our cognitive, aesthetic and moral experiences, for example, have a fragmentariness about them initially and tend to become more and more comprehensive and complete in a perfect experience which is the Absolute. "This, then, is the fundamental nature of the inference to the Absolute—the passage from the contradictory and unstable in all experience alike to the stable and the satisfactory".⁶ The whole is not an abstract universal, but a concrete universal, perfect individual, where the particulars find their completion. Another form of this argument from the contingent nature of finite experience is to say that the knowledge of the particular

object of our experiences is open to doubt. The knowledge which has the Reality as its content can on the contrary be certain because it leaves out no alternative possibility.

Thirdly, existence is established to be spiritual in the philosophy of ontological idealism. The existences in objects is indubitable. To doubt this will mean the certain existence of doubting assertion. It is not knowing mind that is taken as the starting point here but the existence of things. Existence is a quality of things and as such presupposes the substance of which it is a quality. But existence can be only one of the qualities of the substance which are related in a manifold way. The world is only the sum-total of these substances standing connected by innumerable relations. Every substance has infinite characteristics and is also infinitely divisible. This makes its conception absurd for the following reasons. In order that a substance may exist, it should be distinguishable from other such substances and should admit of sufficient description to highlight its particularity. Again, for the whole substance to be described, its parts must be described. But a material substance is such that the nature of one part could not determine the nature of other parts, nor could there be the sufficient description of the infinite parts of the parts by that of the parts themselves. But sufficient description of a substance is not possible. In its absence, substances cannot be distinguished from one another and there could be no ascertainment of a particular substance. So material substances do not exist. To escape this difficulty there must be a conception of substance in spite of its infinite divisibility which can make the sufficient description possible. Such a conception will be a spiritual one in terms of selves. The proof for the existence is available in our own being. The universe therefore is a spiritual whole, a community of selves which has the perception of all the spiritual parts and wherein the selves know each other and determine each other.

Fourthly, there is the view that the Absolute is not merely thought but also feeling and will. Though all thoughts and things abide in the Absolute, they are not split up and connected by relations. Reality is supra-relational. Reality is given in immediate experience, or feeling, while, though there is diversity, yet they are not parted by relations. That is why relational thought can never give us Reality and in so far as it does not reach reality, it wallows in contradictions. As instances, to interpret the world in terms of primary and secondary qualities, substance and adjective, relation and quality will show the contradictory nature of the world. Thus the world is not real. Thought that moves by terms and relations can give only appearance and not truth.

This negative result cannot be left there; since a theory of Reality should be positive. Proceeding on the principle that all negation presupposes affirmation and that there could be no such thing as bare denial, the appearance is supposed to point to a reality. Since appearances are contradictory, reality must have non-contradictedness, should not contradict itself. This criterion is absolute since to doubt or deny it will mean assumption of the criterion. And since appearances are of the real, they must belong to the real in such a way that they are self-consistent. And Reality is harmony characterised by oneness; it is an individual; subject and object are abstractions of this experience. How the plurality of experiences like subject and object proceed from the whole is a mystery. Yet we have a general idea as to what it could be in our ordinary sentient experience. The Absolute is not merely intellectually satisfying as a metaphysical theory but also emotionally agreeable; it is also the really existent. This absolute is supra-personal and not to be identified with God.

In another form of idealism⁷ mind as the pure subject is ultimate and absolute. To speak of a transcendence is meaningless. If anything, the Absolute is wholly immanent. If one wants to speak of transcendence, it is in self-consciousness that we find it when one is aware of the subject as against the object. But yet that which knows both the subject and the object is other than both; it is the ultimate mental act, (the transcendental ego), mind as pure act which can never be objectified; that is the real subject. What is objectified is a thing, a fact, while mind a reality is an act, a process. If mind is opposed to matter, it becomes itself materialized. Mind is not a substance independent of the thinking activity. It is neither a spectator nor a spectacle. It is the act of experiencing. Such a mind is our true self, that can never be objectified. This experiencing or thinking cannot be defined because it is "what is defining"; beyond the subject and the object. This subject-mind is the only concept, the true self as distinguished from the empirical self. And necessarily, this self is eternal.⁸

(B)

The method that is involved in the speculations of the idealists surveyed hitherto very broadly falls into the category of the transcendental method or in Indian terminology the method of *arthāpatti*. The ontological argument, argument from the contingent nature of the finite and even the dialectical method could be classed under the transcendental method. In *arthāpatti*, some general statement is accepted, and as one particular case of it is false, another is postulated as true. Devadatta, admitted to be living, is not in the house and

hence must be outside it. Given something that is limited, we have to postulate the unlimited. The causal necessity *a priori* is transcendently arrived at because the necessity of causal relation is not explicable on *a posteriori* considerations. Yet there is the experience of causality. If the experienced causality is not explained by the known conditions of *a posteriori*, the *a priori* necessity must be postulated for the explanation of the phenomenon. If there is the fact of the presented world and if it is not self-explanatory, then a higher Reality is postulated. In Advaita the puzzling phenomenon of the presented finite with its basis in the Infinite will not be intelligible unless we postulate the principle of *māyā* which is the mechanism by which the Infinite appears as the finite.⁹ This principle of *māyā* does not propose to be an explanation; rather it is a pointer to the inexplicability of the situation. No consistent theory could explain how the Absolute appears as the world. If the world could be shown as deducible from the nature of the Absolute, the how and why of the manifestation and evolution could also be given. It has not been done so far. Yet that there is a Reality that is not finite is plain. But what exactly is the relation between the finite and the Absolute can never be settled precisely because the Absolute is supra-rational. Nor is it possible to know *a priori* the intermediary conditions that stand in between the finite and the infinite. Only a systematic inquiry based on the accepted canons of reason will reveal the limit of our experience. To know the limit of reason, reason is the first method. To the dilemma, if Brahman is completely known, no philosophy is necessary; and if Brahman is not known to any one in any manner, the enterprise is useless, the answer is that Reality is not altogether unknown though not completely known. And that is why, in the twilight of haze, diverse ideas exist leading to controversies. Consequently, an inquiry becomes necessary. Only by philosophical reasoning is it possible to know whatever is not Reality. This is a process of discovery and not deduction. The moving principle here is non-contradiction.

Nothing that changes could be real. Anything that has a nature of its own will not be subject to change. *Ekarūpena hi avasthito yo'rthah sa paramārthah*. Whichever changes is unreal. The relative realities should be fixed only by the comparative persistence. The idea is that any finite is in theory falsifiable. Till it is falsified, it is taken for what it is. Absence of contradiction and the presence of it, constitute the difference between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. *Kim punah vaidharmyam, bādhabhau iti brūmah* (S.B. II. 2.29). Anything is false only with reference to a higher reality, not by itself. That a thing is not the Real is known only when it is contradicted. While there are illusions even the finite experiences,

the world of finitude is itself an error. To be sublated is to vanish into the substrate and not to be taken over. This brings us to the next consideration.

(C)

As such there is no bare denial anywhere. The basis of the world-error is Reality (*sarva-kalpanā-mūlatvāt*). There is nothing like just emptiness of being. Illusions point to some reality. In the totally non-existent there could be no illusion. There is neither substrateless delusion nor limitless sublation. When the illusory or the erroneous is denied, the reality that is mistaken giving rise to erroneous judgment is uncanceled. Negative texts in the scripture have the positive as their import. Since there is no non-being without a positive limit to it, the finite is an appearance of the positive reality and ends in it. If the finite is somehow carried over into the Absolute and is preserved there in however transmuted a form, the question is inevitable whether the Absolute is any the richer for containing the finite experiences in the sublated form. If it were, it will be getting a character which it did not have earlier. It will be the growing Absolute. If it were not, the necessity for preserving the experiences is not obvious. Besides, how the changeless and eternally perfect Absolute manifests itself in world-forms without surrendering its changelessness will have to be explained. If it is through a negation "characteristic of consciousness which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated and thereby survives its being sublated" and as such the historical method is introduced into the scheme of the dialectic, does this negation secure any new richness for the Absolute? There is nothing that the Absolute gains by manifesting itself in world-forms, nor by preserving the appearances. Neither the historical method, nor any mode of negation could explain how or why the Absolute expresses itself in the form of the world. We cannot consider the world of creation either as different from the Absolute in which case there will be no relation between the two, or that the world and the absolute are mutually supporting in which case there will be no creation as each is necessary for the other and will be equally eternal. If the world of plurality is already contained in the Absolute, why deduce it from the Absolute? For all these reasons, the mathematical method of deducing the world of categories from the Absolute is a useless task. Not only is this a mystery but also it leaves the reality of creation doubtful.

By a method that could be called at once dialectical and analytical, the Advaita philosophers seek to negate the world of appearances and affirm the supreme Reality. Through the examination, for

instance, of the notion of creation and causality, the different alternatives of causal production are examined and are allowed to cancel out each other leaving the idea so examined indefensible and indeterminate. The cause that is examined is the material cause and it is shown that the effect can neither be totally contained in the cause nor be outside it. Yet causal production itself is an experienced fact. Advaita speaks of one material cause *ajñāna* or *māyā* which evolves into manifold forms.¹⁰ Looked at from this point of view, it is one principle that transforms itself continuously into many forms. The reality of this phenomenal series is that of Brahman. Thus there is nothing like production or creation. This is the conclusion we are driven to by the consideration of the logical character of the Absolute. By the same method, the ontological status of the object in illusion is found to be neither existent nor non-existent nor both. The theory regarding the illusory object as existent cancels out the theories that hold the object to be non-existent. The *sat-khyāti-vādins* and the *asat-khyātivādins* without their knowing establish the *anirvacanīyakhyaṭi*. The objects of the world also partake of the same character, since they are not existent like the supreme Reality nor non-existent like the non-entities. Absence of being does not entail non-being and vice versa. The nature of the illusory object is such that it is removed by knowledge. This removal implies the affirmation of Reality. It takes place in the locus of Reality wherein it appears through the principle of *māyā* or *ajñāna* as the case may be. Another reason why it is removable is that it appears different from the Real with dissimilar characteristics of inertness, limitedness and objectivity.

(D)

This last mentioned objectivity is the work of *ajñāna* which is the principle of individuation. It is the a priori condition of all relational experience. To it belongs the mechanism of thought and reason. This is the initial darkness that has clouded the originally unitive transparent consciousness and created the duality of subject and object. And here the function of reason starts. When this reason dissects the objects of the world and analyses them to find their true character, it is slowly led by its own operation to the puzzlement of their self-contradictory nature. It is able to destroy the cherished views but is away from Reality. Being a product of the initial division, it itself starts with the weakness which it finds in others also. It finds its own reflection in the world. But turned on itself, to find its own foundations, reason melts into its basic a priori stuff. What is the centre from which the objectifying process starts? An enquiry into the nature of the self will show that objective

function of judgement is not necessary for consciousness to exist in itself. Thought is limitation as much as adjuncts like body etc. This limitation, too, must lie within consciousness and therefore, to know the finite is to transcend it in the sense of recognition of the pure consciousness which is neither the subject nor the object but make possible both. Here we are already passing into a realm of near certainty and immediacy, as we are on the frontiers of discursive thought peeping, as it were into the Self. This takes us to the last section.

There is a hesitation on the part of some Western Idealists to treat the Reality as Self. Ego or Self-consciousness or the noumenal Self or Mind as pure act are some of the conceptions that have been formulated. Yet Self is very often understood only in correlation with an 'other', some principle of inner differentiation or identity-in-difference. It gets the image of mind superimposed on it. It is thought to be the subject always opposed to an object. Where it is thought to be deeper than either subject or object, is said to be an act related to the multiple subjects and objects and as such, a process. Such a temporal relation makes the Self the psychological me, the ego rather the immutable Self. To think of the Self is to realize it. The Self by its very definition is the true nature of anything. We can speak of the nature of anything as its self. Thus to realize the true self is to recognize and stay in one's own being. The task will be to see first what it is not; what the superimposed elements are that have come to be mixed up with the Self; how the infinitude and independence are transferred to the finite and dependent and vice versa and eliminate the superimpositions one by one till the possible final point in the analysis is reached. When thought itself collapses, the final intuition dawns. The *adhyāsa-apavāda* or *adhyāropa-apavāda*, is a recognized method in Advaita.¹¹

That there is a self and is realizable is the basic starting-point. The fact of experience is itself proof for it. What is unique in the method of *adhyāsa-apavāda* is the subjective analysis in terms of the diverse states of experience. Just as the identity of persons is proved in spite of the growth and change with the passage of time, the fundamental Reality is shown to be transcendent and immanent, a light that shines both manifesting the objects and the mind and their absence. The conscious experiences, acquired and organised through the mind and the sense-organs, of a world external to the mind are different from the experiences encountered in dreams where the mind functions without the aid of the senses and without a contact with a world external to it. Still there is, the awareness of the experiences; they happen to us. When deep sleep supervenes, thoughts cease to be and the identity built up of the

empirical memories is suspended. We can say that thoughts merge into their causal state till they are revived. There is an unconsciousness in terms of relational thought. The subject-object distinction is in abeyance. Just as the play of perceptions and memories was manifested, the light of consciousness manifests their absence also. Both knowledge and ignorance are lighted up by the basic *caitanya* which is the *avastha-traya-sākṣi*. It is true that this *sākṣin* is still covered, though free from multiple distractions. But the analysis clearly indicates the nature of the self.

(E)

The awareness, total and unmediated, of the true Reality which is to be it, is intuition. This is what we mean when we say that Reality shines by itself and that what one has to do is to remove the ignorance about it. The intuition is experience in its merest presence and being. It is not intellectually mediated, it is not a possibility but a realization. In ordinary perception, there is an immediacy; but it is not complete intuition. Intuition is not distinguished by not being intellectually mediated so much as possessing the basic reality. Advaita as an inquiry into the ways of possessing or being one's own self makes it a constructive method par excellence.

Thought does not automatically pass into intuition. The suicide of thought is not voluntary. Intellect should be trained along with will and feeling. The method of intuition, *jñāna-marga* is not just a philosophical method of a dialectic, the ballot of bloodless categories, it is a response of the entire human being to the challenging enigmas of the finite appearances. Truth is not just a theory. It is reality and being. Mediacy can be overwhelmed not by another mediacy in thought relations. The subject who is not merely a thinker, must get himself chastened from the angles of will and feeling. Spiritual disciplines cleanse the instrument of thought and feeling and will. To such a receptacle alone, the intuition dawns. It is here that the positive method, as against the negative method of reason, is prescribed. This consists of the true knowledge of the scripture and concentration on its message. Reason becomes subordinate. It dispels the doubts, and sense of implausibilities. Concentration with the whole of one's being on the truth so grasped from the intuitive utterances of the scripture removes what little is there left of the obstructing films of prejudice.

Scripture is the sole authority in the matter of the ultimate truth. Reason can tell us what Reality is not. Scripture is the body of intuitions. Positive knowledge can come only from scripture. It has to be said here that *brahmajijñāsā* starts with the teacher who himself

is in possession of the truth. These are part and parcel of the art of philosophising. If intellect is based on intuition, philosophy is based on revelation. The authoritarian method in philosophy, then, cannot be avoided. *Śruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava* are the triple basis of philosophy.

1. Consciousness *per se* was not imagined.
2. The relation is organic. The parts and whole here are mutually dependent and determine each other ; parts are also mutually determinant. One is meaningless without the other.
3. *ātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyam bhavati*.
4. cf. We are reminded here of the Sāṅkhya doctrine where the *prakṛti* moves by internal disturbances in the presence of the *puruṣa*, the principle of consciousness.
5. Hegel, Quoted by Bosanquet.
6. Bosanquet.
7. Called Actual Idealism or Modern Idealism.
8. As time is held in all its three moments by the Act.
9. *Māyā* cannot be directly proved to be either existent or non-existent. Positive means of proof fail us here, though according to some thinkers the explicability of *māyā* is not due to the impossibility of proof but is due to its removability by knowledge. *Māyā* is established in experience.
10. If Brahman is considered the material cause, then the world is its transfiguration.
11. Even with regard to the objective world this method is adopted. Gaṅga-dharendra Sarasvati has written a complete work on it.

R. Balasubramanian

THE PROBLEM OF
METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY:
FROM THE
EXISTENTIALIST POINT
OF VIEW

The choice of a method in philosophy is determined by what one considers to be the nature and scope of philosophy as well as the problem to be dealt with therein. Existentialists are not committed to any particular method on any *a priori* consideration or view of either the method or the problem. But this is not to suggest that their approach to the problem is without any presupposition. To have a certain point of view initially with regard to the choice of the problem to be investigated is to have a certain presupposition.

The method which the existentialists employ centre round the following key ideas which constitute the chief problems of philosophy. Though there are different ways in which the problems can be stated, they can be forcefully brought out by allowing the philosophers themselves to speak about them. The statements of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Sartre may be considered in this connection.

(1) There is the Kierkegaardian dictum : "Truth is subjectivity."

(2) Jaspers observes : "Each philosophy creates its own concepts; it has no higher criterion outside. To know what philosophy truly is, I must live in it; I do not know it by a definition." Again he says : "What we cannot *be* at all, we cannot *understand* either."

(3) Sartre says : "Man defines himself by his project."

The problem of subjective truth, the view that each philosophy is a disclosure of the transcendent Being from a particular standpoint and that philosophy is a way of life, and the significance of human existence both from ontological and social points of view—these are the chief problems with which the existentialists are concerned. In

a very important sense all these problems centre round the existence of man and the nature of Being. All existentialists, whether theistic or atheistic, devote considerable attention to the discussion of the nature of human existence and the nature of Being in their writings. According to the existentialists these two are not separate issues which can be pursued independently of each other. Rather they are interconnected problems. It is through human existence that we have to approach the problem of Being. While the study of Being via human existence takes us on into the realm of ontology, the study of human existence against the background of Being forms the central issue in social philosophy. Existentialists are much interested in the social and humanistic aspects of philosophy. This is particularly the case in respect of the writings of Jaspers and Sartre.

In dealing with the problem of Being and human existence, existentialists make use of *phenomenological method* and the *method of intuition*. In addition to these methods Sartre specifically refers to the *progressive-regressive method* to be employed for studying man against the objective situation or environment in which he finds himself.

Let us first consider how and why the existentialists make use of the phenomenological method. We can mention only a few of the well-known cases studied by this method, and our choice of the thinkers in this connection must also be selective.

Existentialists seem to think that existential experience can best be portrayed through the medium of literature. But this alone is not enough. It is equally necessary to approach it through philosophy. To the extent it is possible it must be conveyed through philosophic terminology. That is why we have, for example, two Sartres and two Marceles — as literary artists and also as philosophers. What these thinkers endeavour to do is to provide the objective correlate through phenomenological analysis to the subjective immediacy of literature. The themes dealt with in their literary writings find a place in their philosophical works.

Consider the description of existence given by Roquentin. He says: "The thing which was waiting was on the alert, it has pounced on me, it flows through me, I am filled with it.... Existence, liberated, detached, floods over me. I exist. I exist. It's sweet, so sweet, so slow.... There is bubbling water in my mouth. I swallow. It slides down my throat, it caresses me—and now it comes up again into my mouth. For ever I shall have a little pool of whitish water in my mouth—lying low-grazing my tongue. And the pool is still me. And the tongue. And the throat is me...At this very moment—it's frightful—if I exist,

it is because I am horrified at existing...there are so many ways to *make* myself exist, to thrust myself into existence.....”

Here is a philosophical attempt to give a phenomenological description of Being :

“The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being. The first being which we meet in our ontological inquiry is the being of appearance..... Thus there must be for it a phenomenon of being, an appearance of being capable of description as such. Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access — boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself: that is, without intermediary.”¹

Existentialists do not want to explain Being and human existence through concepts in an abstract language. On the contrary, they are concerned with concrete existence as realised by the individual in the act itself. Simone de Beauvoir explains the method of the existentialists as follows: “There are two ways of seizing and explaining metaphysical reality. One can attempt to elucidate the universal signification in an abstract language. In this case the theory takes a universal and timeless form. Subjectivity and historicity are utterly excluded. Or one can incorporate into the doctrine the concrete and dramatic aspect of experience and propose not some sort of abstract truth, but my truth, as I realise it in my own life. This is the existentialistic way. And this also explains why existentialism often chooses to express itself through fiction, novel, and play (e.g., Marcel, Sartre, Camus). The purpose is to grasp existence in the act itself, in which it fulfils itself.”²

Though Kierkegaard does not refer to the phenomenological method by name — for the method was introduced by Husserl and was adopted by a number of existentialists like Heidegger, Sartre, and others later on — he does make use of the method in the most effective way in his works. The phenomenological method is the method of description. It aims at the description of all that manifests itself as it manifests itself. In the sense in which it has been used by other existentialists, Kierkegaard too uses this method.

Kierkegaard's main concern is to study the rich contents of human experience in all its aspects and dimensions without trying to fit them into *apriori* theories. What interests him is the concrete individual and his concrete experience and not the individual *in general* or human nature or existence in general. The study of the data as given to us in our experience is the preliminary task of

philosophical investigation. The data or the given will include not only what we see, but also our subjective states — our feelings, emotions, and moods, our being-in-the world and our being-with-others. The data are rich and diversified and all of them deserve to be described and analysed. The aim of such a descriptive method is to gain an insight into the nature of human existence and thereby into the nature of Being as a result of the disclosures of the given. Metaphysics to start with must not only be descriptive, but also be empirically based. Kierkegaard should be considered to be the pioneer of this method among the existentialists. In the *Journals* Kierkegaard refers to the difficulty of employing the descriptive method by contrasting description *vis-a-vis* generalization. He says: "It is far more difficult to describe one actor than to write a whole philosophy of art, and more difficult to describe one of his performances than to describe the actor. The more limited the material, the more difficult the task.....because it is a direct test of the powers of description. The more one can depend upon generalizations, the easier it is, for the material is so vast that all the completely abstract observations, which anyone can learn by heart, seem to mean something. But the more concrete the observations, the more difficult it is. God knows how long philosophers will continue puffing themselves up with the fantastic notion with which they deceive themselves and others, that generalization is what is difficult."

Let us first examine how Kierkegaard employs this method and what insight he is able to get thereby. Kierkegaard's description of the three levels of human existence is his most significant contribution to philosophy and his graphic description of the various modes of despair in his *The Sickness Unto Death* is one of the best descriptive psychological studies available on the theme. Consider first the three levels or modes of human existence — the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. At the aesthetic level, man is immediately what he is. His mode of existence is that of a man possessing a body with its instinctive urges and emotional drives. The aesthetic mode of existence may assume many forms. Basic to all of them is the attitude of pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding. According to Kierkegaard, it is the dread of boredom which serves as the characteristic feature of an aesthete. Boredom is the subjective equivalent of the sequence and regularity found in the outside world. The aesthete wants to escape from boredom and so he indulges in a life of flight from actuality.

Kierkegaard is of the view that one can overcome boredom not by increasing the extent of experience, shifting from one subject to another like a butterfly, but by deepening its intensity. This

can be achieved only by narrowing the field, by limiting our experience. "The more one limits oneself, the more ingenious does one become." The prisoner in a narrow cell finds entertainment in watching the manoeuvres of a spider. The most trivial incidents become interesting.

The man who is given to speculation is the intellectual aesthete. Leaving the factual world, the speculative person wanders in a realm of essence. His concern is pure thought, and his accent is on necessity. Contingency and emotional immediacy fall outside his scope. Instead of dealing with the actual world, he is interested in finding out the *what* or *essence* of it. He is interested in objective truth which is universally valid.

At the ethical level, the individual becomes qualitatively different from what he was at the aesthetic level. It is not the case that passion does not find a place in his life. There is room as much for passion as for thought in his life. In fact, man has to feel, think, and choose at every level. But his feeling and thinking and the choice that he makes at the ethical level make him qualitatively different from his mode of existence as an aesthete. Kierkegaard maintains that choice is the key-note of the ethical level.

The significance of the act of choice which is an important feature in the Kierkegaardian thought can be fully appreciated only when we consider the concrete act of an individual in a situation. Kierkegaard says: "For me, the instant of choice is very serious, not so much on account of the rigorous cogitation involved in weighing the alternatives.....but rather because there is danger afoot, danger that the next instant it may not be equally in my power to choose..." The fact that we choose is really more important than how we choose. It does not mean that the latter is of no consequence. What Kierkegaard is anxious to point out is that when a man is thrown open in a concrete situation and when he realizes that his very existence is at stake in that situation, the choice that he makes is bound to be right. Kierkegaard observes: "As soon as one can get a man to stand at the cross roads in such a position that there is no recourse but to choose, he will choose the right."

The intrinsic value of free choice emphasised by Kierkegaard is beautifully brought out by Sartre in his novels. Consider for example what Orestes says: "I have accomplished *my act*, Electra, and this act was good." It is necessary to bear in mind that what Orestes wishes to emphasise is not the virtue of matricide, but the value of free choice. Orestes is prepared to take full responsibility for his act, because it is his burden which he has willingly put on

his shoulder. He says: "I shall bear it on my shoulders as a carrier at a ferry carries the traveller to the farther bank. And when I have brought it to the further bank I shall take stock of it. The heavier it is to carry, the better pleased I shall be: for that burden is my freedom. Only yesterday I walked the earth haphazard; thousands of roads I tramped brought me nowhere, for they were other men's roads.....Today I have one path only, and heaven knows where it leads. But it is *my* path."

In genuine choice the individual is called upon to act in one way or the other. The dialectic of choice produces tension. At the ethical level good and evil become directions of self-determination rather than any quality of the objects chosen. The good is posited in the act of choice. The individual commits himself to a certain mode of existence which is the opposite of the other direction rejected by him. The choice which he makes places him under ethical categories.

It is necessary to point out that Kierkegaard does not make a formal analysis of the ethical level. There is a basic difference between the approach of moral philosophers to this issue and that of Kierkegaard. While others are interested in analysing the nature and meaning of ethical predicates like good, bad, etc., and in finding out whether good is a natural property or a simple indefinable quality, etc., Kierkegaard shifts the enquiry from a formal and linguistic analysis of these terms to a consideration of the mode of existence in which the choice of one alternative and the rejection of the other find concrete expression. No useful purpose is going to be served by making a theoretical analysis of them in paper. What is required is that the individual in the concrete situation must embody the values in his life. The fundamental choice is not the choice between rival values of good and bad, but the choice by which the individual concretely realizes them in his life.

The point which Kierkegaard emphasises regarding the significance of choice finds support in recent times in the writings of R. M. Hare. Hare considers at length the question of decision and moral principles and argues that decisions cannot be taught, but principles can. He points out that in the ultimate analysis we can justify a decision only by specifying the way of life to which we subscribe. This is the only way by which in the last resort we can try to meet someone who is concerned about moral decisions. In the words of Hare: "We can only ask him to make up his own mind which way he ought to live; for in the end everything rests upon such a decision of principle. He has to decide whether to accept that way of life

or not; if he accepts it, then we can proceed to justify the decisions that are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some other, and try to live by it. The sting is in the last clause."³

It is at the religious level that subjectivity receives an even more concrete expression. The individual realizes at this level that his relation to God is something personal and incommunicable. It calls for and involves a through transformation of the inner life of the individual. One cannot find God speculatively. Finding God depends on the way in which the individual relates himself to God. It is an existential relation: the individual lives in it. The emphasis here is not on the relation between thought and its object, but rather on the relation between the thought and its thinker. Given the proper way of knowing, this knowing leads to truth. Kierkegaard says that "there is a *how* such that, if it is clearly given, the *what* is also given."

What is it that works for the leap from one level to another? It is *despair*. The change is not a gradual unfoldment or a logical development, but a leap during a personal metamorphosis. Despair affects the whole person, his thought, feelings, and action. All of us are in despair whether we are conscious of it or not. But it is only when we are consciously under its grip that we can move from one level to another.

Let us now turn to Jaspers' concept of *ultimate situations*. Critics are of the view that Jaspers' analysis of ultimate situations is a characteristic feature of existential philosophizing, and all existentialists refer to this aspect in some form or other. Jaspers says that ultimate situations limit the individual and that they are always present and inescapable. The individual as he is cannot understand them, nor can he surmount them. Though he is aware of them, he cannot see beyond them at all. Jaspers says: "Situations such as the fact that I am always in situations, that I cannot live without conflict and suffering, that I unavoidably incur guilt, that I must die, — these I call ultimate situations. They do not change, except in their appearance; with respect to our existence, they are ultimate. They are not surveyable; in our existence we see nothing else behind them. They are like a wall, we come up against, and upon which we founder. They cannot be changed by us, only brought to clarity — without our being able to explain or deduce them from anything else. They are a part of existence itself."⁴ Jaspers points out that ultimate situation is not an intellectual concept, nor an objective category. The significance which it has for one is not conceptually exhaustible.

It will be of interest to consider three of these boundary situations, namely, situation, suffering, and death.

(1) *Situation* :—Every one is involved in a situation, whether he likes it or not. Either one acts on the situation or allow the situation to act on him. At no time can one leave the situation. If I leave one situation, it is to enter into another. So every one is inescapably involved in a situation.

(2) *Suffering* :—This is another ultimate situation from which no one is exempt as long as one's empirical existence continues. There are various forms of suffering, differing in intensity from person to person. Whatever may be the differences, every one has his part to play and no one is spared.

(3) *Death* :—Though every individual must finally face the end called death, more often than not man lives by forgetting the inevitability of death. What torments us is the fact that though it is inevitable we do not know what it is. It is necessary to bear in mind that Jaspers is not interested in the naturalistic view of death as the final end of a gradual ripening process which, starting from birth, passes through growth, maturity and decay, and finally ends in death. How an individual views death as an ultimate situation—this is what is relevant to Jaspers.

In the existentialist literature we come across expressions like the *absurdity* of human existence, the *contingency* of human existence, the *existential anguish* which is an extremely intense experience involving a sense of dread, revulsion, and awe, etc. All these concepts serve to bring out the same idea which Jaspers wants to drive home through his concept of ultimate situations. It appears that all of us, as Camus seems to suggest through his work *The Myth of Sisyphus*, are in the same tragic plight of Sisyphus in our empirical existence being engaged in futile pursuits and hopeless endeavours. The ceaseless rolling of a rock by Sisyphus to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight, is symbolic of human bondage. It is not with a view to show that man is condemned for ever in his existential predicament, but to stress that man has to overcome it through his authentic existence that existentialists resort to the phenomenological analysis of human existence.

Heidegger's analysis of time is another illustration to show how we can gain a new insight into the nature of time as a result of phenomenological investigation. There is a radical difference between the traditional view of time and Heidegger's phenomenological notion of time. The traditional view looks upon time on the analogy of a

flowing stream. The temporal dimensions succeed each other in a particular order—the present succeeding the past and the future succeeding the present. Of the three dimensions, since the past is no more and since the future is non-existent, the present alone seems to be real. Heidegger says that the traditional view is not satisfactory. For one thing, it does not tell us what time is. It speaks about the succession of events. Since the succession of events takes place in time, we should know what time itself is. There is also another difficulty. When we say that one event succeeds another, there must be some connection between the two; there must be something to connect the events so that we can legitimately speak about succession. If events are discontinuous, then they cannot form a succession. Something is required in order to connect the events and make them a succession. What it is we do not know in the traditional view. There is yet another difficulty. Why is, asks Heidegger, the stream of time irreversible? Why should we think of the future succeeding the present and the present succeeding the past?

According to Heidegger, time is an existential structure of man's being in the world. It is the very nature of human existence to temporalize itself. Man is not *in* time. It is through his existence that temporal dimensions come into being. It is in terms of what he wants to be, what he aims at, that he views his present and his past. The being ahead of himself is the vantage point and also the guiding factor. According to Heidegger, what we call the temporal dimensions are inseparable phases of a simple integrated human existence. The past cannot be obliterated. So long as I am what I am, I *have* my past with me. The being ahead of me is a possible mode of existence. It is that which determines and gives significance to my present mode of existence. So we cannot dismiss the past as that-which-is-no-more and the future as that-which-is-not-yet.

Sartre's analysis is similar to Heidegger's analysis. He maintains that it is impossible for us to understand the three dimensions without phenomenological approach. We cannot think of the past as something existing in isolation in its "pastness". The past can never exist as the past. It is the past of the present. The past is always the past of something or of somebody. Very often we say we *have* a past. Sartre observes that it is necessary to find out the meaning of "having a past". Is it the case that one *has* a past as one has an automobile? Possession ordinarily expresses an *external* relation of the possessor to the possessed. If so, do I possess my past which remains external to me in the same way as the automobile which I possess remains external to me? Sartre points out that the expression "to have a past" suggests a mode of possession in which the possessor can be passive

like matter. Instead of the expression "to have a past", we must use "to be". We can significantly speak about a past only for human existence which can exist without being its past, whose existence is such that its past being is in question. The past becomes a substance, a facticity or in-itself. I am this in-itself as surpassed. If I cannot re-enter into the past, it is not because some magical power puts it beyond my reach, but simply because it is in-itself and I am for-myself. Sartre explains the present as *presence to*. My present is *to be present to* this table, that tree, to the world; the present is the presence of the for-itself to in-itself. The future is a mode of being which the for-itself is not yet.

While the existentialists do not ignore or underestimate the importance of reason, they are convinced about its limitations. There are problems which fall outside the scope of reason and logical demonstration, but which can be known only by intuition. They emphasise the fact that in addition to reason, feelings and emotions play their part in helping the individual to gain intuitive experience. They do not repudiate reason and exalt the impulses. It would, therefore, be unfair to characterize them as irrationalists.

We can illustrate the standpoint of the existentialists by considering first the problem of personal existence which is basic to Kierkegaard. Personal existence, according to Kierkegaard, is essentially self-realization in its deepest and most profound sense. It is existence at the religious level. It is not theoretical knowing, but practical awareness or realization of one's authentic existence. Kierkegaard points out that no one can teach it. No one can understand the meaning of personal existence unless one lives it and so the benefit which one can derive from the instruction from others on this is only indirect. The function of reason and the usefulness of instruction are restricted to what may be called *indirect communication* which consists in stating the alternatives in such a way that the individual is moved through decision and choice towards the realization of his personal existence. The rational approach is inadequate to deal with the existential problem. What it means to exist can never be brought out by discursive reasoning. Consider some of the existential problems which we have to encounter in our life. What does it mean to get married and be a husband or a wife? What does it mean to be thankful to someone for the good that he has done me? What does it mean to be human? In all these cases reason or conceptual thinking is of no use. To realize personal existence is a task in the sense that it involves earnestness, decision, and choice, and appropriating what is chosen as a mode of existence. It is in this context that we have to understand the profound significance of Kierkegaard's

declaration that truth is subjectivity. It is not with impersonal truth that he is concerned, but with truth as personal, with the personal appropriation of truth. If truth is subjective, then it must be the truth of the whole man. It is not the truth that I *have*, but the truth that I *am*.

The entire philosophy of Jaspers works at two levels. There is first the level of objective truth which is the sphere of science and reason; and second, there is the level of personal assimilation of truth which is the level of Existenz where one has to depend upon "direct awareness" or intuition. Journeying to the realm of philosophy through science and medicine, Jaspers realises at once the importance as well as the limitations of science. Science is valuable in that (1) it enables us to know the facts of the objective world. (2) Its impact on the world is so tremendous that no one can understand the fate of the world without grasping the potentialities indicated by science. (3) It helps us to free ourselves from the bondage of a limited dogmatic view of the world in order to arrive at the totality of the world and reality. Jaspers observes: With the rational attitude I desire unlimited clarity; I try to know scientifically, to grasp the empirically real and the compelling validities of the thinkable; but at the same time, I live with an awareness of the limits of scientific penetrability and of clarity in general; however, I push forward from all sources in all modes of the Encompassing toward a universal unfolding of them in thought and reject above all thoughtlessness."⁵

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Existenz and Transcendence are the two central ideas in the philosophy of Jaspers. Jaspers makes a distinction between Dasein and Existenz. By the term Dasein he refers to the empirical existence of man as a psycho-physical organism in the world of nature. The real core of man as Spirit is brought out by the term Existenz. Jaspers points out that man's Existenz and his relation to the transcendent Being cannot be known by logic and reason. It requires a special illumination, a direct awareness of it. Jaspers makes use of the concept of the *cipher* in order to show how by giving up the method of reason we have to hope for an insight into the Transcendence through reading the language of cipher. According to him, the world and Existenz are the appearances of Being. Jaspers does not use the term *cipher* merely in the sense of a symbol. He makes a distinction between the two. A symbol may be interpreted. It refers to a signatum in the world. But a *cipher* can only be intuited; it does not refer to a definite, fixed object as its signatum. According to him, the world and Existenz are the appearances of Being. The *cipher* is not identical with the

appearances of Being, but is the language through which the transcendent Being speaks to Existenz. It is through the reading of the ciphers in the appearances of Being that we can intuit it. The direct awareness of Being through the ciphers is unique to the person who experiences it, and so it cannot be directly shared by others.

It will be useful in this connection to refer to the distinction that Jaspers makes between the primal language of Transcendence and the language of man. The speculative language of the metaphysicians is removed from the primal language of Transcendence by two degrees. Metaphysical language makes use of reason. A system which a philosopher works out is intended for the purpose of sharing his thoughts with others; it is a case of unrolling his thoughts for the benefit of others. It will, therefore, involve theorizing, generalization, objective thinking. The language of myth and religion mediates between the primal language and the speculative language. The aim of philosophy is to help us reach the primal language. Every philosophical system, according to Jaspers, must be viewed as an approach to reality. No philosophical system can claim finality. It may help us to get illumination of Being through the concepts it uses, through the peculiar terminology which each system-builder develops in a particular situation. So every philosophical system must be viewed as a disclosure of reality from a particular point of view. Its value lies in the fact that it takes us on up to the realm of the ciphers and makes us read that language for ourselves. In other words, since the reading of the ciphers is a personal act, philosophy beyond a particular stage becomes personal. If I am existentially deaf, I will not be able to hear the language of Transcendence. Jaspers contends that philosophical activity is fully real only at the summit of personal philosophizing, while objectivized philosophical thought is a preparation for, and a recollection of, it. It is through the inner action by which I become myself that there is the revelation of Being. It is against this background that we have to understand Jaspers' declarations: "Each philosophy creates its own concept; it has no higher criterion outside. To know what philosophy truly is, I must live in it; I do not know it by a definition." "What we cannot *be* at all, we cannot understand *either*." Jaspers is against a closed, final system of philosophy. It is futile to take shelter in any position as if it is final.

Drawing a distinction between a problem and a mystery, Marcel maintains that Being can be approached only in a meta-problematic way. In our approach to Being, it is necessary to

recognise the importance of the personal existence of the investigator. It is relevant to ask: Who am I? What is the nature of this I who questions Being? How am I qualified to begin this investigation? If I do not exist, how can I succeed in it? And, if I do exist, how can I be sure of this fact? In short, the ontological status of the investigator assumes, according to Marcel, a decisive importance. The problem of Being which I want to investigate cannot remain outside of me. There is what Marcel calls *participation* of the investigator in the realm of Being. This participation cannot be an object of thought; it cannot be known through discursive reasoning. It is beyond the realm of problems: it is meta-problematical.

The distinction between a problem and a mystery is the distinction between scientific, objective knowledge and philosophical knowledge. A problem is something which one hits upon, something which demands a solution by being a challenge to one's thought. A mystery, on the contrary, is something in which I find myself engaged, and so it is not what is "in front of me." The distinction between what is within myself and what is in front of me loses its significance in the realm of mystery. We treat a problem in an objective way: we study it, analyse it, try to find out how it has originated. The problematic approach is a characteristic feature of science. But this method is not adequate for philosophical investigation.

Being falls outside the sphere of the problematic, and so it cannot be known through epistemological investigation. There is a basic difficulty inherent in the epistemological approach. Every problem of knowledge presupposes what is sought to be proved: that which is sought in the end is always presupposed at the outset. For example, the validity of my knowledge could never be ascertained in the end, if this validity were not taken for granted from the beginning. Again, to arrive at self-affirmation, we must start from self-affirmation. Marcel contends that the problem of knowledge destroys itself *qua* problem. We can escape from *petitio principii* only if we pass from the problematical to the meta-problematical. That means we must get into a sphere in which thought and being are no longer separated.

When Marcel speaks about the mystery of Being, it is not in the sense of something which is unknown or unknowable. When he refers to mystery, it is to show that the problematic approach is quite inadequate to deal with it. We do not require a Kierkegaardian leap to know the mystery. Genuine thinking, says Marcel, is ontological

rather than epistemological. Thought at this stage partakes of Being. And this is something unintelligible for us, since we are accustomed to the problem epistemologically.

Metaphysics which is concerned with the mystery of Being must, therefore, give up the problemaic approach towards it. In order to understand the mystery of Being, Marcel suggests a negative method which consists in making a series of negations rather than affirmations about it. We must state what it is *not* rather than what it *is*. This negative method will be supplemented by the method of secondary, recuperative reflection, what Marcel calls recollection, in order to get the direct apprehension of Being. Primary reflection proceeds along the path of critical analysis of the given. It does not help us to understand the mystery of Being. Only recollection can do this. It is not mere recalling of something. It is an inward reflection, inward hold. It is a case of repossessing of one's self. Every one has an original intuition of Being; and recollection works on this original intuition of Being.

According to Marcel, recollection functions as a form of detachment. There are two modes of detachment — the detachment of a spectator and the detachment of a saint. The scientific approach to the study of problems exemplifies the detachment of a spectator. Here there is no personal involvement; the personal aspect of the scientist does not come to prominence. The problem is studied objectively, dispassionately, in a de-personalized way. Unlike the scientist, the saint is not concerned with objects as things to be known and controlled. He does not get himself involved in the epistemological problem of subject-object relation, looking upon the self as noetic correlate of the external object. By detaching himself from the world of objects, he attaches himself to Being, and this attachment is participation in the mystery of Being. In the words of Marcel: "The detachment of the saint has its *habitat*, if I may say so, in the very heart of reality; any curiosity regarding the universe is absent from it. This kind of detachment is a participation, the highest that there is. The detachment of the spectator, on the other hand, is the exact opposite: it is a desertion."

To many critics it may appear that existentialism which is mainly concerned with the individual and the subjectivity has no social philosophy, and that Sartre who is so much concerned with the radical freedom of the individual is, like J. S. Mill, a prophet of empty liberty and an abstract individual. The study of human existence brings the existentialists into social philosophy. Particularly Jaspers and Sartre devote considerable attention to the social aspect of

man's existence. The social philosophy of the existentialists as developed by Jaspers and Sartre has its root in the liberal-democratic tradition of Mill, on the one hand, and that of Marx, on the other. While Jaspers is anxious to show that the social philosophy of liberalism and democracy centring round the importance and the dignity of man is opposed to Marxism, Sartre, who is equally anxious to preserve the freedom of the individual and the value of his free choice tries to reconcile Marxism with existentialism. It is necessary to bear in mind that Sartre is not in agreement with the Stalinist Neo-Marxism and the communistic interpretation of Marxism which reduce man to the status of the objects of the world. According to Sartre, Marxist metaphysical materialism and belief in the determination of the dialectic are examples of "bad faith", since they serve as avenues of escape from personal moral responsibility.

Sartre points out that every individual functions in an objective situation, and the material conditions of his existence limit the field of his possibilities. But it is the very nature of man to transcend the given situation with a view to realise his *project* which is ahead of himself. So Sartre rejects the view that human events are determined by any sort of external law imposed upon them. To Sartre, there cannot be a dialectic without men. The dialectic is no more than a theoretical construct subjective in origin for the purpose of understanding the situation. Sartre accepts the thesis put forward by Engels in a letter to Marx: "Men themselves make their history but in a given environment which conditions them." The point which Sartre wants to emphasise is that progress in history is identical with the progress of free individuals in the realisation of their projects. Everyone has a perspective of the future which serves as the real motivation of his behaviour. To the extent that he acts on that, he lives an authentic life.

Sartre develops the dialectic of the subjective and the objective. According to this dialectic, while man has to function in a given situation which limits him, he is not determined by the situation. He accepts the situation as facticity; at the same time he tries to transcend it in terms of the project he has. He wants to inscribe himself through the project on the situation. Man is never identical with the situation, but exists as a relation to it. He decides how he will live it and what its meaning is to be. Though he cannot exist except in a situation, he exists by continually surpassing it. This is what Sartre calls the "internalisation of the external" and the "externalisation of the internal". It is not enough if we study man against the objective situation. It is first of all necessary to place man in his proper frame-work as the Marxists want to do. Sartre calls this

as the *progressive method*. But it is equally necessary to study the situation against the individual, and this may be called the *regressive method*. It is necessary to remember that if any situation assumes importance and significance it is because of what man does. Sartre repeatedly points out that the world is human, and that profundity comes to the world through man. The progressive-regressive method is also called the heuristic method.⁶

Sartre, and for that matter any existentialist, is not for any kind of ideology, social and political, for he is not prepared to see any finality in any type of social and political order envisaged by an ideology. But itself no ideology will be of any value unless the individual relates himself to what it embodies in his personal acts. Things are not valuable in themselves. Evaluation is a characteristic of free human subjectivity, and so the individual creates values and gives expression to them in his concrete acts. Sartre does not think in terms of a value system inherent in a social and political order. The authentic individual of Sartre does not contemplate the absurdity of the world and withdraws. Rather he actively pursues his chosen ends, accepting responsibility for what he does. It is certainly the case that existentialists including Sartre put a heavy burden on the individual. It may be doubted whether the average person is equal to the task which Sartre sets for him. So far as Sartre is concerned, there is no other way for the individual than to accept his position and responsibility and lead on authentic life. To Sartre individualism is not inconsistent with Marxism, and he interprets Marxism in such a way that it would provide a legitimate place for the free, purposive activity of the human being. Man is neither good nor bad, but has possibilities for both; and Sartre's existentialism in respect of its humanism is characterised by measured optimism. Man, according to Sartre, is a being who is not what he is and is what he is not.

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. xlviii

2. quoted in Wilfrid Desan. *The Tragic Finale* (Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 7

3. R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 59

4. quoted by Edwin Latzel in his essay "The Concept of Ultimate Situation in Jaspers' Philosophy" in Paul Arthur Schilpp (Ed.), *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1957), p. 188

5. Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, p. 196

6. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Problem of Method* (London: Methuen & Co., 1963), Chap. III

S. Gopalan

ON THE EXISTENTIALIST METHODOLOGY

Speculations on man and his nature have given rise to philosophies of various shades with their emphases on the different aspects of the human personality. The fact of man being the common denominator in these various enquiries regarding the human predicament not merely permits but adds extra significance to the review of one mode of enquiry by another, especially if the aim of reviewing is considered to be not merely critically assessing the salient features of one system of philosophy by another but also paving the way, however indirectly, for establishing a meaningful dialogue between one mode of philosophizing and another. In this paper a review of the existentialist methodology from the point of view of social philosophy is attempted.

The implication in philosophizing about man-in-society is that his essence does not get exhausted in the *social milieu*. The metaphysical dimension of the human personality adds to the necessity of deeply analysing man in all his aspects — as part of the world in which he lives and as aspiring to attain completion of his being. The synthesis of the *fact* of existence (as an empirical entity) and the *ideal* of living (becoming a true person) that is characteristic of the human situation profoundly influences speculations on human life, and any sound system of social philosophy presupposes such an intertwining of the positive and the normative aspects of human life. The social philosophers therefore does not stop with an empirical analysis of man since it reveals only the layers which are more easily observable and accessible, but inquires into the normative aspects of man. From this general frame-work of the methodology of social philosophy it is fruitful to review some of the methods adopted in the existentialist philosophies, since it reveals the deeper layers of philosophizing about man-in-society

inherent in social philosophy and since it lays bare the true significance of the existentialist approach to the problem of human existence.

Three aspects of existentialism are significant in this context. The emphasis on the concrete individual rather than on the abstract society, the importance accorded to particular man rather than an abstract entity called humanity is to be found in the existentialist thinkers in general. Secondly, the analysis of the predicament of man—the “situation” in which he “is”, forms a significant aspect of the philosophy of each of the thinkers belonging to the existentialist school. Thirdly they all postulate a transcendent-goal to be achieved. The three aspects may be found in the existentialists with different significance attached to them in their individual philosophies and can be discerned though they use different terminologies. We shall now illustrate our thesis by briefly referring to some aspects of the philosophies of five existentialists — Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre.

Kierkegaard's starting point was that philosophy will serve no useful purpose if it were to be only “wisdom about wisdom”, and nothing to do with life. To him the criterion of a worthwhile system of philosophy is enabling the individual man to take decisions—to “make the choice”. The individual, needing the help of philosophy is the one characterised by genuine dilemmas in life, conflicts and anxieties, agonies and expectations. The “reality” of the individual thus becomes evident from an inward search, an introspective analysis. This is the significance of Kierkegaard's famous dictum “Truth is subjectivity”. For, it is by a serious subjective analysis that the individual avoids getting crushed. His emphasis on the concrete individual is quite evident when he writes that his desire, in all his writings, is “to read *solo* the original text of the individual human existence-relationship, the old text, well-known, handed down from the fathers, to read it through yet once more, if possible, in a more heartfelt way”.¹

He voices forth the concern of the individual man who experiences the crushing effects of philosophies dealing with “objectivities” — philosophies which promote the mass man and the mass society. He protests against philosophies ignoring the thinking subjects and smothering the individuality in man. “The levelling process” (the effect of ignoring the individuality in man) “is not the effect of an individual but the work of reflection in the hands of an abstract power The individual who levels down is

himself engulfed in the process and while he seems to know selfishly what he is doing, one can only say of people *en masse* that they know not what they do A demon is called up over whom no individual has any power, and though the very abstraction of levelling gives the individual a momentary, selfish kind of enjoyment he is at the same time signing the warrant for his doom No age, and therefore not the present age, can bring the scepticism of that process to a stop, for as soon as it tries to stop it, the law of the levelling process is again called into action".²

The "choice" is made when the individual, becoming dissatisfied with being reduced to a thing, being an average person, experiences despair³ and conflict. The stage of despair and conflict Kierkegaard calls the aesthetic stage and the transcendence of it is the ethico-religious stage.

The aesthetic stage is the one in which the individual is incapable and is hence afraid of facing the "conflict", of realising his true self. In this stage he is under the illusion that his true self can be found in the social relations — seeking to be one among many in society, not trying to be unique. Moreover, the individual gets himself lost in the material pleasures without committing himself to an inward search and responsible moral action.

Man faces and accepts the challenge of despair in his ethico-religious stage. Man's choice to free himself from the unauthentic experience is a genuine choice and the authentic selfhood is synonymous with his becoming free from the impending disintegration of his being, becoming responsible, unified and integrated.

In Jasper's thought concern for the concrete individual is expressed by emphasizing personal existence. Jaspers unambiguously clearly rejects unauthentic being. We are unauthentic as members of a mass-society and become authentic only by transcending the "situation" in which we find ourselves. He systematically analyses man's being-in-the-world and emphasizes the subjective element in man.⁴ Man is first analysed as *dasein* or *being-there*, in an environment like any other living being. This is the mode of man's being in which he discloses himself mostly as being concernfully immersed in a given situation. Secondly, man is consciousness in the sense that he becomes aware of the subject-object relationship in which he finds himself with the "objects" of the world. Thirdly he is mind which helps him to reflect about his individuality — his distinctness and purposiveness. Fourthly he is existence or freedom — the core of his personal being, the subjective — the never-to-be-objectivised

mode of his being. This is the mode of human existence in which he is able to take conscious decisions and actions. This is also man's concreteness in that his freedom expresses itself in his exercising his ethical choice in the situation in which he is placed. The ethical choice implies again that man accepts the struggle, the suffering characteristic of "being-in-a-situation" in the world. Naturally the "others" in the situation will have to be recognized and respected. For the uniqueness of one's own self presupposes the acceptance of the others with whom he enters into communication. Society raised on such mutual acceptance of the personal uniqueness and the freedom of individuals would be a "loving struggle" in which each man as freedom seeks to assert his own individuality and liberty by respecting the individuality and liberty of the others. Man's specific ethical relations with other persons thus provide the concrete basis for the realisation of his freedom in the world.

No wonder, therefore, his analysis of the contemporary situation reflects his fear that the concrete individual is likely to be crushed completely unless he "gains" himself. In his "Man in the Modern World" he is concerned with the fate of the person who is in danger of becoming a mere cog within the enormous machine of the modern welfare state, who loses his substance, self, and his spiritual centre. He believes it to be the great problem of our time, whether, in face of this development the independent person working out his own destiny will be able to survive. The contemporary technological civilization, he regards as a social disease on the ground that ever-growing reliance upon objective criteria of thought has resulted in the deepening ignorance of the real nature of human existence. The world surrounding the individual, Jaspers maintains "grows so dense with objective and mechanistic systems of thought that the will is progressively stifled. The surrender of man's thinking to rationalism and of his artifice to technics have consequences which console man with the feeling that he is progressing, but make him neglect or deny fundamental forces of his inner life which are then turned into forces of destruction.

Jaspers speaks of the Being-in-itself as the hidden meaning of the world and as the fulfilment of the liberty of being oneself. As the ground of both, it is to be distinguished from both and is the Transcendence which is the culmination of the life of liberty pursued by man through his struggle and frustration in the world. This becomes significant when Jaspers maintains that man should not get 'lost' in the abyss of 'nothingness' but transcend it so as to encounter Being; the purpose of true philosophizing must be "not to sink through

the vacuum into the absolutely groundless, but rather to hold the thinker open for the encounter with Being."⁶

Marcel, true to the tradition of the Existentialists emphasises the importance of analysing one's own concrete experience. The concrete experience referred to is of the human being within-this-world. The experience is not merely of the objects of the external world but of persons within the realm of persons. It is based on the active participation of the subject in the lives of the "others". It should however be noted that though Marcel refers primarily to the experience of the 'subjects', he refers also to the experience of the objects and of the Transcendent. He argues that "there must exist a possibility of having an experience of the transcendent as such, and unless that possibility exists the word can have no meaning."⁶

In the analysis of concrete experience, Marcel maintains, reflection plays an important role. Reflection or rather "reflexion" means "thought or consciousness (*pensee*) turning back to itself and concentrating on its spontaneous acts or on a group of them." But it also means "critical suspension of judgment in order to analyse the causes or the reasons of a specific fact." This seems to mean a sort of introspection combined with analysis. This reflective method Marcel calls "primary reflection."⁷ The dualism of the Self and the body and the world and the person is a result of "primary reflection." In this stage the basic unity is lost sight of and it is restored only in "secondary reflection" which stage seems to synthesise the different elements analysed. It discloses the body as *my* body, the world as *my* situation and brings to light the unitary character of my human existence.

But Marcel emphasises the situationality of man, of man's being-in-a-situation in which he is not merely in concerned touch with things but also enters into 'living' communication with other persons. Man is not an 'isolated' being but a 'being-with-others', and the 'others' are constitutive of his human existence since he can maintain himself at the level of human existence only by entering into inter-subjective communication with others.⁸

In his analysis of the contemporary situation he is critical about the increasing socialisation of life and the growing powers of the state since, in his opinion, they have had the undesirable effect of invading the privacy of the person and destroying the brotherhood of men. It is a world in which human beings tend to become *fonctionnaires*, exercising a specific function in human society, reduced to statistical numbers, and are no longer free agents of their own right.

Marcel maintains that in a society dominated by technology everything becomes a "problem". "Having" is here more important than "being". Everybody *has* employment, *has* possessions, and *has* certain functions to fulfil. Objects which we possess, in a specific sense "have" us. We are in danger of becoming captive souls cut off from other persons and not responding to their 'presence'. They suffer a loss of being, an "ontological deficiency". They are "absent". They talk and talk about they will do for you, but in an hour of peril they are not there, not "present", i.e. not at your disposal. This unavailability leads on to denial and betrayal.⁹

These facts point to a loss of participation in the life of others, in "being", and in the Divine life. Possessed by "having", men have lost "being" and suffer from "ontological deficiency". They feel the urge for being. They are in search of being, they have an "ontological sense" or they feel an "ontological exigence". Marcel affirms that freedom — the attainment of the transcendent stage of being is something which is not 'known' objectively but something which is experienced subjectively. Freedom is the core of self-hood and as such can be discovered not in external acts but only in the internalised consciousness of the Self. When it is faced with alternatives the choice is to be made in the inward consciousness of the individual.¹⁰

Heidegger :—Though Heidegger's main interest in the problem of Being is intellectual and theoretical and not ethical, as is the case with Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel, the point of interest for us is that even in Heidegger's philosophy the final purpose of the analysis of Being in general and human existence in particular is only to awaken man to his authentic human existence which is both practical and ethical.

He maintains that if one wants to know what being is, one has to start with an analysis of human existence, which contains as one of its elements the understanding of being. His thesis is that only the analysis of existence can lay open the way for understanding Being.¹¹

Like the other existentialists Heidegger accords a place of importance to man. Man is never a mere instance of a species; his unique and personal being cannot be described by "categories" applicable to things, but merely by "modes of existence". It is obvious "human existence" is here understood as "potential being", "a possibility of being or not being itself". It anticipates the future, it "projects" itself into the world. As "the possibility of being oneself" it is authentic existence, as "the possibility of not being oneself", unauthentic existence.

The possibility of being oneself implies that man has the freedom of choice. The loss of freedom occurs when he designs his decisions and actions on public approbation. Heidegger describes such a state the "fallenness" from its own authentic potentiality-of-being. In this state man does not think for himself nor conceive of any personal goal to be attained but is led away by public opinion—blindly and unreflectively accepting and following it.

But, all the same, the fact that he has not made the choice to be an authentic being, his flight from personal responsibility manifests itself when he experiences the worthlessness of his unauthentic existence in the world. And when man faces and accepts responsibility he orients his existence towards authentic realisation of his potentiality-of-being.

Another significant feature of Heidegger's theory of the modes of human existence is that in both the authentic and the inauthentic, man relates himself to the world in terms of concerned dealings with it.¹² The only difference between them is that while in the authentic mode of existence man concernfully deals with the world having in view the whole structure of his existence including in itself future possibilities, he ignores them in his inauthentic existence and 'loses' himself in the present pre-occupations of everyday existence.

In the philosophy of Sartre again we find the subjective characteristic of man being emphasized. His famous dictum: "Existence precedes essence" signifies that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterwards. That is, to begin with man is nothing and till he creates his essence—not by simply conceiving himself to be but by willing to be, after that leap towards existence.¹³ We see here that a proper orientation of human life towards authentic existence is stressed by Sartre.

Human existence is described by Sartre as being constituted by two ontological principles—Consciousness and Being-in-itself. "All consciousness", writes Sartre "...is consciousness of something" and continues, "This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent goal"¹⁴. ".....the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge"¹⁵. Sartre's meaning is clear. The term consciousness signifies an awareness of things other than itself and also a simultaneous awareness that it is distinct from the 'others' of which it is aware, and hence it exists-for-itself. The uniqueness of man consists in the fact that he is "not just there" as other things but is conscious of his own existence.

Sartre constantly emphasises the inter-dependence of these two principles—the Being-in-itself and the Being-for-itself. The Being-for-itself has existence merely as reflecting the Being-in-itself, and the latter exists only in so far as it is reflected by the Being-for-itself. Sartre writes: "The reflecting exists only in order to reflect the reflection, and the reflection is a reflection only in so far as it refers to the reflecting. Thus the two terms.....point to each other, and each engages its being in the being of the other."¹⁰ Thus, as a "possibility" the Being-for-itself is dependent on the Being-in-itself and has no reality or existence apart from this dependence. The point of interest, for us here is the emphasis by Sartre that human existence/human life becomes significant only because it is neither mere Being-for-itself nor Being-in-itself but the realisation of the Being-for-itself in the Being-in-itself.

Our brief reference to certain aspects of the philosophies of some existentialists has then revealed the significant fact that the life of man-in-society (being-in-the-world, in the terminology of the existentialists) becomes meaningful inasmuch as it is the means by which the transcendent goal set can be realised. Though the terminologies used in existentialism and social philosophy may be different, the method of approach to the deepest of man's aspiration-to-be-himself is strikingly similar and impart added significance to each other.

1. See his "Final Postscript".
2. See "The Present Age" (trans., A. Dru, Oxford, 1940), p. 30.
3. See his "The Sickness Unto Death" for a detailed account of the significance of "despair"—in its existential aspects.
4. Karl Jaspers: "The Perennial Scope of Philosophy", trans., Ralph Manheim (London, 1950), p. 18
5. "Reason and Existenz". ed. William Eark. (New York: 1960), p. 126.
6. "The Mystery of Being", Vol. I, p. 46.
7. See F. H. Heinemann: "Existentialism and the modern Predicament" (London: Adam Charles Black, 1958.) p. 138f.
8. See G. Srinivasan: "Existentialist concepts and the Hindu philosophical systems". (Allahabad: Udayana Publications.)
9. See F. H. Heinemann: "Existentialism and the Modern Predicament", p. 143.
10. See "Being and Having" (London: Adam Charles Black Ltd. 1950).
11. See his *Sein Und Zeit* where he commences the 'quest' by analysing the 'average' Dasein experienced in everyday life. The clear implication in the work is that the phenomenological understanding of Being comprehends in it the concrete experiences and acts of the being-in-the-world.

12. An authentic (*Eigentlich*) mode of standing-in is based on Dasein's relating himself to things in view of the whole structure of what he really is. An inauthentic (*Ingigentlich*) mode of standing-in finds Dasein so concerned with the necessities of daily life that he relates himself to things by projections which ignore the implications of the full structure of his possibilities. See T. Langan: "The Meaning of Heidegger" (London: Routledge Kegan Paul), pp. 22-23.

13. See Jean Paul Sartre: "Existentialism and Humanism" (London: Methuen Co., Ltd., First English edn., reprinted 1955), p. 28.

14. "Being and Nothingness" (London: Methuen Co., Ltd. First English (trans.) edn., 1957), Introduction, p. li.

15. Ibid. p. lii.

16. Ibid p. 173.

S. E. Demetrian

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
IN TEILHARD DE
CHARDIN

A discussion concerned with the method, the philosophical method, used by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in building his integrated conception of man and world, may be interesting as looked at from two points of view.

Firstly we must consider that Chardin was from the very beginning a seeker, and, it seems, a successful one, of a deeper meaning of the reality. A christian jesuit monk, he practised the disciplines enjoined by his order especially the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius; his biographers are in accord that after a period of crisis connected with the first world war, around his thirties (35-38), he had very convincing spiritual experiences.

The way in which he expresses himself after these events may be relevant as he speaks of a "complete organic transformation such as death alone can bring about"; himself "incandescent", he sees the whole universe as such; or when he says, among many other statements, "I live in the heart of a single unique Element, the centre of the Universe and present in each part of it: personal love and Cosmic Power" (in *Hymn to the Universe*, p. 53-54).

The necessity, his commentators refer to it as "L'idée fixe" his fixed idea or obsession, came soon to be as to how to express in logical terms, and mostly as to where to find the outward proofs of the mystery of the unity as lived by him.

So Chardin is comparable to any great thinker belonging to western but particularly to eastern tradition, and familiar to Indian philosophy, who having first seen intuitively the Truth is expressing It, or is trying to express It, in terms of mundane realities.

But, and here we may find the second point of interest, Chardin was also a scientist, and a very perspicacious one; an authority in the broad field of biology skilled mostly in paleontology and anthropology, author of a number of scientific articles and books. So he was trained to satisfy his taste for rigorous observation and to have respect for the palpable sensorial fact; the necessities of a mind thinking in logical terms had to be brought to bear on his intuitions. As to correspond to his insights, properly and scientifically, somehow measurable or at least impossible to be rejected data had to be found, and this not by improvising, by stitching together some elements gleaned here and there; critical minded people had to be convinced. Results of scientific research had to stand up to the scientific criticism.

His project was also grandiose: he had to encompass neither more nor less than the whole development of man, the centre of the world for Chardin, starting with his appearance 500 millions of years ago, and of the whole development of the earth as background, from its beginnings 5 billions of years ago. Taking his stand on the evolutionary theory in biology he had to prove not only the existence of a psychic reality, what is called by him the "within" of the things, behind the "without" of the things, but also the interconnection of the "within" features in an unitary sphere called by him *noosphere*. For Chardin the meaning of the unitary psycho-material evolution is the hominisation of the world, that is the becoming conscious of himself of the "within" of the things. The gigantic but unitary advance of an evolving world was to have an end in what is called by him Omega-point, his equivalent for Divinity.

Now with a view to being faithful both to his intuitions and to science, and to be able to organize all the collected information in an harmonious unity suited to his vision, Chardin had at his disposal only what is called the scientific method as used by the natural sciences.

The question we shall try to answer in what follows is how and why it was possible for a scientist, a biologist, to achieve a synthesis with a deep philosophical meaning, by utilizing the classical descriptive plus nomologic or inductive method of the natural sciences or—if we want the phenomenological method as used in the natural sciences—by gathering his data through direct objective and dispassionate, and as much as possible personal, observation of sensorial data, by experiencing himself with these data, by the selection of similar data, by classifying and by systematizing them, and then by generalizing on them.

What were the conditions thanks to which by using the method of what may be called also the scientific phenomenology,¹ he succeeded in building an articulated philosophical system.

The attempt to answer the questions "how and why", could be stated under the headings: (1) thanks to the characteristics of the field of research, (2) thanks to his attitude as concerns the phenomena, and (3) thanks to his basically integrated approach to the reality.

(1) As regards the characteristics of his field of research one may stress once again, as it has just been done with the instance of the sketching of his project, his field was the whole terrestrial phenomenon with the moving mankind at its centre. Chardin had to delineate the evolution of mankind as a single huge biological phenomenon in all its material, social, and historical manifestations. Dealing in the most general way with the collected data but only as a scientist, that means without parting with biology, and by putting at every moment his generalizations under the trial of experience he was able to carefully extrapolate on his scientific observations finding himself almost always at the limit between science and philosophy.

Having the root in practical science his generalisations belong to philosophy without being a philosophy of science.

(2) The second point has to consider how Chardin used the phenomenological method. It has been said that the phenomenological method is neutral, or better it ought to be, we may add. At the first glance what could be simpler than, objectively and in a dispassionate way, to gather facts, to describe them, and so on; the personal coefficient of the scientist with the influence of environment, fashion, time, level of understanding, instruments, etc., would appear only at the later stages of generalisation, synthesis and interpretation. Yet looking close by it is not difficult to conclude that the personal coefficient comes in play at the very beginning of the setting in work of the method: one has to have a personal standpoint by establishing the limits of a phenomenon, by calling it by a name or if we want by establishing the "phenomenonness" of a phenomenon; then immediately one has to decide as to which phenomena are meaningful and which are not. In fact one must, in science also, if not clearly know, at least feel somehow what you want or what you have to express in the language of the phenomena. What are properly speaking phenomena than personal slices or sections of the same reality; some don't "see" anything there where others are "seeing" and are capable or making the former

also to "see". And Chardin was of the latter group. The interiorly lived insight of the unity and the observations gathered in lifelong studies enabled him to make the best possible use of the natural science he professed.

(3) Having first dealt with Chardin's field of research, then with the way he used the phenomenological method, we may now be concerned with an even larger instance by asking ourselves: is there any basic difference between the mystic, philosophical, and scientific approach to the reality?

And to start with the mystic approach, can we refuse the quality of being acceptable to the philosopher and to the scientist of the great insights conveyed by the mystics of all times? Hardly; it had been proved that these insights can be expressed, to some extent for they are much more than they could be expressed, in clear and acceptable philosophical propositions and stand successfully the criticism of science.

Can we deny the quality of being truly scientific and satisfying from the mystic point of view to a philosophical system that once put in practice fulfils the requirements of both science and spiritual life? In no way.

And finally one cannot decline the quality of being truly acceptable from both mystical and philosophical points of view to those scientific generalisations from which the corresponding equivalents are easy to be found by both the man of meditation and by the philosopher.

True seekers are starting from where they are or from where they feel called: whether science, (or practical activity) whether philosophy, whether spiritual practices; but if they are to be perfectly satisfied and useful to others, if what they are saying or working has to stand the test of time, they have to fulfil themselves in all the three approaches. Chardin was one of the rare ones able to personify for our benefit the integrated approach to the reality, which is one.

This is the way in which the place of the philosophical method in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's work and thought, both inseparable from his life, may be understood.

1. The meaning of the word "phenomenology" as understood by Chardin is not interchangeable with the meanings given to the same word neither by Lambert in his "Neue Organon" (New Organon-1764) to the theory of appearances, nor by Kant in his "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations for Beginning the Study of Natural Sciences — 1786), nor with Hegel's "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (Phenomenology of the Spirit-1807), nor by Husserl in his "Phenomenology" which being a variety of analytical approach to philosophy considers its task to be "an accurate description of the pure essence of various phenomena without the admixture of any interpretation, assumptions or spatio-temporal particularities" (Khawaja, Jamal A., *Five Approaches to Philosophy*. New Delhi, 1965).

Chardin, speaking about the finalist and the determinist point of view in biology is convinced that they will soon "... unite in a kind of *phenomenology* or generalized physics in which the internal aspect of things as well as the external aspect of the world will be taken into account. Otherwise, so it seems to me, it is impossible to cover the totality of the cosmic phenomenon by a coherent explanation such as science must try to construct". And "To harmonize objects in time and space, without presuming to determine the conditions that rule their deepest being: to establish an experimental chain of succession in nature, not a union of 'ontological' causality; to see, in other words, and not to explain..." is the task he is ascribing to his principal essay (Phenomenon of Man) (in his *Phenomenon of Man* pp. 53 and 58).

N. Veezhinathan

THE PROBLEM OF METHOD IN ADVAITA

The aim of this paper is to bring out the methodology of Advaita. As the method cannot be explained without reference to the subject-matter, I propose to bring in details relating to the subject-matter of Advaita in so far as they are necessary to illustrate the method.

I

The Method of the Removal of Avidyā

The goal of Advaita is Brahman—the partless ultimate. Happiness and absence of misery which every being desires to have constitute the essence of liberation. These two according to Advaita, constitute the nature of Brahman. The *jīva*'s real essence is Brahman. On account of *avidyā* it is not aware of this truth. Having thus lost sight of its identity with Brahman, the *jīva* longs for liberation. It is the removal of *avidyā* by the knowledge of identity of *jīva* with Brahman that is to be accomplished.

Knowledge could arise only from *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa School admit six *pramāṇas*, namely *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti*, and *anupalabdhi*. Advaitins admit all these *pramāṇas* and it is evident from Śrī Śaṅkara's reference to them in his commentary on the *Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma-stotra*.¹ A *pramāṇa* is defined as that which gives rise to the knowledge of that object which is hitherto unknown or veiled by *avidyā*. According to Advaita, Brahman alone can be veiled by *avidyā* as it alone is self-luminous. All other things being insentient by themselves need no external cause for being obscured. When viewed in this light the Upaniṣads alone can be considered as *pramāṇa* in the strict sense of the term. No doubt all the *pramāṇas*, according to Advaita, are the transfigurations of Brahman. But noticing that the Upaniṣadic texts deal with the nature of Brahman and the other *pramāṇas* with

the objects of the world, the Advaitins conclude that the sentient element of Brahman is predominant in the Veda in general and the insentient element of *avidyā* is predominant in other *pramāṇas*.² The Upaniṣadic portion of the Veda alone gives rise to the knowledge of Brahman. Yet the other *pramāṇas* are useful to the Advaitins in one way or another. Discussion about *pratyakṣa* is useful in this that the Advaitins conclude that the Upaniṣads could give rise to the immediate experience of Brahman. *Anumāna* and *arthāpatti* are useful to establish the unreality of the universe. *Upamāna* gives rise to the knowledge of similarity between the objects. In the same way it would give rise to the knowledge that a particular object is dissimilar to another object. The Advaitins on the basis of this *pramāṇa* conclude that Brahman is unlike everything and like nothing and the world, therefore, is not real like Brahman. *Anupalabdhi* is useful in this that the aspirant is able to ascertain the absence of silver in the shell after the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the shell and then to conclude that shell is free from silver in the three divisions of time—past, present, and future. He is then able to extend this line of explanation to Brahman and to conclude that Brahman is free from the universe.

We said that the Upaniṣadic texts alone are the means of knowing Brahman. Herein arises the question as to the place of *yukti*. Padma-pāda takes³ the word *yukti* to be a synonym of *tarka*. *Tarka* is only argument which proposes the unwelcome position if a particular premise is not admitted. For example, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance in the form "wherever there is smoke, there is fire" is the instrument of the inferential knowledge in the form "the mountain has fire". If the validity of the invariable concomitance is questioned by stating that smoke could exist without fire, then *tarka* in the form "if there is no fire, there could be no smoke" comes into operation. This argument proposes an unwelcome conclusion, namely, the absence of smoke when smoke is being perceived if the invariable concomitance between the smoke and fire is not admitted. Thus *tarka* is only an aid to a *pramāṇa*. In the same way, the proof—presumption is applied to prove the unreality of the universe. The universe is *mithyā*; for, otherwise it would neither be presented in cognition nor annihilated. This is a *pramāṇa*. It might be objected that a thing may be presented in a cognition and it may be annihilated; but it is not necessary that it must be *mithyā*. Herein *tarka* in the form "if the universe is real, then it cannot be annihilated; if it is unreal, then it cannot be presented in a cognition" comes into operation. Brahmanānda in his *Laghucandrikā* states⁴ that this argument is *arthāpattiśodhaka tarka*. *Tarka* is, therefore, an aid to a *pramāṇa*. Vācaspatimiśra takes⁵ *yukti* to mean *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*.

Brahmānanda in his *Laghucandrikā* interprets⁶ the word *yukti* to mean *anumāna* and other proofs aided by *tarka*. For our purpose we shall use the word *yukti* in the sense in which Brahmānanda uses it.

The Upaniṣadic texts themselves speak of the need for *yukti*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, "The Ātman should be realized; for that it should be heard, reflected, and meditated upon"⁷ emphasizes the need for reflection, which is only arguing within oneself on the basis of inference, etc., aided by *tarka*. This helps one to convince oneself that the teaching of the Upaniṣads is true. *Tarka* is also useful in ascertaining the import of the Upaniṣadic texts. When the doubt as regards the validity of the truth arrived at from the Upaniṣads is removed by the exercise of *yukti*, then one pursues what is known as *nididhyāsana*. The major texts of the Upaniṣads when contemplated after this stage give rise to the direct experience of the identity of *jīva* with Brahman. It is this direct experience that is referred to by the term *anubhava*. It is only a mental state and it annihilates *avidyā*, and thereby leads to the manifestation of Brahman which is experience. This is what Śrī Śaṅkara means when he says: *anubhavāvasānatvāt bhūtaṣṭaviśayatvācca brahmajñānasya*.⁸ *Brahma-jñāna* or the direct experience of Brahman which is only a mental state is *anubhavāvasāna*, that is, it has for its goal the manifestation of Brahman by removing *avidyā*. Amalānanda interprets⁹ the word *anubhava* to mean *abhivṛtyak*. *Anubhava* which is only the mental state is valid and can on no account be doubted. Examination of the Upaniṣadic texts and arguing within oneself with the help of *yukti* that does not contradict the scriptural teaching—these constitute the method suggested by the Upaniṣads themselves to discover the truth.

II

The Method of Interpretation of the Texts of the Upaniṣads.

The major texts of the Upaniṣads like *tat tvam asi* convey the true nature of Brahman, that is the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. The major text *tat tvam asi* conveys the identity of the terms *tat* and *tvam*, and this is ascertained by analysing the context in which this text occurs.

A sentence conveys its sense only through the senses of the words constituting it. The senses of the words are two-fold: primary and secondary. The Upaniṣadic texts which convey the primary and secondary senses of the terms *tat* and *tvam* separately are termed subsidiary sentences. There are certain texts¹⁰ which convey the primary sense of the term *tat* to be Īśvara and the secondary sense of the term to be consciousness, bliss, truth, and absolute. For arriving at the knowledge of the secondary sense of the term *tat*, the

author of the *Brahma-sūtra* prescribes¹¹ a method of gathering unpeated words found in the affirmative Upaniṣadic passages dealing with Brahman. The words thus gathered amount to ten, and they are *nitya*, *śuddha*, *buddha*, *mukta*, *satya*, *sūkṣma*, *sat*, *vibhu*, *advitiya*, and *ānanda*.¹² No additional essential nature is accepted in the case of Brahman apart from those signified by these words. Apart from these affirmative texts, there are negative texts¹³ which convey Brahman as free from all objective elements. These texts thus confirm the knowledge that Brahman is absolute. The primary sense of the term *tvam* is *jiva* who experiences the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. And the secondary sense of the term is pure consciousness which is constant in the above three states.¹⁴ *Īśvara* is mediate and is known to be omniscient. *Jiva* is immediate and is ignorant. The primary senses of the terms, *tat* and *tvam*, namely, *Īśvara* and *jiva* cannot be identified because of the contradictory attributes they possess. The Advaitins hold that the two words constituting the sentence convey, therefore, through secondary signification the sense conveyed by the subsidiary Upaniṣadic texts.

Of the three kinds of secondary signification, namely, *jahallakṣaṇā*, *ajahallakṣaṇā*, and *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*, Śrī Śaṅkara holds¹⁵ that the words *tat* and *tvam* through *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* give rise to the recollection of the secondary senses arrived at from the subsidiary sentences. Sureśvara maintains¹⁶ that the modes of interpreting the major texts are *jahallakṣaṇā* and another kind of signification known as *gaunīvṛtti*. The sentence as a whole conveys the identity of the two senses, which is hitherto unknown from any other source.

The knowledge of Brahman as the absolute arises from the Upaniṣads only by sublating the knowledge of duality resulting from perception. This is analogous to the subsequent knowledge of the true nature of a desert land which arises only by sublating the erroneous knowledge of mirage that arose earlier. This principle of the subsequent one sublating the earlier one is known as *apaccheda-nyāya*, and this maxim is arrived at in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-sūtras*.¹⁷ It should be borne in mind that the maxim holds good only where the latter cognition cannot arise without contradicting the earlier cognition as in 'This is silver' and 'This is not silver'.¹⁸ On this ground perception does not stultify the Upaniṣadic texts.

Thus the major texts of the Upaniṣads are valid in the sense that the knowledge that arises from them removes *avidyā* pertaining to Brahman. They do not convey Brahman as 'This is Brahman'. When *avidyā* is removed Brahman manifests itself in its true nature as bliss and this is Advaita.

III

The Method of Refutation of Rival Theories.

The concept of *avidyā* and the non-real character of the universe are but a corollary of the Upaniṣadic view that Brahman which is the sole reality is non-dual. The world is considered to be the appearance of Brahman, and Brahman is taken to be the material and the efficient cause of the world. The Upaniṣads first speak of Brahman as associated with the world and later negate it mainly to prove the non-real character of the world and thereby the absolute nature of Brahman. The concept of *avidyā* is introduced to account for the relation of Brahman to the world. This method of superposition and negation is known as *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* and the well-known saying 'Brahman is shown as being acosmic by the method of superposition and subsequent negation' first finds expression in the fifteenth chapter (verse 23) of the *Garuḍa Purāṇa* thus: *adhyāropāpavādābhyāṃ kurute brahmacintanam*. It is clear therefore that the Advaitins had to reject the theories of creation advocated by the other schools, as their admission would clearly contradict the absolute nature of Brahman. The Vedānta-sūtras themselves critically examine the schools of the Sautrāntika and the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya. The former two schools are rejected on the basis of reasoning, while the Sāṅkhya school is rejected on the basis of scriptural authority also. The reason is that the Sāṅkhya school read their views into the Upaniṣadic texts.

In the 9th and the 10th centuries the great authorities on Nyāya like Jayantabhaṭṭa and Udayana introduced logical methods to prove that all that is knowable is real. This position is directly opposed to the Vedāntin's position that all that is knowable is indefinable. There was a renewal of activity in the field of Nyāya when it received a fresh impetus from the new technique developed by one Kulārka Paṇḍita in his *mahāvīdyānumāna* in the 11th century. This type of *anumāna* was originally invented for refuting the Mīmāṃsaka arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving their non-eternity. But some writers on Nyāya adopted this type of syllogism to establish the eternal nature of atoms, and to prove the existence of God as the efficient cause of the world. The Advaitic writers who flourished in these centuries adopted this kind of syllogism to refute the above-mentioned Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions. Śrī Harṣa in the 12th century, Citsukha in the early part of the 13th century, Ānandagiri and Ānandānubhava of the same century

criticized the reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories on logical grounds to prove the Vedāntic position that the universe is not real.

After some time the Nyāya system was rendered more or less ineffective and Advaita definitely triumphed over all systems of Indian thought prevalent at the time. Then we land ourselves in a most controversial period in the history of Indian thought. Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Madhva appeared on the scene and led a revolt against Advaita. It may be said that their objections against Advaita had already been anticipated and answered in earlier Advaitic works. But the Advaitins had to resort to logical methods to prove the non-real nature of the universe. It is because the theistic and the pluralistic schools interpreted the Upaniṣadic texts in a way that is totally opposed to Advaita. For example the Advaitins state that the Upaniṣadic text, *neha nānāsti kiñcana*,¹⁰ affirms the non-real nature of the universe: *iha* — in this Brahman, *nānā nāsti* — there is no multiplicity. This presumptively implies that the universe is *mithyā*. But the dualistic schools interpret the text as follows: *iha* — in God, *nānā nāsti* — there is no distinction because of His several incarnations.²⁰ Hence the Advaitins have to frame a definition of *mithyātva* on logical grounds as *pratipannopādhau traikālika-niṣedha-pratīyogitā*.²¹ This means that an object is *mithyā* because it does not really exist in a substratum where it appears. In the same way, the Upaniṣadic text²² “Just as the rivers leaving out their names and forms merge in the ocean, so also the one who has realized the self becomes one with Brahman by leaving out (*vimukta*) one’s name and form” states that the knowledge of Brahman removes the universe characterised by name and form. This text implies that name and form are *mithyā*, as they are removable by the knowledge of Brahman. The dualistic school, however, interpreted the word *vimukta* to mean *amukta*, that is, not leaving out or retaining.²³ Hence the Advaitins felt that there is no point in citing the Upaniṣadic texts to prove the non-real nature of this universe and so framed the definition *jñānanivartyatvaṁ mithyātvam*.²⁴ This means that an object is *mithyā* if it is removed by knowledge. This *mithyātva* is established with reference to the universe. Vyāsatīrtha, the most noteworthy commentator of the Dvaita school criticized the viewpoints of Advaita on logical grounds by adopting the method of Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, and Gadādhara. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also adopted the *navya-nyāya* dialectic and proved that the most cherished objections of the dualistic school against Advaita are in general false.

A word about the method adopted by the Advaitins to establish *avidyā* which is so pivotal to Advaita. Vyāsatīrtha asks the proof

for the existence of *avidyā*. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that the witness-self manifests *avidyā* and as such it does not require any proof for its manifestation. Following Padmapāda and Prakāśātman he points out that perception and other proofs go to establish the positive nature of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* as such cannot be an object of any proof; for proof is that which makes known a thing that is unknown or characterized by *avidyā*. If perception, etc., were said to be the proofs for the evidence of *avidyā*, then we must admit that *avidyā* is characterized by another *avidyā*. This would definitely lead to the fallacy of *infinite regress*. And an entity which is directly manifested by the witness-self does not need any proof, like happiness or misery. But as regards its specific nature, namely, whether it is positive or not, there may arise doubt. And it is this element that is characterized by *avidyā*. And perception and other proofs go to prove that it is positive in nature by removing the *avidyā* pertaining to that element.²⁶

The view that unintelligibility of *avidyā* is an ornament to *avidyā* and to Advaita is often mentioned, but its true import is seldom understood. Vyāsatiṛtha sardonically remarks that the Advaitins could very well say that *ahamkāra* is real and *avidyā* is superimposed on it; or they could say that *ahamkāra* is the effect of *avidyā* and *avidyā* is superimposed on it; for, any problem connected with *avidyā* is said to be unintelligible and unintelligibility constitutes glory to Advaita.²⁶ Madhusūdana Sarasvatī points out that unintelligibility with regard to any problem connected with *avidyā* is not an ornament. We do not say that *avidyā* is unintelligible in all its aspects. We define *avidyā*, offer proofs to establish its positive nature, and discuss its locus and content and also its annihilating factor. But it is only when we try to prove whether it is real or unreal, we are beset with difficulties; and, it is this unintelligibility that is said to be the ornament, as it suggests that *avidyā* is *anirvacanīya* and thus is removable by knowledge.²⁷

IV

Conclusion


We started our discussion by saying that the knowledge of the identity of *jīva* with Brahman is the annihilating factor of *avidyā*. The major texts of the Upaniṣads alone give rise to such a knowledge. Its validity, however, is questioned by certain objections that suggest themselves or are suggested by the schools that are opposed to Advaita. Exercise of *yukti* confutes all these objections and confirms that the knowledge that arises from the major texts of the Upaniṣads is true. While it may be said that the method of interpretation of

the texts of the Upaniṣads remained uniform, methods of refutation changed with bewildering rapidity on account of the impact of the schools that are opposed to Advaita.

1. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the verse—*aprameyo hṛṣīkeśaḥ padmanābho'mara-prabhuḥ*, *Viṣṇusahasranāmastotra*, 23.
2. *pratyakṣasahvidavacchinnaḥ ajñānaḥ pramāṇākāreṇa vivartate, tatra ajñāna-pradhānena cakṣurādivivartaḥ, saḥvidbrādhānyena vedavivartaḥ*: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's commentary on the *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, II, 102.
3. *Pañcapādikā* [Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, 1958], p. 171.
4. *Advaita-siddhi—Laghucandrikā* [Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay,] p. 630.
5. *yuktiśca arthāpattiḥ anumānaḥ vā, Bhāmatī*, [Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938], p. 89.
6. *Advaita-siddhi—Laghucandrikā*, p. 577.
7. *Bṛh.*, II, iv, 5.
8. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, i, 2.
9. *iha anubhavaḥ svarūpābhivyaktiḥ, Kalpataru* [Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938], p. 90.
10. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III, i, 1; II, i.
11. *Brahma-sūtra*, III, iii, 11.
12. *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, I, 173.
13. *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad*, III, viii, 8.
14. *ibid.*, IV, iii, 18-19; IV, iii, 7.
15. *Vākya-vṛtti*, 48.
16. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, II, 55.
17. VI, v, 20/54.
18. See *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, II, 116-119.
19. *Bṛhadāraṇyako'paniṣad*, IV, iv, 19.
20. *dvaitamithyātvaṁ anaṅgīkurvāṇāḥ 'neha nānāsti kiñcana' iti śrutiḥ brahmaṇi avatārabhedena niyāmyabhedena vā prasaktaḥ bhedaḥ niṣedhati, brahmaṇi na ko'pi bhedo'sti, ekameva brahma na nānā iti tadarthaḥ iti manyante, Brahmānandīyabhāvaaprakāśaḥ* [Edited by Sri V. Subramania Sastri and Published by The Private Secretary To His Highness The Maharaja of Cochin, 1961], p. 54.
21. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 94.
22. *Muṇḍako'paniṣad*, III, ii, 8.
23. *Vidvān—brahmajñānī, nāmarūpāt vimuktāḥ — amuktāḥ nāmarūpayukta eva, Brahmānandīyabhāvaaprakāśa*, p. 94.
24. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 160.
25. *ibid.*, p. 565.
26. *ibid.*, p. 577.
27. *ibid.*

PART THREE

SPECIAL ARTICLES



Chedomil Veljacic

INDIAN ANALOGIES
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PLOTINUS

The results of recent research by J. Filliozat¹ have reopened the discussion of possible Indian influences on Plotinus. The present paper is not based on such investigation of historical documents concerning the extent of any specifically determinable sources. It will remain within the frame of the Plotinian thought itself and try to approach the implicit subject of comparative philosophy directly by a different method. This method can be defined as *doxographic*, or restricted to an essential analysis of ideas constituting the structure of systems to be compared. The other method—which comparative philosophy cannot ignore, especially on the actual level of historical research—is the method of *chronological documentation* which seeks to estimate possible indirect or direct influences of one system of thought upon another. Purely doxographic analysis of any particular subject from the viewpoint of comparative philosophy should however be considered as partial and restricted as long as an investigation of objective historical circumstances by the method of chronological documentation can be reasonably postulated, as in our case. The two methods and their fields of research being essentially different and independent of each other, the final aim of producing a coherent and synchronized unit of philosophical actuality in comparative philosophy cannot be attained alone by a *global* analysis of ideas essential for the immanent structure of a *closed* system of thought, as it used to be supposed too often in the past. Results that can be obtained by doxographic analysis—and in questions of essential philosophical interest only by it—will contribute to the formation of a valid basis for further investigation only if by applying this method special attention is paid to such comparative elements that may facilitate, or at least do not ignore, parallel research in the field of chronological documentation, and *vice versa*.

In this sense the following doxographic analysis of the Plotinian philosophy has been thematically determined by methodological motives.

I

In comparative studies of analogous or common elements pertaining to separate systems of thought, special attention should be paid to the *imaginative aspect* of their structure. Its constituent part in the representation of intellectual contents cannot be reduced to the logical value of a symbolic *form* alone. In comparative philosophy the imaginative contents, representing an idea in its systematic explication, have an incontestable though not exclusively determinant value particularly in cases where the hypothesis of actual, indirect or direct, contacts or influences may reasonably be postulated, as it is assumed in the motives of such analogies with Indian views in the system of Plotinus.

In the following I shall try to demonstrate three specific types of analogies in imaginative complexes on three characteristic examples.

The first type of analogy can be termed "accidental". Its form is more that of a metaphor than an allegory. Such is the comparison of the body with a garment in a series of homologous metaphors by which Plotinus explains the theory of the soul's reincarnation, proceeding from the same metaphysical and psychological assumptions as can be found in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The illusory nature of sense appearances and the imperturbability of the spirit are particularly stressed thereby.

Analogies of the second type are the most valuable and the least frequent. There the imaginative representation is connected with a deeper analysis of some specific philosophical theory, whereby a detailed elaboration of the imaginative side is required, parallel to an extended deduction of ideas, while the basic image becomes naturally enlarged by other more or less accidental associations. Such is the deduction of the principle of identity of Being and Consciousness, explicated by the symbol of the tree to which Plotinus reverts on several occasions, mainly in his III *Ennead*. The same magnificent simile holds the central place in the deduction of Uddālaka's principle *tat tvam asi* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

As an example of the third kind of analogy the Plotinian theory on the hypostases (especially in the V *Ennead*) will be compared with the teaching of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Some details of this analogy have been already elaborated by S. Radhakrishnan.²

The peculiar feature of this analogy consists in the fact that here, as in many other Vedāntic texts, the Upaniṣadic teaching contains an analysis of the state of dream, though not as an aspect of representation or as a simile within a complex of intellection, but as its immediate object of study. We do not find any such *analogy in the object* in Plotinus, though it is not difficult to find in the *Enneads* either similar theories or imaginative equivalents of the dream as a simile in some specific sense. A doxographic analysis of the Plotinian theory on the dreams in view of the elements elaborated in the Upaniṣad would therefore not bring us to a negative result. However, an *integral analogy* of essential comparative elements cannot be traced in Plotinus. It could only be *reconstructed* for the purpose of an ideal but not a representational doxographic analogy.

The examples mentioned above as characteristic for each of these three types of analogies are elaborated accordingly in the following chapters.

II

The simile of the garment appears often in Indian texts dealing with the theory of reincarnation. In the following analogy it is connected with the central idea of a deduction corresponding to the interpretation of Arjuna's moral problem in the second *adhyāya* of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. It is the problem of the moral attitude toward mutual annihilation of living beings in their struggle for life and in war.

Bhagavad Gita, II :

*Plotinus, Enneads **

12. But not in any respect was I ever not, nor thou, nor those kings; and not at all shall we ever come not to be, all of us, henceforward.

13. As to the embodied soul in this body come childhood, youth, old age, so the coming to another body; the wise is not confused herein.

15. For whom these contacts do not cause any waver, the man to whom pain and pleasure

III,2,4 :

In the immaterial heaven every member is unchangeably itself for ever; in the heaven of our universe, while the whole has life eternally and so too all the nobler and lordlier components, the Souls pass from body to body entering into varied forms-

and, when it may, a Soul will rise outside of the realm of birth and dwell with the one Soul of

are alike, the wise, he is fit for immortality. all... for life here is a thing of change; only in that prior realm is it unmoving.

16. Of what is not, no coming to be occurs; no coming not to be occurs of what is; but the dividing-line of both is seen, of these two, by those who see the truth.
18. These bodies come to an end, it is declared, of the embodied eternal soul, which is indestructible and unfathomable. Therefore fight, son of Bharata ! III,2,15 :
This devouring of kind by kind is necessary as the means to the transmutation of living things which could not keep form for ever even though no other killed them: what grievance is it that when they must go their despatch is so planned as to be serviceable to others? Still more, what does it matter when they are devoured only to return in some new form? It comes to no more than the murder of one of the personages in a play; the actor changes his garments and enters in a new role.
19. Who believes him a slayer, and who thinks him slain, both these understand not: he slays not, is not slain.
22. *As leaving aside worn-out garments a man takes other, new ones, so leaving aside worn-out bodies to other, new ones goes the embodied soul.*⁴
23. Swords cut him not, fire burns him not, water wets him not, wind dries him not. Men directing their weapons against each other — under doom of death yet neatly lined up to fight as in the pyrrhic sword-dances of their sport — this is enough to tell us that all human intentions are but play, that death is nothing terrible, that to die in a war or in a fight is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store, to go away earlier and to come back the sooner... For on earth, in all the succession of life, it is not the Soul within but the Shadow outside of the authentic man, that grieves and complains
24. Not to be cut is he, not to be burnt is he, not to be wet nor yet dried, eternal, omnipresent, fixed, immovable, everlasting is he.
25. Unmanifest he, unthinkable he, unchangeable he is declared to be. Therefore knowing him thus thou shouldst not mourn him.

26. Moreover, even if constantly born or constantly dying thou considerest him, even so, thou shouldst not mourn him. and acts out the plot on this world stage...
27. For to one that is born death is certain, and birth is certain for one that has died. Therefore the thing being unavoidable, thou shouldst not mourn.
20. He is not born, nor does he ever die; nor having come to be, will he ever more come not to be. Unborn, eternal everlasting, this ancient one is not slain when the body is slain. III,4,3:
The dominant is the prior of the individual spirit; it presides inoperative while its secondary acts.
30. This embodied soul is eternally unslayable in the body of everyone, therefore all beings thou shouldst not mourn. III,2,15:
To handle austere matters austere is reserved for the thoughtful: the other kind of man is himself a futility. Those incapable of thinking gravely read gravity into frivolities which correspond to their own frivolous nature.
31. Having regard for thine own duty thou shouldst not tremble; for another, better thing than a fight required of duty exists not for a warrior. III,2,8:
... And both one day stand girt and armed. Then there is a finer spectacle than is ever seen by those that train in the ring. But at this stage some have not armed themselves — and they duly armed win the day. Not even a God would have the right to deal a blow for the unwarlike: the law decrees that to come safe out of battle is for fighting men, not for those that pray.
33. If thou this duty-required conflict wilt not perform, then thine own duty and glory abandoning, thou shalt get thee evil. III,2,13:
Those that have unjustly killed, are killed in turn, unjustly as
38. Holding pleasure and pain alike, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then gird thyself

for battle : thus thou shalt not regard the murderer but justly get evil. as regards the victim, and those that are to suffer are thrown into the path of those that administer the merited treatment. It is not an accident that makes a man a slave ; no one is a prisoner by chance ... for in very truth this ordinance is an *Adrasteia*, Justice itself and a wonderful wisdom.

39. This mental attitude has been declared to thee according to the *sāmkhya* teaching ; but hear it according to the *yoga*, disciplined with which mental attitude thou shalt get rid of the bondage of action. III,2,10 :
Given the starting Principle, the secondary line, no doubt, is inevitably completed ; but each and every principle contributes towards the sequence. Now, Men are Principles, or, at least, they are moved by their characteristic nature towards all that is good, and that nature is a Principle, a freely acting cause.
50. The disciplined in mental attitude leaves behind in this world both good and evil deeds. Therefore discipline thyself unto discipline (of the *yoga*). Discipline in actions is weal. III,1,10 :
Unwisdom, then, is not due to the Soul, and, in general, if we mean by Fate a compulsion outside ourselves, an act is fated when it is contrary to wisdom. But all our best is of our own doing : *such is our nature as long as we remain detached*. The wise and good do perform acts ; their right action is the expression of their own power.
51. For the disciplined in mental attitude, *action-produced fruit abandoning*, the intelligent ones, freed from the bondage of rebirth go to the place that is free from illness.

It may appear, if we confront the intellectual condensation of ideas in both texts, that a more concise and explicit formulation was attained in the *Gītā* than in the selection from Plotinus. This impression is due mainly to a greater extension of the chapters on *Providence* out of which the fragments from Plotinus have been selected. The criterion applied for their selection required that single phrases or parts of phrases should not be dismembered from their context nor bereft of their primary meaning in the quoted passage. At the

same time an integral representation had to be obtained with special regard to its imaginative components, consisting not only of a poetic metaphor, but implying the entire situation analogous to the epic motive of war as it is reflected in the *Gītā*. The ideal adequacy of some particular elements will, therefore, find a better expression in connection with some other subsequent motives.

The comparison of the above texts can also be extended in order to disclose a peculiar difference in their theoretical contents. From the view-point of the Indian theory of *karma* it may be noted that Plotinus's arguments to the same effect appear more coherent and specific than those professed by Kṛṣṇa in the same connection. The critical moral situation faced by the author of the *Gītā* amidst a waged war determines a radical idealistic solution of the problem of action, a solution that will become typical for the later *Vedānta*. There is a tendency in this passage of the *Gītā* to eliminate the deeper ontological sense of the theory of *karma* and to concentrate on a radical solution of the problem of causality—its abolition by liberation achieved in the *yoga*. Plotinus, on the other side, stressed with more intensity different implications of the idea that "all our reasoning on these questions must take account of previous living as the source from which the present takes its rise". Thus "the quality now manifested may be probably referred to the conduct of a former life" (III, 3, 4). "Similarly, the very wrong of man by man may be derived from an effort towards the Good; foiled, in their weakness, of their true desire, they turn against each other: still, when they do wrong, they pay the penalty...for nothing can ever escape what decreed in the law of the Universe" (III, 2, 4).

In the *Gītā* an issue from this unavoidable situation of the human character is sought for in metaphysical cognition which, in the teaching of the *yoga*, can be interpreted also as a marked act of stands violence against our mundane nature.*

Plotinus remains satisfied with a poetic metaphor on the harmonious beauty of the universe: "Just so the Soul, entering this drama of the Universe, making itself a part of the Play, bringing to its acting its personal excellence or defect, set in a definite place at the entry and accepting from the author its entire role—superimposed upon its own character and conduct—just so, it receives in the end its punishment and reward" (III, 2, 17). The same view-point is not at all unfamiliar to Indian metaphysics. In our time it was stressed particularly by Rabindranath Tagore who tried, in his *Sādhana*, to deduce it from old Vedāntic antecedents. It may be worth mentioning that Shri Aurobindo in his immanent analysis of the *Gītā*, com-

menting on the passage X, 18, came to the following conclusion: "Here the Gītā points at something that it does not express explicitly though it is often found in the Upaniṣads and was developed later on, in a greater intensity of vision by Viṣṇuism and Śāktism: the Joy Divine, a joy that man can reach in his mundane existence, the universal *ānanda*, the play of the Mother, the sweetness and the beauty of God's *līlā*."

Although Plotinus comes back in various connections to the moral aspect of the struggle and war, his argument remains concentrated just on this aspect whose importance in Indian literature, particularly in post-epic Hinduism, was enhanced by the *Vedānta* teaching on the illusory nature of the world (*māyā-vāda*).

The cult of beauty was pointed out in this connection by Radhakrishnan in the early Upaniṣads and even in the discourses of the Buddha. Thus, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV, 4, 4) we find the simile: "And as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold turns it into another, newer and more beautiful shape, even so does this self, after having thrown away this body and dispelled its ignorance, make unto himself another, newer and more beautiful shape, like that of the fathers or of the *gandhārvas*, or of the gods or of Prajāpati or of Brahmā or of other beings".

In an analogous meaning the smile of the garment can be found in other parts of the *Mahābhārata*: "Who goes over to yonder world must take off his body as a garment. Then, his soul becomes transparent from all sides to the penetrating eye of knowledge" (VII, 321, 54). P. Deussen singled out the analogy of this quotation with Plato's *Gorgia* (523 E).

This is also the meaning in which the analogy reappears in *Ennead* I (6, 7): "Therefore we must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of every Soul. Anyone that has seen This, knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful... To attain it is for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest themselves of all that we have put on it our descent: so, to those that approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry in nakedness—until, passing on the upward way, all that is other than the God, each in the solitude of himself shall behold that solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, the Unmingled, the Pure....the Source of Life and of Intellection and of Being."

In this passage the metaphor of the garment appears as a less important detail if compared with the central motive where the

principles of Intelligence and of Being are identified with the idea of Good and of Beauty. The postulate of their ideal harmony had been formulated by Plato, while several allusions to a harmonious trinity can be found in Plotinus. The quoted description brings us near to the idea of the supreme trinity, formulated in the above-mentioned frame of later Vedantism as *sat-cit-ānanda*. This formula, expressing the ideal state of mind, had not yet attained its final shape in the older Upaniṣads nor in the *Gītā*. However, the notion of *ānanda* appears there whenever Being (*Brahman*) and Consciousness (*Ātman*) are identified by the Upaniṣadic sages.

At the beginning of his first treatise on *Providence* (III,2,1) Plotinus establishes the following "relationship" of the same three attributes: "Intelligence or Being constitutes the authentic and primal Kosmos. This contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of the feebleness of division... In this Nature inheres all life and all intellect, a life living and having intellection as one act within a unity: every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content is its very own, for there is here no separation of thing from thing, no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest... Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest throughout and shows difference at no point. There is no action of one part upon another; there can be no reason for changing what is everywhere perfect. Why should Reason elaborate yet another Reason, or Intelligence another Intelligence? A power of producing by the Self is not indwelling to absolutely perfect beings. Beings produce and move themselves only by reason of some failure in quality. Those whose nature is all Blessedness have no more to do than to repose in themselves and be their being... But such is the Blessedness of this Being that in its very non-action it magnificently operates and in its self-dwelling it produces mightily."

The first identification is that of Intelligence and Being. So too in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads the identification of *Brahman* and *Ātman* is the basic postulate. This identical Being (*sat*) is the essential Truth (*satya*) of the universe, it is the First (*pūrva*), Inextended (*avyakta*), Undivided (*advaita*) so that it can be said: "*sa eṣo'ṇimā ātad ātmyam idam sarvam, tat satyam . .*"

In the explication of the idea of the unity and perfection of the intelligible world the most important detail for our comparison is the insistence, on both sides, on its immovability and immeasurability. The richest choice of attributes designating these absolute qualities can be found in the quoted analogies from the *Gītā*. In II, 24, it is called "fixed, allpervasive, constant, immovable, eternal" (*nityaḥ, sarvagataḥ, sthāṇur-acalo'yam syānātanah*). It is

obvious that the definition of the irrational character of the Absolute, mentioned in the next sentence of the *Gītā* (as *acintya* but *viditvā*), will possibly be no less explicit in the *Vedānta* than in the Plotinian metaphysical construction. Let us remember *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (I, 3, 10-11): "Beyond the senses are the objects, and beyond the objects is the mind; beyond the mind is the intelligence, and beyond the intelligence is the great self. Beyond the great self is the unmanifest; beyond the unmanifest is the spirit (*puruṣa*). Beyond the spirit there is nothing; that is the end, that is the final goal." According to Yājñavalkya (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV, 5, 15) the transcendence of the supreme principle of intelligence becomes evident in the impossibility of its positive definition: "That self is (to be described as) 'not this, not this' (*neti, neti*)... Indeed, by what would one know the knower?" - "This eternal greatness of *Brahman* is not increased by work, nor diminished" (*ibid* IV, 4, 23).

In this imperturbable integrity of Being and Intelligence is contained the supreme Bliss of the *Vedānta*. The most condensed expression of this trinity in its unique perfection is witnessed in the concluding sentence of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* III,9,28 as "*vijñānam ānandam brahma*". In the course of development of the philosophical terminology this designation had been gradually changed until the standardized formula *sat-cit-ānanda* was coined.⁷

III

The last sentence quoted from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, III, is the conclusion of one among many Upaniṣadic allegories on the tree of existence. There are three essential elements in those allegories. In our example they are expressed in the following terms:

"As the tree, king of the wood, so indeed is a man..."

"A tree when it is felled springs up from its root in a newer form; from what root does man spring forth when he is cut off by death?"

"When born, he is not born again, for who should create him again? *Brahman*, the knowledge, the Bliss is the final goal of him who offers gifts, as well as of him who stands firm and who knows it."

This theory of oneness of the world-soul was known to Plotinus and he takes a critical viewpoint of it in his tractate on *Fate* (III,1,4). There we find the first allegory of the tree: "Is it one Soul, penetrating all things and performing all acts? Is every separate phenomenon a member of the whole that moves in its place with the general movement?... Is it like in a plant whose principle is in the root, and

we are asked on that account to reason that not only the interconnection linking the root to all the members and every member to every other, but the entire activity and experience of the plant, as well, must be one organized overruling, a destiny of the plant? - But such an extremity of determination, a destiny so all-pervasive, does away with the very destiny that is affirmed: it shatters the sequence and cooperation of causes... If all that performs acts and is subject to experience constitutes one substance, if one thing does not really produce another thing under causes leading back continuously one to another, then it is not a truth that all happens by causes, since all beings constitute only one single being. Then we are not ourselves, nothing is our act, our thought is not ours, our decisions are the reasoning of something outside ourselves ...”

The central Upaniṣadic theory to whose deduction the simile of the tree is attached is Uddālaka Āruṇi's teaching on *tat tvam asi* in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI,8. The same subject, including the *sequel of examples* used to demonstrate the corresponding theory inspired the most extensive analogy in Plotinus, though in his writings the simile itself appears also in several other contexts.

It is necessary to remember that Yājñavalkya, who was a student with Uddālaka Āruṇi, repeats in a condensed form, in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV,5, the main tenets of his teacher Uddālaka on this subject, in order to connect therewith his own deduction of “*neti, neti*”.

Passages which will be compared here consist, on both sides of fairly condensed texts. In *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI, the conclusion concerning the identity of Being, “*tat tvam asi*”, is repeated in nine instances (para 8-16). Yājñavalkya, in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* V, took over from *Chāndogya* two of those examples: on the rivers and on the salt (12-13). In Plotinus the analogous deduction is condensed in para 10 of the 8th treatise in the *III Ennead* (on *Contemplation*). He mentions first the simile of the *rivers*, then follows that of the *tree*. In *Chāndogya* the first example refers to plants and animals in general (9), the next to rivers, the simile of the tree is the third, while the following are the seeds of *nyagrodha*—a typical symbol of the cosmic tree “growing upside down”, described also in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (XV, 1-3)—and then the lump of salt (13). The last three examples are taken from human life and are by far not so characteristic for the new method of reasoning as the first four.

In the chapter preceding the series of examples (8) the “root of beings” is mentioned, the supposition of the entire sequel being that “all these creatures have their root in Being, they have

Being as their abode, Being as their support". Plotinus concludes the paragraph preceding the homologous *similia* (9), with the statement: "Consequently, the One is none of these beings, it precedes all beings". From this view-point his imagination finds its approach to the ancient analogies of the rivers and their source, of the tree and its roots. No wonder that his conclusion appears analogous to Yājñavalkya's theory of "*neti, neti*".

Simile of the rivers

"These rivers flow the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west. They go just from sea to sea. They become the sea itself. Just as these rivers, while there, do not know: 'I am this one', 'I am that one', in the same manner all these creatures even though they have come forth from Being do not know that they have come forth from Being." (*Chând. Up. VI, 10*)

Plotinus: "Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they take, but remains always integrally as it was; The tides that proceed from it are at one within it before their several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what channels they will pour their streams." (*III Enn., 8, 10*)

Simile of the tree

"Of this mighty tree if someone should strike at the root it would bleed but still live: if someone should strike it at the middle, it would bleed but still live. If someone should strike at the top, it would bleed but still live. Being pervaded by its living self, it stands firm, drinking in its moisture and rejoicing. If the life leaves one branch of it, then it dries up; if it leaves a second, then it dries up; if it leaves the third, then it dries up. If it leaves the whole, the whole dries up... Verily, indeed, this body dies, when deprived of the living self, the living self does [not die. That which is the subtle essence this whole world has for its self..." (*Chând. Up. VI, 11*).

Plotinus: "Or think of the Life coursing throughout some mighty tree while it is the stationary Principle of the whole, in no sense scattered over all that extent but, as it were, vested in the root: it is the giver of the entire and manifold life of the tree, but remains unmoved itself, not manifold but the Principle of that manifold life, (*III Enn. 8, 10*)

In this second analogy a passage from the *V Ennead* (2,2), where Plotinus returns to the same topic, seems to reproduce more faithfully

the imaginative composition of the Upaniṣadic picture: "Looking more minutely into the matter, *when shoots or topmost boughs are lopped from some growing plant*, where goes the soul that was present in them? Simply, whence it came: soul never knows spatial separation and therefore is always within the source. If you cut the root to pieces, or burn it, where is the life that was present there? In the soul, which never went outside of itself."

"*Neti neti*"

In connection with the philosophical interpretation of these two metaphors by Plotinus it is interesting to extend the analysis of the homologous elements to the next simile in the *Chānd. Up.*, that of the seed, and also to the simile of the salt, as taken over by Yājñavalkya in *Bṛh. Up.* IV, 5, 13.

"...That subtle essence which you do not perceive, verily, from that very essence this great *nyagrodha* tree exists." (*Chānd. Up.* VI, 12)

"As a mass of salt is without inside, without outside, is altogether a mass of salt, even so is this Self, without inside, without outside, altogether a mass of intelligence only. Having arisen out of these elements (the Self) vanishes again in them. There is no more cognizance (*samjñā*)... That Self is (to be described only as) 'not this, not this.' *Bṛh. Up.* IV, 5, 13)

Plotinus: "Now when we reach the One — the stationary Principle in the tree, in the animal, in Soul, in the All — we have in every case the most powerful, the precious element: when we come to the One in the Authentically Existing Beings—their Principle and source of Potentiality—shall we lose confidence and suspect it of being nothing? Certainly this Absolute is nothing, *nothing of that whose source it is*. Its nature is that nothing can be affirmed of it — not existence, not essence, not life — since it is That which transcends all these. Abstract from Being in order to hold it! ..." (*III Enn.*, 8, 10)

IV

The uplift through contemplation or initiation into mysteries, interpreted in the *VI Ennead* (9, 11) as a return from the world of multiplicity to the original unity proceeds by three higher degrees of manifestation or emanation of the world (world-soul, Reason, Unity). It was mentioned above that Radhakrishnam had compared these three stages with the phases of awakening which, in the representational world of the Upaniṣads correspond to stages of dream.

In the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* the sphere of the waking state is called *vaiśvānara*. According to Śaṅkara's commentary it is so named because it "leads all creatures in diverse ways" of existential activities. The next state, *taijasa*, is that of dreaming. In it consciousness is limited to the "cognizance of internal states", since he who sleeps dreams "by his own brightness, by his own light; in that state the person becomes self-illuminated" (*Bṛh. Up.* IV, 3, 9). The third is the state of deep dreamless sleep. It is called the state of knowledge (*prajñā*) by identification, since the subject and the object have "become one" in the totality or "mass of knowledge full of bliss". "The fourth state" (*turiya*) is the ultimate state of the *Ātman*. According to *Māṇḍūkya Up.* it is "not that which cognizes the internal, not that which cognizes the external (objects) not what cognizes both of them, not a mass of cognition, not cognitive, not non-cognitive ... This is *Ātman*." The difference between the two latter stages, according to commentaries, is that the former still contains latent "seeds" of worldliness — the *logoi spermatikoi*, assumed in the same function by Plotinus.

The essential connotations of this "road of introversion", as Radhakrishnan designates it⁸ are given in the V *Ennead* (3, 8): "Even in our own sphere our vision is light or rather becomes one with the light, and it sees light for it sees colours. In the intellectual, the vision sees not through some organic medium but by and through itself alone, for its object is not external: by one light it sees another not through any intermediate agency; a light sees a light, that is to say a thing sees itself... Think of the traces of this light upon the soul, then say to yourself that such and more beautiful and broader and more radiant, is the light itself; thus you will approach to the nature of the Intellectual Principle and the Intellectual Realm... It is not the source of the generative life of the soul which, on the contrary, it draws inward, preserving it from such diffusion, holding it to the love of the splendour of its Prior. Nor does it give the life of perception and sensation..."

Efforts to overcome duality on this ground, in the case of Plotinus, have been stressed by Radhakrishnan, too. However, among several aspects of the *ideal adequation* of the three stages of identity, imperturbability and quietness (cf. III *Ennead*, 8. 5), we do not find in Plotinus any *imaginative adequation* to the peculiar subject of dream-consciousness. On the Indian side, a positive, almost creative power of "realization" had been attributed to the dream, so that the proceedings of the meditation (*samādhi*, *dhyaṇa*)

could be deduced directly therefrom. For Plotinus dream is a variegated picture of illusion, one of the imaginative elements of Indian *māyā* or *upādhi*.

The central comparative theme of this article would, however, remain incomplete if such aspects of partial and peripheric coincidences of the dream-motive were not also reconsidered as well.

In Brh. Up. IV, 3, 9 — quoted at beginning of this article — Yājñavalkya gives a description of the dream as a two-sided psychical power of internal illuminations. The awareness of the dream as pure phantasy is still very spontaneous, as if its philosophical prejudicing was just about to take some shape: "Verily, there are just two states of this person (the state of being in) this world and in the other world. There is an intermediate third state, that of being sleep. By standing in this intermediate state one sees both those states... Now whatever the way is to the state of being in the other world, having obtained that way one sees both the evils (of this world) and the joys (of the other world). When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up... In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself..." (id. 13).

The comparison of the dream with a mirror, in *Kāṭha Up.* (II,3,5), recalls another analogy to the idea of *māyā* in the III *Ennead*, though its illusoriness effects primarily the world of ancestors and of demons (*gandharva*) the same as in the last example quoted from Yājñavalkya: "As in a mirror, so in the soul, as in a dream, so in the world of the manes, as (an object) is seen in water, so in the world of the *gandharvas*; as shade and light in the world of *Brahmā*". — Plotinus (III, 6-7) compares "those who, on the evidence of thrust and resistance identify body with real being and find assurance of truth in the phantasms that reach us through the senses, to those who, like dreamers take for actualities the figments of their sleeping vision. The sphere of sense pertains to the Soul in its slumber, for all of the Soul that is in the body is asleep and the true getting-up without the body and not with it. In any movement that takes the body with it there is no more than a passage from sleep to sleep, from bed to bed. The veritable walking or rising is to abandon definitely the corporeal things." — "The Being that we imagine in the matter is no Being, but a passing play. All that seems to be present in it plays with us, it is only a phantasm within another phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending everything... images playing upon an image devoid of Form..."

In order to complete the range of analogies referring to the dream-motive, let us remember *Maitri Up.* (VI, 25) where the allegory of dream is connected to that of the "cavern of senses", the *tertium comparationis* being essentially the same as in the famous chapter from Plato's "Republic" (VII, 1): "And thus it has been said elsewhere: 'He who has his senses indrawn as in sleep, who has his thoughts perfectly pure as in dream, who, while in the cavern of the senses, is not under their control, perceives him who is called Prajāpati, the leader'."

V

The approach to the comparative analysis of the theory of contemplation in the preceding chapter brought us to a subject in which the adherence of imaginative elements to the central conception loses its strength and becomes accidental. In such cases *the frequency of fortuitous associations* may still indicate some prospective extension of analogies, or rather of *homologous trends in the development of ideas*. At this limit the *problem of differential analysis* arises also within the scope of our study.

Several authors have attempted to deduce from a phenomenological *analysis of the contemplative thought* differential criteria for a global delimitation, or rather discrimination, of European and Indian, or still better, of Eastern and Western philosophies. Contrary to such ambitions, the purpose of the following concluding considerations on the Philosophy of Plotinus is to add a specific example of differential analysis, not as a tentative contrary alternative to the preceding interpretation by doxographic analogies, but rather as their prospective extension.

Authors who have dealt with problems of the logic of cultural (or "moral") sciences in recent times—and they are not many°—agree that the comparative method can attain a wider scope and bring about results of essential importance only when it is directed to the investigation of common features. Pointing out of differences would never constitute the sufficient reason for a scientific method based on general principles. The comparative value of the differential analysis should therefore always be considered in its dependence on the basic meaning previously determined by the method of analogy.

At the beginning of chapter III, a problem of differential analysis was pointed out, referring to the theory of oneness of the world-soul. Essential difference in the conceptual *sub-stratum* had to be distinguished *within* the analogy of the imaginative representation used as a common example in the discussion of the metaphysical theory of identity.

There Plotinus criticized a popular oriental theory as it probably was transmitted by the Stoics. If we try to estimate the depth of his objective knowledge of such theories of foreign provenance—theories whose objective historical confrontation in the cultural sphere of Alexandria has to be taken for granted—then the comparison of two different examples of criticism to that effect, within his own philosophy, may reveal also some characteristics of our philosopher's own method.

Within the structure of the Plotinian system the theory of contemplation occupies the central position. By it his system obtained its specific place in the history of Western philosophy. The same problem re-acquired an equivalent value only when it was brought into the centre of a wider philosophical interest in modern comparative studies of Indian and European philosophies. Western interest in *yoga* and Buddhist meditation may confirm the actual importance of this topic also beyond our limits.

In this case, as in that mentioned above, the differential element should be considered as an essential *symptom of the depth* in which the analogy is rooted. It is obvious, and has often been stressed, that "philosophers almost never do describe the teaching of others in an objective and independent way, but rather interwoven in their own systems as proof and illustration".¹⁰ If comparative philosophy should just serve the purpose of discovering plagiarisms (as naive enthusiasts sometimes tried to do), then its own *raison d'être* would become null and void—another barren ideal of a negative philosophy.

The basic approach of Plotinus to the problem of contemplation results from a trend of thought which seems to proceed from a direction opposite to that which we would expect in the Indian system. He considers contemplation primarily as the process of world manifestation or emanation. Nevertheless, the opposite intention of the contemplative thought, that of liberation from duality and ignorance, is known to him as well, so that both courses merge ultimately in one "circuit": "Action, thus, is set towards contemplation and an object of contemplation... The Soul produces for the purpose of contemplation, in the desire of knowing all its contents... Thus once more, action is brought back to contemplation...in the course of its circuit, and ... the knowing faculty comes to identification with the object of its knowledge" (III, 8, 6). The Soul "refused to have the total intelligible Being simultaneously present", "it could not bear to retain within itself all the dense fullness of its possession". Therefore "time was produced by desire succession," and contemplation could "uncoil" in a twofold direction: "A Seed is at rest; the nature-principle within, uncoiling outwards, makes way towards what seems

to it a large life; but by that partition it looses...For the Kosmos moves only in Soul — the only space within the range of the All open to it to move in — and therefore its Movement has always been in the Time which inheres in Soul" (III, 7, 11), while "the addition introduces deprivation and deficiency" (III, 9, 7).

The orphic symbols of Seed and Serpent are associated, in the same passage of Plotinus, with reminiscences seeming more explicitly Vedic when connected with his theory of Time whose Iranian, *zurvanist*, inspiration could hardly be put in doubt. These seem to be the stages of the philosopher's ideal journey to the Indo-Iranian East, in space and time, up to the analogy of the Vedic Creation Hymn (R. V. X, 129): "But from the Divine Beings thus at rest within themselves, how did this Time first emerge? We can scarcely call upon the Muses to recount its origin *since they were not in existence then—perhaps not even if they had been*. The engendered thing, Time, itself, can best tell us how it rose and became manifest..."(l.c.)

In order to explain the appearance of the dual aspect of the world-process by his theory of creative contemplation Plotinus made use "indeed of a puzzling mass of various arguments and illustrations" and achieved, according to E. Bréhier, nothing more than "a paradox that he maintained for all the levels of Being"¹¹. This set of arguments may appear in a less puzzling light, if we compare the Indian, Advaita, version of his theory with the share of explicitly western traditions in it.

Without entering into further details, let us remember once more Yājñavalkya's description of the dream-consciousness as an intermediate state of existence and try to understand in the Upaniṣadic light the following conclusion of Plotinus: "It is not in the soul's nature to touch utter nothingness; the lowest descent is into evil and, so far, into non-being: but to utter nothing, never. When the soul begins to mount, it comes not to something alien but to its very self... self-gathered it is no longer in the order of Being, it is in the Supreme. There is thus a converse in virtue of which the essential man outgrows Being, becomes identical with the Transcendent of Being".

In the following quotation from the I *Ennead*, the state of contemplation is described not as spreading but as condensation of the "ray of attention" (to apply an adequate term from Husserl's phenomenology) in whose spotlight alone the world of duality can "uncoil"; the state of contemplation indicating the path of freedom, analogous to *samādhi* in its proper sense. In general lines this analogy can be reconnected also with the final part of the II *adhyāya* of the

Bhagavad Gītā and thus complete the thematic cycle of the first analogy quoted in this paper.

I *Ennead* (4, 9-12): "Wisdom is, in its essential nature, an Authentic-Existence, or rather is The Authentic-Existent and this Existent does not perish in one asleep or, to take the particular case presented to us, in the man out of his mind: the Act of this Existent is continuous within him; and is sleepless activity: the Sage, therefore, even unconscious, is still the Sage in Act... Consequently, the Sage arrived at this state has the truer fullness of life, life not spilled out in sensation but gathered closely within itself... pleasure that does not rise from movement and is not a thing of process, for all that is good is immediately present to the Sage and the Sage is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable."

Bhagavad Gītā, (II, 68-69): "Therefore whosoever has withdrawn on all sides the senses from the objects of sense, his mentality is stabilized. What is night for all beings, therein the man of restraint is awake; wherein other beings are awake, that is night for the Sage of vision."

The last two sentences quoted from Plotinus contain almost literally the essential elements of the stages of *dhyāna* in the Buddha's formulation: "... the second *dhyāna*, a state of joy and ease, born of the serenity of concentration, when no reasoning or investigation goes on ... Mindful and self-possessed he experiences in his body that ease which the *arhats* talk of when they say: 'The man serene and self-possessed is well at ease',: and so he enters into and abides in the third *dhyāna*."

We have considered the theory of contemplation as an example of differential analysis of analogous theories and, before that mentioned the criticism of Plotinus concerning a typically oriental theory of *pan-en-theism* with a view to confirming the conclusions drawn from the preceding analysis of the imaginative aspect in the structure of the Plotinian thought. Thus, the extension of analogies from occasional images to a homologous development of ideas represented by them reflects an intensive elaboration of homologous theories marked by critical distinction and specification of different possible solutions within their scope. Avoiding of superficial analogies that might suggest a syncretism in taking over bits and pieces appears evident. In the system of Plotinus consistent thinking to the end always corresponds to a coherent inspiration. Compared to typical eclectic influences of oriental views in other hellenistic schools, notably throughout the development of the Stoic philosophy, the system of Plotinus can be distinguished by the essential mark of its ideal analogies

with authentic Indo-Iranian traditions. To what extent a reliable knowledge of those sources—whose existence at Plotinus' times seems to be confirmed by recent research—may have contributed to the ideal harmony of his system, is a question to which a definite reply has not yet been given, though at the present state of studies it does not any longer seem to be definitely insoluble.

1. "Les relations extérieures de l'Inde (I)", "La doctrine bramannique à Rome au III^e siècle" — Pondicherry, Institut Français d'Indologie, 1956.

2. "The Principal Upaniṣads", London, 1953. p. 699-705.

3. Quotations from the Gītā are, in general lines, taken from F. Edgerton's translation, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 38, Cambridge, Mass., 1944. Those from Plotinus follow St. Mackenna's translation, London, 1917—1930. In both cases slight changes have been made where deemed necessary to the author, mainly for terminological reasons.

4. For the comparison with the actor cf. *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, 42: ... *prakṛter vibhūta-yogān naṣṭvād vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam*.

5. Cf. *Kaṣha Up.* II, 3, 17: ... *taṃ svāc-charīrāt pravṛthen-muñjādi veṣikāṃ dhairyena*.

6. The quotation is retranslated from the French version of Anilbaran Roy's "The Message of the Gītā as interpreted by Shrī Aurobindo".

7. This problem was studied very carefully by P. Deussen in his "Philosophy of the Upaniṣads" ("Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie" I, 2—Leipzig, 1922, 4th ed., pp. 115-133.)

8. l. c. 704.

9. Here I have in view mainly: P. Masson-Oursel, "La Philosophie Comparée", Paris, 1923; E. Rothacker, "Logik u. Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften" ("Handbuch der Philosophie", Abt. II), München, 1927; and E. Cassirer, "Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften", Göteborg, 1942.

10. F. Cumont, "Die Orientalischen Religionen im Römischen Heidentum"—Leipzig, Teubner, 1913, p. 13

11. E. Bréhier, French translation of the Enneads, III, 151.

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